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Opportunity for Choice

A goal for women in Canada

Gail C. A. Cook, Editor



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for Choice



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Gail C.A. Cook, Editor

Statistics Canada
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Foreword

This volume is provided by Statistics Canada as a contribution to International Women's Year and is designed to broaden understanding of the role of women in the Canadian economy by using analysts in several disciplines and data collected by Statistics Canada, the 1971 Census in particular. Just as the preparation of the book extended beyond International Women's Year, we hope that its contribution to an understanding of the role of women in the Canadian economy will generate discussion, and possibly action, long after 1975.

The project was initiated by the former Chief Statistician of Canada, Dr. Sylvia Ostry, who approached the executive director of the C. D. Howe Research Institute to explore the Institute's interest in accepting responsibility for producing such a volume on behalf of Statistics Canada. After agreement was reached that the interests of both Statistics Canada and the C. D. Howe Research Institute would be reflected in the volume, and upon Dr. Gail Cook's agreement to act as project director, a decision was made to proceed.

The objective was not only to blend information of interest to both organizations and their audiences but to expand these audiences to include the general reader who is interested in the subject but has no specialized background in the disciplines represented and who might not otherwise come directly into contact with the publications of either organization. We hope that the volume will be of interest both to professionals in the disciplines of demography, economics, law, sociology, and statistics and to those individuals with a particular interest in the place of women in our society.


The book is designed to contribute to Statistics Canada's objective of wider dissemination of its data and statistical analyses in the interest of improving understanding of social and economic issues and to the C. D. Howe Research Institute's objective of contributing to economic policy evaluation and comment. In particular, we hope that the volume will contribute to a broader discussion and knowledge of some of the policy options open to us as Canadians that may influence the respective roles of men and women in our society. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 reflect the particular interest of Statistics Canada, while Chapters 1, 5, and 6 combine statistical analysis with evaluation of policy options and issues to reflect the particular interests of the C. D. Howe Research Institute. The views expressed are, of course, those of the authors and not necessarily those of Statistics Canada or the C. D. Howe Research Institute.

Opportunity for Choice

We wish to thank the individual authors for their contributions to the book and to extend a particular expression of appreciation to Dr. Gail Cook of the C. D. Howe Research Institute, who directed the research, contributed to it as an author, and edited the volume. Without her dedication and willing efforts, the production of this book would not have been possible. We are grateful to Mr. Lorne Rowebottom for coordinating Statistics Canada's contribution to the study and to Dr. Leroy Stone for providing the liaison between the two organizations required to obtain the data for analysis. We also wish to thank other members of both the C. D. Howe Research Institute and Statistics Canada who assisted in various phases of preparation of the volume.



Peter G. Kirkham
Chief Statistician of Canada
Statistics Canada



Carl E. Beigie
Executive Director
C. D. Howe Research Institute



Preface

Opportunity for Choice: A Goal for Women in Canada contains the results of research undertaken especially for this book by authors who were chosen for their interest in the role of women in Canada and their expertise in their fields of research. Their contributions span the fields of demography, economics, law, and sociology and, taken together, provide a description, an explanation, and an evaluation of the changing pattern of women's participation in the family, in educational institutions, and in the labour force.

To permit readers to assess for themselves the evidence on the changing patterns of women in Canadian society, many of the raw data are provided in tables. Since our objective is to present the authors' analysis of the data in the simplest fashion consistent with accuracy, results of specialized techniques are either found in appendices or deleted altogether when they simply confirm the results of simpler procedures.

The book goes beyond description and interpretation to the evaluation of the evidence presented. Accordingly, it begins with a criterion (Chapter 1) by which the patterns of women's participation in the home (Chapter 2), in educational institutions (Chapter 3), and in the labour force (Chapter 4) and the policy options for changing these patterns (Chapter 5) can be assessed (Chapter 6).

The undertaking of a study from the initial proposal to publication requires the cooperation and assistance of many people in addition to the authors. I am grateful to Sylvia Ostry, who, in her capacity as a labour economist, commented on research outlines; to the following for reviewing, on behalf of the editor, the research outlines or draft chapters in their fields of specialization: Gail Brent, Tom Courchene, Jane Banfield Haynes, Judith Maxwell, Caroline Pestieau, Pierre-Paul Proulx, David Stager, and John Vanderkamp; and to Elizabeth Humphreys for research assistance. Carl Beigie and Leroy Stone provided cogent comments on each chapter of the draft manuscript. The administrative skills and flexibility of Lorne Rowebottom at Statistics Canada ensured the smooth progress of the joint project. The graphic design of the book was undertaken by the Information Division, Statistics Canada.

I wish to thank J. G. Stinson and his staff in the Data Dissemination Division, Statistics Canada, for meeting the project demands for detailed data requests; Byron Spencer and his assistants at McMaster University for meeting the project requirements from the Public Use Sample Tape; D. D. Rosenbloom of Labour Canada for data on collec-

tive agreements; Gregory Jump for simulations using the University of Toronto TRACE econometric model; and Samuel Rea, Jr., for simulations using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances.

The manuscript was handled by the Institute's staff. Gennifer Sussman assisted editorially in abbreviating the manuscript, and Constance Parsons and Ann Pate, through their great care, assisted in achieving consistency within the English manuscript and between the English and French versions (translated by the Translation Company of North America), a task the dimensions of which only we can appreciate. In addition, my work as author and editor was undertaken in an atmosphere of challenge created by the Institute's secretarial staff, whose participation in, and enthusiasm for, the project proved to be a vital force.

And finally, my gratitude to two individuals who really know the meaning of opportunity for choice — Ina H. and W. H. Cook.

G. C. A. C.

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Opportunity for Choice: A Criterion

Gail C.A. Cook*

Suppose you were asked to create the traditions and institutions defining the rights and responsibilities of women and men in a new society. Suppose, in addition, that you had an equal probability of being born into that new society as a male or female. Would you create a society and an economy in which the opportunities, responsibilities, and rewards associated with the family, the educational system, and the labour market were shared by women and men in the same manner as they are today?

The above question places this study of selected economic and social patterns of women in Canada firmly in the context of a society based on the economic and social cooperation of its members. In addition, it focuses attention on Canadian traditions and institutions as they influence how the advantages and disadvantages of this cooperation are distributed among Canadians and, in particular, between women and men. In this context, many so-called women's issues, such as availability of child care and part-time work, are more properly viewed as human or social issues arising from the distribution of benefits and costs of social cooperation between men and women in Canada.

Our focus on social cooperation as it takes place between the sexes, and not only among individuals, suggests the view that some of the benefits and costs of this cooperation may be associated with one's sex. It does not, however, suggest that women or men are homogeneous groups of individuals with identical aspirations, opportunities, and limitations. Attitudes and behaviour of people, whether men or women, vary according to social, economic, ethnic, and educational backgrounds and, within these groups, according to personal temperament, goals, particular family influences, opportunity, and luck. Since women differ from each other, according to both circumstances and personal characteristics, it is understandable that any one avenue of social change is unlikely to fulfill the demands of all women, any more than of all men, in Canada. Moreover, specific changes may make some women better off, and other women worse off, than they are now. These observations underline the importance of examining, in subsequent chapters, both the similarities and the dif-

ferences in women's circumstances, attitudes, and patterns of participation in the home and in the labour force.

To go beyond a description to an explanation of the key patterns exhibited by women requires recognition of the general context in which women's contributions to society take place and are evaluated. Quite simply, many of the problems, as well as many of the opportunities, for women in Canada are associated with the mixed capitalistic-governmental nature of our economy — an economy in which, for the most part, only paid productive activity is recognized in measures of economic output, in which success tends to be rewarded by income, and in which status tends to be measured by income.

Other characteristics of this mixed economy must also be recognized if fruitful avenues for public policy change are to be initiated. That is, our mixed economy is based on private business decisions which are guided by profits, but which operate within governmental rules and regulations and are therefore subject to influence by appropriate government incentives. Consequently, proposed policy actions to make private decisions consistent with publicly professed notions of justice must be tied into the incentive system to which private decision-makers respond.

Opportunity for Choice: A Criterion

The basic dilemma involved in the statistical evaluation of women's position in the Canadian economy and society is that the same evidence can be interpreted quite differently by different observers. To some, the evidence will reflect primarily the preferences of women, while to others it will reflect primarily the constraints faced by women. As a result, it is necessary to move beyond analysis of the data to present both a criterion against which to evaluate current patterns and a goal providing a focus for proposals for change.

Recognizing that alternative criteria and goals could be selected, we have chosen a criterion and a goal based on the concept of opportunity for choice. Specifically, the criterion chosen is equal opportunity for choice for women and men in Canada, a condition that would be met if the whole range of advantages and disadvantages or costs and benefits of particular choices were unrelated to one's sex.¹ Alternately stated, equal opportunity for choice would characterize Canadian society if the whole range of emotional and financial burdens and rewards of participating in society, exclusive of pregnancy and childbirth, were unrelated to one's sex. Closely related to this criterion is our goal for society: to expand the range of effective choices available to Canadians so that the costs and benefits associated with particular choices are not dependent upon one's sex.

The opportunity-for-choice criterion and goal make quite clear that the objective of social policy should not be to dictate to Canadians what their choices should be. Rather, the objective is to place women and men on an equal footing in society by eliminating the association

between one's sex and the costs and benefits of particular choices. Achieving this objective would move us closer to an environment in which each individual pursues his or her own route through life more in accord with his or her own particular nature, aspirations, and abilities than with social expectations associated with his or her sex.

Evidence, for example, that particular job opportunities are much less available to one sex or that the costs and benefits from pursuing a course of action are systematically higher for one sex than the other would indicate failure to meet the standard. Yet scattered evidence that some women and some men have made choices not typical of their sex does not necessarily indicate that the standard has been achieved. Such evidence may indicate only that some women and some men have been willing to bear a disproportionate cost relative to members of the other sex undertaking the same activity.

Use of the opportunity-for-choice criterion or goal rules out a comparison of male and female patterns of activity with the implicit assumption that the pattern for males is the standard against which the pattern for women should be judged. It is not clear, for example, that the predominant pattern of men in the home and the labour force reflects true opportunity for choice for them, even though their predominant pattern is more highly regarded, in some highly articulate quarters, than that for women. Men's behaviour should not for that reason be used as a standard against which to judge the progress of women. Moreover, using men's participation in the home and the labour force as a standard for women locks women into the position of duplicating the patterns of men instead of creating new alternatives for achieving self-fulfillment while contributing to the family, the economy, and society.

The opportunity-for-choice criterion also leads us beyond the narrow economic argument that any pattern of male and female participation in our major institutions is automatically appropriate because it reflects rational decisions of men and women in response to the opportunities and financial rewards facing them. As long as some of these opportunities and rewards are systematically associated with one's sex alone, equal opportunity for choice does not exist. The narrow economic rationalization indicates only that in the light of their options, it may pay most women to make different decisions than most men. Why this may be so is addressed in the chapters that follow.

Opportunity for Choice: Some Issues

One of the main features of the opportunity-for-choice criterion is its applicability to all alternatives facing women and men. Consistent with this feature, we examine selected issues raised in using the criterion to assess women's position in three situations: where their primary commitment is made to family life, where a major commitment is made both to family life and to labour force participation, and where their primary commitment is to the labour force. In discussing the issues

involved, we suggest the types of costs and benefits associated with these particular choices and question the extent to which they may be also associated with gender. These questions provide a basis for examining the statistical evidence and assessing government policy in subsequent chapters.

Family Life

Many women and few men have in the past undertaken the responsibility of full-time homemaker. Why? Do the costs and benefits of choosing the homemaker role vary according to one's sex? An obvious explanation of the division of work responsibilities within the home is that decisions in the home are to a great degree governed by options outside the home. Thus the traditionally higher earning capacity of the male could explain the familiar pattern of shared responsibility in the home and in the labour force. It is not at all clear, however, that this explanation is sufficient. In families where the differential in earning capacity of husband and wife is small, we tend to observe increased participation by the wives in the labour force, or continuation of the familiar pattern of the woman as homemaker, but rarely the situation where the husband becomes the homemaker and the wife participates in the labour force.

Such observations suggest that social attitudes point strongly in the direction of women's fulfilling the homemaker role and men's fulfilling the income-earning role. This evidence is consistent with attitudes more favourable towards women's participation in the labour force in addition to fulfilling their primary responsibility in the home, and attitudes less favourable towards men's fulfilling the homemaker role as their primary responsibility. The evidence is also consistent, however, with the view that a full-time homemaker role is difficult for men or women and, for that reason, not one that will be chosen by men, especially in face of the social attitudes against it. Under current circumstances, it is difficult to separate these two motivations for men's avoiding the homemaker role.

Evidence in this book suggests that women are increasingly curtailing their lifelong wife-housewife-mother roles in various ways, even though they are continuing to marry at the same rate and perhaps at a slightly younger age. This adaptation reflects a response to a number of factors: more tolerant attitudes towards women who do not play the full-time wife-housewife-mother roles; increased opportunities outside the family; and economic pressures for two income earners in the family. For all except one indicator of the wife-housewife-mother roles — childlessness — the evidence indicates that many women are limiting the time devoted to these roles and not rejecting the roles themselves. In spite of these trends, then, women are committing appreciable amounts of time and energy to family life, and many continue to do so on a full-time basis. It is therefore important to

examine the financial position of the homemaker and particularly the full-time homemaker.

Homemakers perform productive work in a form that is not directly remunerated but is indirectly rewarded through voluntary sharing of the earnings of labour force participants. Apart from voluntary stipulation, by a couple, of joint ownership, the law, in general, recognizes only cash payments as constituting a claim to ownership of the assets built up during a marriage. Clearly, to recognize only that work remunerated in the form of cash constitutes an inequity for any homemaker, whether woman or man. Consistent with this narrow definition of work is the widespread view that the man is the primary worker in the labour force and the woman is the homemaker (and perhaps the secondary worker in the labour force). Against this background, it is not surprising to hear that the woman in the home "does not work" and is economically dependent rather than to hear that she works at a different kind of job and, in so doing, provides economic support to the labour force participant.

What constitutes work is the central issue and, in particular, whether unpaid work is to be recognized as work in the law and in society generally. If it is to be recognized, what is the best way of achieving this recognition, consistent with society's other goals?

Dual Jobs

A larger percentage of women of all ages are increasingly participating in the labour force and thereby taking on dual roles in the home and in the labour force, a pattern long associated with men. Whether women's increased employment reflects primarily emancipation from the home, the attraction of interesting opportunities outside the home, or simple economic necessity, the basic issue is whether the costs and benefits of dual jobs are any different for women than for men.

Suggestive evidence on the costs of undertaking dual roles is available from two quite different sources: surveys of total hours worked in the home and in the labour force by married couples and attitudes towards women participating in the labour force as revealed in Canadian Gallup polls. Surveys indicate that married women who are full-time participants in the labour force work more hours each week in the home and labour force combined than do their husbands.² In addition, the type of work undertaken by women and men in the home differs significantly. Married women spend the vast majority of their work time in the home on tasks that must be performed regularly each day, while their husbands tend to perform tasks over which they have more discretion in timing.³

In addition, women face a far less tangible but very real cost to participation in the labour force in the form of a general climate of opinion against such activity, a climate capable of imposing costs in terms of guilt or other emotional strain. Responses to Gallup poll questions in 1960 and 1970 reflect an increasing acceptance of mar-

ried women with no children taking a job, but even in 1970, 15 percent of respondents were against such women taking a job outside the home.⁴ Responses to a more general question proposed in 1973 underline the uneasiness of a large proportion of Canadians concerning dual jobs for women. These respondents were confronted with the following statement: "There are more married women — with families — in the working world than ever before," and the following question: "Do you think this has a harmful effect on family life, or not?" Sixty-two percent of male, and 57 percent of female, respondents felt that women's participation in the working world had a harmful effect on family life.⁵

When the homemaker role includes that of parent of young children, the differential cost of women's and men's dual jobs becomes even more apparent. That the man will participate in the labour force is taken for granted. The effective choice is not child care by the mother, by the father, or by a parent-substitute, but, rather, child care by the mother or a mother-substitute. As a result, the emotional burden of making the decision to leave children with someone other than the child's own parents tends to be borne by the mother. This burden is exacerbated by much conventional wisdom indicating that children suffer mentally, emotionally, and even physically when their mothers are employed outside the home. This view persists in spite of repeated studies of the effects of maternal employment on children, which, taken as a body of literature, indicate that the characteristics of children with mothers in the labour force do not differ significantly from those with mothers who are not in the labour force.⁶ In those cases where there are differences, results tend to be quite evenly divided between those favouring children of mothers in the labour force and those favouring the children of mothers who stay at home.

Responses to the Canadian Gallup poll questions portray quite clearly the social climate facing women with young children who are assessing whether to participate in the labour force. As recently as 1970, 80 percent of respondents indicated that married women should not take a job outside the home if they have young children.⁷

Two important conclusions can be drawn from the evidence contained in Canadian Gallup polls. First, the very nature of the questions posed, which focus on the woman's importance to the home and family, with no parallel questions on the man's contribution, illustrates how significantly we differentiate our expectations of men and women with respect to family roles. Second, women who may wish to undertake major commitments to both family and the labour force face a different set of options and social pressures than men with the same interests. The decision to raise a child does not involve the same tough choices and consequences for a father as for a mother, even if we ignore childbirth itself.

This background makes it quite clear why availability of part-time work and provision of more adequate day care become identified as

women's issues, since by social assumption it is women who adjust their labour force commitments to accommodate their family roles and it is women who must find the mother-substitute for their children. Although the dilemma facing many women is clear, there is no clear consensus concerning the appropriate role of public policy in encouraging such possible solutions as more opportunity for part-time work or broader subsidization of day-care facilities.

Labour Market

An assessment of women's opportunity for choice in the labour market requires an examination of hiring, job assignment (including training), and remuneration decisions, three potential areas where distinctions could be made on the basis of sex alone. A judgment as to how much effective choice and how much discrimination are reflected in the patterns of women in the labour force requires identification of those factors that society considers legitimate as a basis for differentiating among individuals. Next, one must ask whether restricting differentiation to these factors alone is consistent with the legitimate goals of employers, who are in a position to make distinctions. If the two are not in harmony, what is the role of public policy in making private decisions consistent with publicly professed social attitudes? To the extent that public policy is utilized, should the cost of bringing individual and social decisions into line be placed on Canadians generally or on employers?

For the most part, we accept the characteristics that are thought to make the employee more productive to the enterprise as constituting a legitimate basis for distinguishing among people of the same or different sex. These include such employee characteristics as experience, proven capability in other jobs, education, and training. Although there may be little dispute over use of these factors to differentiate among individuals, there is a real question as to whether some additional group or class attributes can be legitimately used to distinguish among individuals, even if these attributes may affect a firm's productivity. Should, for example, the potential work life of a woman entering the labour force for the first time be estimated by the employer on the basis of the record of other women? To judge a woman's probability of continuing in the labour force on the basis of the experience of all women, most of whom do not pursue full-time, full-life labour force commitments, makes it difficult for the pioneer women who are diverging from the group norm. Yet employers must make decisions under conditions of uncertainty and are in a position to reduce this uncertainty to some degree by making decisions on the basis of probabilities drawn from group experience. For example, there are some combinations of group characteristics such as age and sex that may have affected an establishment's turnover and productivity in the past. Consequently, to define opportunity for choice with respect to an individual's record alone may be to ask the em-

ployer to forget his own past experience with employees in making decisions that could affect productivity. To regard any differentiation on the basis of group characteristics as discriminatory makes it highly likely that employer actions and socially professed values will be inconsistent, and this makes resolution through government action necessary.

There is much less agreement concerning the motive for discrimination on the part of employers that goes beyond factors affecting productivity and profit. In partial response to this question of motive, a useful distinction has been drawn between erroneous and deliberate discrimination — the former covering employers who have incorrect or no information on women's abilities and overlook them on a consistent basis for that reason, and the latter reflecting a distinct preference for males over females.⁸ The inadequate information at the root of erroneous discrimination may arise from what is perceived to be a relatively recent commitment of women to the labour force as well as from their very small representation in certain occupations and low levels of responsibility within numerous fields. It appears that the potential for altering decisions based on erroneous discrimination is high, if better information can be provided. The most powerful source of this information is women's increasing participation in various parts of the labour force. As this increased involvement comes about, the myths of women as failures or women as superstars will not be so readily generalized to all women on the basis of a very few examples.

Unless one is to attribute some peculiar characteristics to all employers, their deliberate discrimination must, in turn, reflect the preferences of their employees or consumers of their product, especially if contact is required with the general public. Some supporting evidence is provided by the results of the Gallup polls in Canada. As late as the mid-1960s, the majority of respondents expressed preference for a male boss.⁹ Moreover, in response to the question, "Do you think married women should be given equal opportunity to compete for the jobs, or do you think employers should give men the first choice?," over one-half of the respondents thought that employers should give men first chance.¹⁰ It is also significant to note that responses to such questions showed little difference according to the respondent's sex. Unfortunately, identical questions were not sustained in polls taken in the 1970s. Responses to related questions in 1971 led one analyst to conclude, with some qualifications, that "the results of the 1971 poll suggest that traditional views and barriers to opportunity still exist, but that *if* a woman works and *if* she does the same kind of work, Canadians believe that she should be as equally paid as her male counterpart."¹¹

This evidence from the Gallup polls suggests that employers may well be caught in a squeeze between what are publicly professed attitudes against discrimination and the social attitudes that they meet in practice. Public policy through sanctions or incentives can be

applied, but at the base is a set of attitudes which, if changed, would avoid the need for much of this policy. If public policy is to be adopted in the hope that attitudes making such policy unnecessary may evolve, there is a real question as to how to achieve results. The most practical approach appears to be to treat employers as agents of society.

Having addressed the difficulties of defining discrimination, the inconsistency between publicly professed attitudes against discrimination, and the attitudes that are met in practice, the final problem is that of obtaining credible evidence on discrimination in hiring, job-assignment, and remuneration decisions. There is very little systematic data analysis on hiring and job-assignment decisions because the reasons for acceptance and rejection of job candidates and for job-assignment decisions are seldom made public. Some observers are encouraged by this lack of information to believe that most women are biologically or temperamentally incapable of performing certain tasks or, less fundamentally, that social conditioning has not encouraged the development of the skills required to perform them. Evidence presented in this book suggests that male-female differentials in basic visual-spatial abilities are insufficient to explain the male-female differentials in representation in a profession requiring these abilities, such as architecture. This type of evidence, combined with that on women's increasing involvement in post-secondary education, suggests that reasons for women's small representation in selected professions reflect not only discrimination but also a broader type of social conditioning affecting definition of roles. Other observers, in the absence of better information, examine the effect of hiring, job-assignment, and remuneration decisions as reflected in male and female patterns of participation by job category and occupational grouping and conclude that any differential is bad. Our opportunity-for-choice criterion, in contrast, requires a specification of the reasons for hiring, job-assignment, and remuneration decisions, which, in turn, requires information often not available in a form for scientific testing.

Against these difficulties, a true understanding of the extent of discrimination should incorporate the tenor of some very powerful anecdotal or case-by-case evidence where detailed information is available. Although such evidence is not amenable to statistical analysis and therefore not presented in this book, we recognize that selected pieces of anecdotal evidence also have a story to tell.

At the same time, much of the story told by the more objective study of group experience is affected by the basic assumptions and methodology used in the analysis. For this reason, some of the qualifications associated with the more advanced statistical analyses are pointed out, using the example of estimates of discrimination between men and women in the form of earnings differentials.

The most powerful means of establishing the existence of earnings discrimination is to examine the relative earnings of women and

men within a particular job classification within the same establishment. Although such information would ensure that the employer regards male and female employees as equally productive, data are seldom available to make possible such a careful analysis. The alternative approach is to estimate qualitatively or quantitatively the contribution of various factors considered legitimate in accounting for earnings differentials between men and women — and to attribute the remaining difference to discrimination. The type of analysis undertaken to establish the component of earnings differentials resulting from discrimination should, in itself, be subjected to scrutiny. For example, the total effect of some people working part-time and others full-time should not be attributed to discrimination. At the same time, to exclude all part-time workers from the analysis ignores the potential effect of lower earnings (on a prorated basis) by part-time workers than by full-time workers. Since women constitute a majority of part-time workers, they bear a greater share of any discrimination towards these workers.

In addition, it is also legitimate to make some adjustment in the overall earnings gap for the fact that some occupations are rewarded more than others in our society, whether they are undertaken by men or by women. Accordingly, some of the earnings differential arising from the uneven distribution of men and women among occupations should be accepted. To assume, as do some studies, that the entire differential is legitimate, however, results in none of the potential discrimination in job assignment being reflected in earnings differentials. Similarly, if all earnings differentials arising from different levels of training are considered legitimate, earnings differentials cannot reflect the possibility that women are not given the same opportunities for on-the-job training as men.

While there are difficulties in obtaining accurate measurements of such factors, there are still other potentially critical factors that are excluded from these studies altogether because they are not quantifiable. As an example, the climate of expectations and encouragement facing women in the labour force may be important in explaining some of the male-female patterns of participation. More specifically, the office messenger (usually male) and the typist (usually female) can look forward to quite different encouragement in many establishments. Moreover, to extend the career horizons for a competent woman from the secretarial to the management stream requires an awareness of potential in women and a willingness to harness it that relatively few Canadian decision-makers seem to exhibit.

Although some elements of a complete picture of opportunity for choice in the Canadian labour force are not readily expressible in quantitative terms, evidence presented in this book leaves little doubt that many women are treated differently from men in the Canadian labour market. The major issue facing public policy is how to assist in achieving equal treatment of women and men in the labour force

when decisions in the labour market merely reflect attitudes that are widely held in society. Although it is impossible to legislate attitudes, it is possible to legislate certain types of benefits from labour force participation and to do so in a fashion more likely to bring success than do some existing provisions, as shown in our discussion of policy.

Opportunity for Choice: The Book

In the process of addressing these issues, *Opportunity for Choice: A Goal for Women in Canada* describes, analyzes, and evaluates women's participation in the family, educational institutions, and the labour force. These particular patterns of participation were chosen on the basis of two criteria: that data be available from Statistics Canada and that the subject matter reflect family, education, and work patterns of most Canadians. For example, the important contribution of psychology in explaining the preferences, attitudes, and responses of women and men to family and work situations was excluded on the basis of the first criterion, and the criminal activity of women was omitted on the basis of the second criterion.

Since these patterns of participation take place in an environment shaped by public policy, the effectiveness of existing policies in achieving opportunity for choice and the implications of proposed policies are examined. Again, to limit the task, only those policies affecting women and their work in the home and labour force were included, with priority given to policies not analyzed extensively elsewhere.

Economists, sociologists, and a lawyer have contributed to the book. It is the combination of the interrelated social, economic, and legal factors identified by the authors that is critical in explaining how and why women and men participate in the home, educational institutions, and the labour force in the manner they do. In a complex society, these factors may be simultaneously both causes and consequences of patterns of participation and must therefore be analyzed one at a time. Accordingly, factors such as fertility, educational attainment, and labour force participation are the subjects of analysis in one chapter and are factors used to explain other patterns in the remaining chapters.

Within this general context, the book has the following objectives:

- To present recent evidence on the participation of women and men in major institutions in Canadian society, such as marriage, the family, the educational system, the labour market, and government.
- To present new research evidence contributing to an understanding of the factors affecting these patterns of participation.
- To analyze changes in these institutions that would contribute to extending the opportunity for effective choice.

Within the above set of objectives, priority has been given to the following:

- Analysis of Canadian rather than international experience.
- Analysis of the decisions of Canadians as influenced by their different social, cultural, and economic backgrounds rather than of specific case studies of various minority or ethnic groups.
- Analysis of a common data source (1971 Census) for much of the demographic, educational, and work-pattern chapters, supplemented, where useful, from other sources.

Notes

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¹ The opportunity-for-choice criterion, as used here, applies only to comparisons between the two sexes and is not intended to imply that if our conditions were fulfilled, equal opportunity for choice would have been attained for all socio-economic, ethnic, or other groups.

² S. Meis and J. Scheu, "All in a Day's Work: A Time Budget Analysis of the Daily Activities of Men and Women," VUSP Report No. 4, mimeographed (Vancouver: Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia, 1973).

³ Elizabeth Humphreys, "Role Bargaining: A Means of Adaptation to Strain within Dual Work Families," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1974.

⁴ Monica Boyd, "Equality Between the Sexes: The Results of Canadian Gallup Polls, 1953-1973," revision of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association, August, 1974, Table 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ T. Taveggia and E. Thomas, "Latchkey Children," *Pacific Sociological Review* 14 (1974).

⁷ Boyd, *op cit.*, Table 4.

⁸ Ronald Oaxaca, "Sex Discrimination in Wages," in O. Ashenfelter and A. Rees, eds., *Discrimination in Labor Markets* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

⁹ Boyd, *op cit.*, Table 2.

¹⁰ Boyd, *op cit.*, Table 3.

¹¹ Boyd, *op cit.*, pp. 14-15.

2

Family: Functions, Formation, and Fertility

Monica Boyd, Margrit Eichler, John R. Hofley*

Within the last hundred years the Canadian family has undergone significant changes. These changes are mainly due to urbanization, new technology, and an expansion of opportunities for paid employment for women. The most obvious effect of these changes on the family is the transition of the family from both a production and a consumption unit to primarily a consumption unit. In rural frontier North America family members produced together the goods necessary for their survival; with progressing industrialization this characterization is no longer valid for an ever increasing portion of the population.

In urban areas the family is no longer the primary production unit — family members no longer jointly produce the goods for family survival. Instead, one or more members of the family work for pay, and the entire family lives on the money earned. In other words, the family consumes together.

This most fundamental of all changes through which the family has recently passed has affected each member of the family in a different fashion.

The husband-father role has experienced the least change. In an agricultural setting, the husband-father was, together with other family members, the family's provider. Today, the husband-father is more often the sole provider for the entire family. Although the strain of carrying this financial responsibility may be considerable, the adult-male family role has not changed appreciably in its nature.

Children have become more dependent. Compulsory education and child-labour laws prohibit children and adolescents from earning sufficient money to become self-sufficient, and their labour is seldom a necessary part of the family's production.

The woman's three roles of wife, mother, and housewife have undergone drastic changes. While the work of the farm wife was, and still is, physically demanding, the modern urban housewife performs less physically exhausting work. At the same time, industrialization has created the potential for socio-psychological problems for the housewife that are unique to this new situation. Most important, every com-

ponent of the housewife role can, nowadays, be purchased on the market, making the housewife replaceable. The wife and mother roles have undergone other changes.

It is generally acknowledged that the contribution of the farm wife to the family enterprise, although different from that of her husband, was as necessary to the running of the farm as that of the husband. Early urban housewives also performed physically demanding (and specialized) services that could not be purchased or that were available only at prices few could afford.

Technology has greatly improved the nature of housework: modern appliances have greatly reduced the amount of hard physical labour; modern cleaning agents have lightened the cleaning process, and new materials have made the care of clothes easier; refrigerators, freezers, and automatic stoves have radically changed the process of shopping for, storing, and preparing food; and electrical washing machines have eased one of the most arduous household tasks.¹

With all these changes, one might expect that housewifery has become a more enjoyable and desirable job. Yet in the face of all these positive changes, housewives are confronted with the challenge of responding to new problems and opportunities.

The first remarkable fact is that housewives spend as much time as ever on their housework. Although the quality and the type of work performed have changed, the quantity of time spent on this work has not decreased.² In addition, the significance of their work has changed dramatically. The same technology that has lightened housework has also made each component of it replaceable. The two main activities in which visible products were produced — sewing and cooking — have become less essential. Most people buy ready-made clothes, and more and more people use prepared foods. Cleaning services can be purchased, transportation can be provided by public transportation systems, delivery services can deliver purchased items, and so on. In short, full-time housekeeping has become optional for family survival, and the services rendered by housewives have become replaceable.

While the physical burden and the significance of various household tasks have been reduced, child care has taken on a much greater role for women, either as a response to the possibilities for reducing the demands of other roles or as a reaction to changes in societal perceptions of parental responsibilities. Mothers are being told that they are indispensable for the care of their young children;³ at the same time it has been suggested that they can produce near perfect children if they will adopt the right socialization techniques. Problem children are no longer identified as naturally bad or imperfect children, as may have been the case in the past, but are identified as a result of poor parental performance, especially on the part of the mother. An ideology of the potential perfectability of children, combined with an urban physical environment increasingly inhospitable to

children, has placed increased pressures on mothers. In most urban areas, small children cannot be permitted to play unsupervised in unenclosed areas because of heavy traffic and other hazards. This change in the residential environment has brought the mother and the small child into much closer physical proximity, so that there is little escape for either if the mother is a full-time housewife and the child does not attend a day-care centre.

Modern technology, which has produced the many appliances that are now standard equipment in most households, has isolated the housewife. If one can perform all the necessary household actions within one's own home, it is easy for contacts with other adults, except with the husband, to dwindle. The lack of institutionalized contact with other adults has resulted in many housewives finding themselves living vicariously through their husbands and children.

Finally, while in an agricultural setting the spouses were economically dependent on each other, the modern full-time housewife is economically dependent on her husband. As a result, her bargaining position vis-à-vis her husband has deteriorated. This loss is recouped, however, when she has an independent income.⁴

In sum, the "traditional" housewife is, in fact, a brand-new creature. In her new situation, today's housewife faces new strains as well as new opportunities to be freed from the constrictions of the conventional duties of the housewife. Women who perceive the strains of the full-time housewife and mother roles might be expected to adapt by opting out of the normal nuclear family, with its attendant female roles, either through avoiding marriage altogether or through desertion, separation, or divorce; by curtailing their full-time, life-long housewife and mother roles by limiting the number of children; by remaining childless; by seeking and accepting paid employment; or simply by acquiescing to the new situation with or without ensuing mental problems.⁵

Social, economic, and political changes in the larger society have made it easier for women to curtail their family roles and participate in activities outside the family circle. Attitudes are changing, divorce has become easier, and homemakers' services and job counselling services for women entering the labour force are now becoming available. Most important, employment opportunities in the paid labour force are expanding. The availability of such options constitutes a significant change in the overall position of women. At the same time it must be recognized that the greater acceptance of women's participation in the labour force is placing further pressures upon the woman who chooses to be a full-time housewife. Increasingly, the example of married women who combine labour force participation with the housewife role is visible around her. In this way the value of her full-time work in the home is called even more into question.

Our main purpose in this chapter is to examine evidence at the aggregate level that points towards a change in marital behaviour of

women, indicating possible adaptation to the changes in the functions of the family members that have taken place in recent decades. We employ two different methods to identify and partially explain such changes in behaviour patterns. First, we look at trends towards avoidance of the marital role by examining marriage rates, age at marriage, divorce and remarriage rates, and illegitimacy. Then we look for behaviour patterns that indicate a curtailment of the full-time, life-long mother and housewife roles by examining trends in the labour force participation of married women and mothers, fertility rates, postponement of births, and childlessness. Finally, we try to identify different subgroups of women who vary in terms of their average number of children and labour force participation. Multivariate analysis allows us to identify the relative importance of specific factors in explaining these variations.

Changes in Marital Behaviour over Time

Differences in Family Formation over Time

If, indeed, the family has changed as markedly as has been suggested above, one might expect that people, and women in particular, would have become more reluctant to enter marriage. We have therefore examined marriage rates over the two decades to 1971 and changes in the age of marriage to see whether any increased reluctance to enter marriage is discernible. The evidence suggests not.

Marriage Rates

In 1972 a record number of 200,470 marriages were contracted, and marriage rates of 9.2 and 9.0 per 1,000 population in 1972 and 1973, respectively, were the highest since 1951. It should be noted, however, that these rates are influenced by the age structure of the population, hence the declining marriage rate in the 1950s and 1960s reflects in part the increase in population from postwar births.

A better way of describing trends in marriage is to relate the number of persons marrying in any one year to the marriageable population, composed of all single, divorced, and widowed adults. The marriage index expresses the number of registered marriages in a year as a percentage of a weighted average of unmarried men and women.⁶ The marriage index⁷ shows a decrease from 1951 to 1963, and an increase from then onward, as shown in Table 2.1.

Some of the recent rise in the marriage index appears to be due to the entry of the large postwar birth cohorts into family formation ages. The maturing of these cohorts has altered the age structure of the Canadian population aged 15 and over. This alteration may be observed by comparing the age distribution of Canadian women in 1961 and 1971. By 1971, 26 percent of the Canadian female population aged 15 and over were under 25 years of age, compared to 22 percent ten years earlier.⁸

In 1961, 66.8 percent of Canadian women aged 15 and over were married. By 1971 the proportion had fallen to 63.9 percent, but this

Table 2.1

Marriage Rate Index, Canada, 1951-72

1951	74	1962	63
1952	73	1963	62
1953	74	1964	63
1954	72	1965	64
1955	72	1966	66
1956	72	1967	68
1957	70	1968	68
1958	68	1969	70
1959	68	1970	70
1960	65	1971	70
1961	64	1972 ^a	71

^a Calculated from Statistics Canada, *Population Estimates by Marital Status, Age and Sex for Canada and Provinces, 1972*, and *Vital Statistics, Preliminary Report, 1973*.

Source: Unpublished Statistics Canada tabulations.

decline was due almost entirely to changes in the age structure. Allowing for change in the age structure, we find that there was no great change in the proportion of women who are married between 1961 and 1971. Similarly, there was no change between 1961 and 1971 in the proportion of women who had ever been married.⁹ Overall marriage rates do not indicate that women tend to avoid marriage now to any greater or lesser degree than previously.

Age at Marriage

If women do not marry less, one might find another indication of hesitancy on the part of women in delayed marriages. Are women more likely to wait longer before they get married now than previously? We know that age at marriage has implications for the stability of the marriage. One might also suppose that if women were older when they marry, they would have better-formed notions as to what their lives should be like, more definite plans as to careers, and firmer expectations as to the type of family life they wish to lead.

Again, an examination of vital statistics yields some interesting results. There is clear evidence that the ages of brides and grooms at marriage have declined over time in Canada. In 1921 the average age of all women marrying or remarrying was 25.5 years; fifty years later it had declined to 24.8 years. This trend is even more striking for males. In 1921 the average age of all grooms was close to 30 years; by 1973 it was 27.3 years.¹⁰ Most of the decline took place between 1921 and 1961, and age at marriage has remained more or less stable since 1961, up to and including 1973.

The average age at marriage for all brides and grooms includes those remarrying and hence is higher than ages at marriage of the never previously married. More telling for our purposes is age at first marriage, as shown in Table 2.2. The median age for first marriage of

Table 2.2

Age at Marriage of Persons Never Previously Married, Brides and Grooms, Canada, 1941-73

Year	Age at Marriage			
	Mean		Median	
	Brides	Grooms	Brides	Grooms
1941 ^a	24.4	27.6	23.0	26.3
1946 ^a	24.1	27.1	22.5	25.4
1951	23.8	26.6	22.0	24.8
1956	23.4	26.1	21.6	24.5
1961	22.9	25.8	21.1	24.0
1966	22.6	25.2	21.2	23.7
1967	22.6	25.0	21.2	23.6
1968	22.6	25.0	21.3	23.5
1969	22.7	25.0	21.4	23.5
1970	22.7	24.9	21.4	23.5
1971	22.6	24.9	21.3	23.5
1972	22.6	24.8	22.3	24.1
1973	22.3	24.7	21.2	23.5

^a Does not include Newfoundland, Yukon, or Northwest Territories until 1951.

Source: Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics*, Vol. 2, *Marriages and Divorces*, 1973, Table 7.

women has declined, from 23.0 years in 1941 to 21.2 years in 1973, and for men, from 26.3 years to 23.5 years.

Overall, we can therefore observe that women are about as likely to marry nowadays as in earlier times and that they are likely to marry at an earlier age. This hardly fits an image of women shunning marriage because of perceived built-in strains.

Non-Family Households

While there is no indication that the readiness of women to marry has in any way diminished, there are, nevertheless, some indications that family households have somewhat diminished in importance compared to non-family households.

In 1961, 86.7 percent of all households were composed of a family. (A census family consists of husband and wife with or without unmarried children, or a parent living with one or more unmarried children together in the same dwelling.) In 1971 only 81.7 percent of all households were composed of a family. In the same period we note an increase in the number and proportion of one-person households. While, in 1961, 9.3 percent of all households were one-person households (424,750 one-person households), in 1971, 13.4 percent of all households were one-person households (811,835 one-person households).¹¹ It is difficult to determine why this increase occurred. It cannot be an indication of rejection of marriage — and therefore of family life — in general, since we have just seen that there is no such indication in marriage rates or age at marriage. It is probably due to a

tendency on the part of young adults to move into a single-person household before marrying and becoming part of another family household. If it indicates a partial rejection of any type of family at all, it would be the parental family (family of origin). However, most of the increase can probably be explained by a demographic factor — in 1971 a greater proportion of young people had reached adulthood than in 1961, owing to the postwar baby-boom, and there was thus a larger population eligible for establishing one-person households.

One-Parent Families

There are, however, some direct indications of strain within the family institution. While single-person households may be no more than stations on the way to a nuclear family, one-parent families indicate a family that has lost one parent through divorce, separation, desertion, or death, or alternatively, that the family consists of illegitimate or adopted offspring living with one parent, usually the mother. In 1961, 8.4 percent of all families were one-parent families, while in 1971, 9.4 percent of all families were one-parent families — that is, almost one family in ten had only one parent living with the children in 1971, and that parent was usually the mother. In 1961 only 1.8 percent of all families were one-parent families in which a male lived with his children, while 6.6 percent of all families were female-headed, one-parent families. The corresponding figures for 1971 are 2.0 percent and 7.4 percent, respectively.¹²

Illegitimacy

A rise in illegitimacy would indicate strain within the family institution, since illegitimacy loosens the connection between parenthood and marriage that is one of the main cornerstones of the family. An increase in illegitimacy might be due to an increase in pre-marital intercourse, which would expose more women to the risk of pregnancy. Reliable estimates of the frequency of pre-marital intercourse which could be considered representative of the entire population are exceedingly difficult to obtain;¹³ however, from those studies that have been made we conclude that we are dealing with an evolution rather than a revolution of sexual mores. It is likely that there has been a slight but steady increase in pre-marital intercourse. At the same time, one would expect that increased efficiency in birth control technology (most importantly, “the pill”) would offset the effects of an increase in pre-marital intercourse with respect to unwanted pre-marital pregnancies.

A rise in illegitimacy might, however, indicate increasing reluctance to marry because of pre-marital pregnancy (i.e., a decline in “shot-gun marriages”). Mothers might give up their babies for adoption, or one parent (usually the mother) might keep the child to raise by herself.¹⁴ Lastly, a rise in illegitimacy might be due to an increase in common-law marriages.

In any case, illegitimacy seems to have increased. The absolute number of illegitimate births increased steadily from 10,430 in 1941 to

35,588 in 1970, and then decreased to 31,005 in 1973.¹⁵ However, use of these figures is misleading, since they may simply reflect an increase in the number of women in their reproductive years and not an increase in the incidence of illegitimacy. For this reason, ratios or rates are preferable.

The illegitimacy ratio¹⁶ — the number of illegitimate births per 1,000 total births — increased from 40 in 1941 to 96 in 1970 and decreased to 90 in 1973.¹⁷

The illegitimacy rate¹⁸ — the number of illegitimate births per 1,000 unmarried women in the fecund age range — increased from 12 in 1951 to a high of 20 in 1970 and declined to 17 in 1972.¹⁹

Thus according to all three measures of illegitimacy, there was an increase in illegitimacy until 1970 and a subsequent decline.²⁰ This decline has been accompanied by a rise in the number of therapeutic abortions. Since most of the women receiving therapeutic abortions are not currently married, such abortions may constitute a partial explanation for the decline in illegitimacy. Of all therapeutic abortions performed in Canada in 1973, 59 percent were done for single or never married women, 10 percent for divorced or separated women, and the remaining 31 percent for married women.²¹ It would appear that, with contraceptives and abortions, illegitimacy is declining slightly and may decline further in the 1970s.

Altogether, we find no decrease in the marriage rate and a slight lowering of the average age at first marriage, both indicating the absence of any avoidance of marriage on the part of young women. We also find an increase in the number of one-person households and in the number and percentage of single-parent families and a rise in illegitimacy until 1970, with a slight decline from then onward. Interpreting these trends as reactions to changes that have occurred in family structure and functions, we can, so far, state that strains do not seem to be perceived by people who are about to be married, or are not seen as sufficiently important to impede women from marrying. Still, there are some trends that indicate a slight increase in the avoidance of husband-wife families.

The recognition of potential strains in marriage may come only with the experience of being married. Willingness to marry may indicate that women are not aware of the problems that may beset them as wives, that they consider them manageable, that they consider the stigma of being single as worse, that they expect to find ways to adjust to problems or to alleviate them, or that the problems that have been postulated here never existed in the first place. Let us therefore examine what happens to marriage after people have tried it — do they remain married, or do they seek divorce or separation?

Differences in Family Dissolution and Reformation over Time

Differences in Divorce Rates over Time

Divorce rates, probably more than any other available measure, directly reflect strain in marriage. Canadian divorce statistics show, for instance, a dramatic increase in divorce rates after the Second World War, which would have to be explained by the strain of enforced separation under inauspicious circumstances. Discounting the war-induced jump, we find a more or less steady increase in the divorce rate from 1941 until 1973, with a dramatic increase in 1969. In 1968 new legislation was passed that permitted divorce for a larger variety of reasons.²² In addition, the residency requirements were changed, further facilitating more numerous and more successful divorce petitions.²³

Marital strain is, therefore, not the only precondition for divorce — legislation must make it possible, and social conditions must at least condone it. In other words, marital strain is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for divorce to occur. While we can, therefore, interpret the incidence of divorce as a certain sign of marital strain, we cannot interpret the absence of divorce as the absence of marital strain. With this caution in mind, let us consider the trends in divorce rates.

By whatever measure we take — the number of divorces, the crude divorce rate, the general divorce rate, or the divorce rate index — Canadian divorce statistics show an increase in the number of divorces, with intermittent stabilizations of the divorce rate over time (always ignoring the immediate postwar years, which disrupt the pattern) and a continuing fluctuating increase, albeit at a much higher level, after the 1968 changes in divorce legislation.

The crude divorce rate (number of divorces per 100,000 population) may be a somewhat misleading measure, since changes in the crude divorce rate may reflect changes in the age structure rather than changes in the incidence of divorce. A more sensitive indicator of trends is the general divorce rate, which relates the incidence to the eligible population — that is, it gives the number of divorces per 100,000 married persons aged 15 and over. As can be seen from Table 2.3 below, between 1968 and 1969 the absolute number of divorces more than doubled, from 11,343 to 26,093, and so did the crude and general divorce rates, as well as the divorce rate index, which is simply a function of the general divorce rate. While we cannot state with certainty whether the rise of the post-1968 period will continue into the future, since there was such a heavy backlog of potential divorces, we can state with certainty that there was a dramatic increase in the incidence of divorce over the three decades. While some of the increase was surely due to an underrepresentation of divorces prior to 1968, owing to restrictive legislation, it does tell us that a higher proportion of marriages are now dissolved than pre-

N2 Table 2.3

Divorce Rates, Canada, Selected Years, 1941-73

Year	Number	Crude Divorce Rate ^a	General Divorce Rate ^b	Divorce Rate Index ^c
1941 ^d	2,462	21.4	56.2	112.4
1946	7,757	63.1	131.9	263.8
1951	5,270	37.6	88.9	177.8
1956	6,002	37.3	89.5	179.0
1961	6,563	36.0	85.9	171.8
1966 ^e	10,239	51.2	117.4	234.8
1967 ^f	11,165	54.8	125.1	250.2
1968	11,343	54.8	124.3	248.6
1969	26,093	124.2	279.5	559.0
1970	29,775	139.8	311.5	623.0
1971	29,685	137.6	303.6	607.2
1972	32,389	148.4	325.0	650.0
1973 ^g	36,704	166.1	^h	^h

^a Number of divorces per 100,000 population.

^b Number of divorces per 100,000 married persons aged 15 and over.

^c Number of divorces per 100,000 married couples aged 15 and over.

^d Newfoundland not included prior to 1951.

^e Yukon and Northwest Territories are included from 1966 on.

^f Rates and indexes for 1967-70 and 1972 are based on population estimates.

^g Preliminary estimate.

^h Population estimates necessary to calculate rates are not available.

Sources: W. E. Kalbach and W. W. McVey, *The Demographic Bases of Canadian Society* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1971), Table 11.1; Statistics Canada, *Population Estimates by Marital Status, Age and Sex for Canada and Provinces, 1972*; Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics, Preliminary Annual Report, 1973*, Tables 15 and 16.

viously. Even with the distorting factor of the change in legislation in mind, this is a fairly strong indication of increasing marital strain, or at least of increasing unwillingness on the part of women to endure whatever strain there may be. (The wife filed for divorce in a little over 63 percent of all cases between 1969 and 1971.)²⁴ Ironically, the relaxing of the divorce laws may have increased the desire for divorce. Relative deprivation — a discrepancy between legitimate expectations and actuality — may increase either if objective conditions worsen or if subjective expectations go up in objectively unchanged circumstances. Therefore, with the easing of divorce laws making divorce a more realistic alternative, many marriages previously defined as unsatisfactory may now be defined as intolerable.

The age of persons at the point of divorce has steadily decreased since the introduction of the new divorce legislation of July 2, 1968. While in 1969 the average age of the wife at divorce was 38.5 years, and that of the husband, 42.0 years, in 1973 the average age of the wife was 35.6 years and that of the husband, 38.6 years.²⁵ However, we cannot regard this as a true trend, since the marriages to be dissolved first under the new legislation were usually those that had taken place twenty or thirty years earlier and could not be dissolved under the old legislation. It is not certain that this distorting effect on the mean and median ages at divorce has already completely leveled off. Thus we cannot validly assume that divorces will occur at increasingly younger ages.²⁶

Divorce Rates of Parents

Mothers are strongly identified with the family, and they tend to identify themselves with the family. Divorce when children are present is a more serious matter than when no children are present.²⁷ The married woman without children is more likely to be in the labour force than the married woman with children. Divorce, therefore, is unlikely to leave the working childless woman destitute. Also, divorce profoundly alters both parental roles. The parent without custody of children (usually the father)²⁸ has limited access to the children, and the parent with custody, usually the mother, has to carry the main burden of child-rearing. Raising children alone and finding oneself suddenly economically poorer are changes in circumstances that one would expect women to initiate only in extraordinary circumstances. Yet we have already noted that wives petition for divorce more frequently than do husbands. In spite of their economic vulnerability, women request the divorce in nearly 70 percent of the cases in which children are involved. This proportion increases with the number of children, reaching 75 percent in families of seven children or more.²⁹

Between 1969 and 1973 — that is, after the new divorce legislation had come into force — the percentage of divorces that involved dependent children increased continually, as seen in Table 2.4.

While 54.9 percent of all divorces involved no dependent children in 1969, this percentage had shrunk to 43.4 by 1973. The increase in

24 Table 2.4

Divorces,^a by Number of Dependent Children, Canada, 1969-73

Number of Children	1969		1970		1971		1972		1973	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
0	12,061	54.9	13,714	46.9	13,241	44.6	14,305	44.2	15,890	43.4
1	4,101	18.7	6,013	20.6	6,189	20.9	7,078	21.9	8,209	22.4
2	3,124	14.2	5,025	17.2	5,430	18.3	5,956	18.4	6,842	18.6
3	1,586	7.2	2,624	9.0	2,825	9.5	2,963	9.2	3,384	9.2
4	659	3.0	1,180	4.0	1,250	4.2	1,294	3.9	1,520	4.1
5+	453	2.0	682	2.3	737	2.5	768	2.4	859	2.3
Total	21,964	100.0	29,238	100.0	29,672	100.0	32,364	100.0	36,704	100.0
Mean number of children	n.a.		1.11		1.17		1.15		1.16	

n.a. — not available.

^a The number of divorces mentioned here pertain only to those filed under the new divorce legislation of July 2, 1968.

Sources: Statistics Canada, *Canada Year Book*, 1973, Table 5.56; Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics*, Vol. 2, *Marriages and Divorces*.

divorces involving children over this period must be interpreted partially as a result of the higher proportion of marriages of long duration (and with few dependent children) that were ended after the 1968 legislation. At the same time, the trend seems to continue and may, therefore, indicate a real increase in divorces of parents with dependent children. This is, certainly, an indication of increasing strain within the marriage institution.

Remarriage of Divorcees

If people get divorced because of intolerable strain experienced within the marital relationship, we might expect them to remain single henceforth. However, we find a steady increase in the percentage of marriages in which at least one partner has been previously married, indicating that remarriage after divorce is not an infrequent occurrence. The overall increase in remarriages is, of course, related to the increase in divorce itself; as more people get divorced, there are more potential divorced marriage partners. This increase in remarriages, especially of previously divorced persons, is shown in Table 2.5, which presents Vital Statistics data on marriages by previous marital status of brides and grooms. Three different time periods were selected to give an historical perspective. 1971-73 represents trends in remarriage occurring after the 1968 liberalization of the divorce laws.

In the period 1971-73, for 51,377 divorced men who remarried, only 46,967 divorced women remarried — that is, 4,410 fewer women than men. As Kuzel and Krishnan indicate in an analysis of remarriage rates between 1961 and 1966, divorced males are likely to remarry more quickly than divorced females at all ages up to 50. Their data show that the probability of remarriage falls drastically for females after 30. For example, the probability of remarriage at age 25 for a female is .773 (for a male, .991); at age 30 it is .620 (male, .927); and at age 40 it is .336 (male, .625).³⁰ A lower incidence of remarriage by women may express either an unwillingness or an inability to remarry — and the two may not always be clearly distinguishable.

To sum up, we can state that there has been some manifestation of increased strain within the marriage institution as expressed through increases in overall divorce rates and through increases in divorces involving dependent children. We have also isolated an indication that marriage is more stressful for women than for men: women are less likely to remarry than men. In addition, women are more likely to petition for divorce than are men, and the percentage of female petitions increases as children are present or their number increases. This may be either another indication of greater experienced strain on the part of women or an artifact of the divorce legislation. In any case, most marriages do *not* end in divorce. Are we to conclude that strain is either distributed or experienced so unevenly that the majority of women have not been significantly affected? Before coming to such a conclusion, we must consider changes in

Percentage Distribution of Brides and Grooms, by Previous Marital Status, Canada, Selected Years

Marital Status and Year	Brides		Grooms	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
1951-53:				
Total	387,916	100.1 ^a	387,916	100.0
Single	355,242	91.6	354,772	91.5
Widowed	19,615	5.1	19,424	5.0
Divorced	13,059	3.4	13,720	3.5
1961-63:				
Total	388,967	100.1 ^a	388,967	100.0
Single	354,258	91.1	355,989	91.5
Widowed	19,352	5.0	17,238	4.4
Divorced	15,357	4.0	15,740	4.1
1971-73:				
Total	590,858	100.1 ^a	590,858	100.1 ^a
Single	520,362	88.1	518,836	87.9
Widowed	23,529	4.0	20,645	3.5
Divorced	46,967	8.0	51,377	8.7

^a Does not sum to 100.0 percent because of rounding.

Sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Nuptiality, 1950-1964* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967); Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics, Vol. 3, Marriages and Divorces, 1971, 1972, 1973*.

behaviour that have been manifested by women that can be interpreted as attempts to adapt to changes that have occurred in the structure and function of the family.

Variations in the Curtailment of the Housewife-Mother Roles

We have previously related changes in the housewife-mother roles that have occurred over the past few decades to the existence of marital strain and have attempted to document that such strain is discernible in an increasing proportion of marriages as reflected in increasing divorce rates. This is not to suggest that some women who have opted to marry and to remain married have not adapted to the changes that have taken place. We shall now attempt to identify behaviour patterns that indicate partial avoidance or curtailment of the lifelong exclusive housewife-mother roles through curtailment of the housewife role by means of participation in the labour market, reduction of the mother role (reduced fertility), and avoidance of the mother role (childlessness).

Labour Force Participation of Women

The "traditional" role for a woman is usually conceived of as marrying, having several children, and caring for husband and children for the rest of her life. Housewifery, combined with motherhood, is often seen as a lifelong, exclusive responsibility for women. When we examine the actual behaviour of women over time, however, we find a great increase in the overall participation rate of women in the labour force and in the percentage of the labour force that is female. For instance, the participation rate of women — i.e., the percentage of all women over age 14 in the labour force — increased from 23.4 percent in 1931 to 37.9 percent in 1972. Correspondingly, in 1931 women constituted 19.1 percent of the labour force and in 1972, 32.9 percent.³¹

Of course, this overall influx of women into the labour market is the outcome of a number of factors acting simultaneously. Among the more important ones are changes in the structure of the labour market such that opportunities for women have become more readily available. For example, the war years showed us that as jobs become available, women will take them.³² Paid employment may simply reflect financial need. As is indicated in Chapter 4, family income, excluding the wife's wage, is a potent predictor of the labour force involvement of wives. Likewise, unmarried women, with presumably no other source of income, are more likely to be in the labour force than are married women,³³ although it is precisely the influx of married women into the labour force that has effected the rise in female labour force participation. While it makes good sense to discuss the economical and financial pushes and pulls of women into and out of the labour force, we are attempting here to relate the changed participation rate to changes within the family, without claiming that this would be a sufficient explanation for the increase of the female labour force.

We should not overlook that about half of all wives do *not* participate in the labour market even if the husband's income is very low (Table 4.3 in Chapter 4). Some of those women whose husbands' incomes are very low but who are not part of the labour force may simply not be able to find a job. According to Table 4.3, about one-quarter of all wives whose husbands are in the highest income category are also in the labour force. Clearly, we see choice rather than necessity at work here. At least the wives with husbands in high income brackets are working to avoid being exclusively housewives. They are also more likely to have a higher education (since marriages tend to be educationally homogamous) and therefore are more likely to have better job opportunities than women who have low-income husbands and who are also likely to have a lower level of education. It seems safe to interpret the increased labour force participation of women not only in economic terms, but also as a response to the changes that have taken place in the housewife-mother roles and as one way to alleviate the stresses inherent in these roles.

Labour Force Participation of Mothers

Assessing the generally increased labour force participation of women provides us with some useful insights, but it addresses only partially the question of changes in the housewife-mother roles. Overall labour force participation rates include both married and unmarried women. For unmarried women — unless they are mothers — no role conflict exists if they are in the labour force. For married women without children who are in the labour force, a role conflict exists only insofar as either husband or wife considers the wife role incompatible with paid employment. For mothers of pre-school or school-age children who wish to work, a role conflict is unavoidable. Small children need constant supervision, and institutionalized alternatives to parental care such as day-care centres are so far insufficient in number.³⁴ The difficulties of combining family life with paid employment on the part of mothers are quite drastic, since fathers still tend to regard housework and child care as a predominantly female domain, rather than as a spousal or parental domain.³⁵ This is probably an indication of cultural lag on the part of most men and women; as long as it prevails, mothers in the labour force bear the weight of the triple roles of labour force participant, housewife, and mother. Working outside the home while small children are present requires, therefore, a fairly high degree of need and/or determination on the part of the mother/wife. In spite of the inherent difficulties, we find that the labour force participation of mothers increased steadily between 1967 and 1973, at an 8.1 percent annual growth rate, as shown in Table 2.6.

Table 2.7 shows that ever married women with young children present are much less likely to participate in the labour force than those with no children present. It also shows that with increasing age of the youngest child, the participation in the labour force of mothers aged 25-34 increases steadily. It is worth noting that the dearth of

Table 2.6
**Labour Force Participation Rates of Mothers, by School Attendance of Children, by Region,
 Canada, 1967 and 1973**

	Total Women with Children			Women with Only Full-Time School Children			Women with Only Pre-School Children			Women with School and Pre-School Children		
	April 1967 (%)	October 1973 (%)	Annual Growth Rate	April 1967 (%)	October 1973 (%)	Annual Growth Rate	April 1967 (%)	October 1973 (%)	Annual Growth Rate	April 1967 (%)	October 1973 (%)	Annual Growth Rate
Canada	21	35	8.1	28	42	6.4	19	29	6.7	15	26	8.9
Atlantic	17	29	8.5	23	34	6.2	16	29	9.5	12	21	9.0
Quebec	15	29	10.7	20	32	7.5	14	27	10.7	11	23	12.0
Ontario	25	40	7.5	32	47	6.1	23	32	5.2	19	30	7.3
Prairies	23	38	8.0	31	46	6.3	21	32	6.7	17	24	5.4
British Columbia	21	37	9.1	32	47	6.1	15	26	8.9	15	25	8.1

Source: Unpublished Statistics Canada tabulations.

institutionalized day care notwithstanding, 32.6 percent of mothers with children under 6 years of age — i.e., before the start of public schooling — are in the labour force. This is certainly an important phenomenon and indicates that many mothers choose to expand their roles beyond those of housewife-mother, generally in spite of considerable practical problems.

Table 2.7

Labour Force Participation of Ever Married Women Aged 25-34, by Age of Youngest Child 0-10 Years, Canada, 1971

<u>Age of Youngest Child</u>	<u>Ever Married Women</u>
No child present	79.4
< 1	25.4
1-1.99	29.8
2-2.99	32.5
3-3.99	35.4
4-4.99	38.2
5-5.99	40.4
6-6.99	45.8
7-7.99	49.8
8-8.99	53.2
9-9.99	56.0

Source: Unpublished Statistics Canada tabulations.

Fertility Rates

If, indeed, the mother role in particular has become more difficult, as has been suggested above, then we would expect to find a curtailment of that role through a variety of mechanisms: reduction of the number of children, delayed first births, or voluntary childlessness. We shall now consider trends in fertility over the past few decades to examine whether any of these behaviour patterns are discernible.

We can note a decline of the birth rate of Canadian women in recent years. The simplest method of reporting changes in fertility is the crude birth rate — the number of births per 1,000 population. Using this measure, we find that the crude birth rate declined steadily from 45 in 1851 to a low of 20 in 1937. From the late 1930s until after World War II, it rose, reaching 28.9 in 1947. Between 1948 and 1959 the rate remained stable around 27 or 28. It then began to decline again, falling to a low of 15.5 births per 1,000 population in 1973.

However, this measure of fertility can be affected by factors such as nuptiality and changes in the age structure of the society. Among recent trends in the age structure is a steady decrease in the reproductive proportion of the population. For instance, in 1951, 64

percent of married women were in the age group 15-44; in 1961, 63 percent; and in 1971, 60 percent.³⁶ This change in the age structure has contributed to the sharply declining birth rate in recent years. Henripin and Légaré submit that these changes in the age-sex structure have had a negative effect on the crude birth rate, but they also argue that "this specific factor cannot be held responsible for the dramatic fall in the birth rate."³⁷

Over time (1951-73), the trend shows an increasing proportion of first or second births, rather than third, fourth, or later births. In 1951 only 53.7 percent of all births were first and second births; by 1961 this percentage had further decreased, to 49.1; by 1968 it had increased to 64.5; by 1971 it had reached 69.9; and by 1973, 75.7 percent.³⁸ These figures reflect declining fertility — more women are having only one or two children, rather than more than two. In part, however, the increase in first and second births over third and later births is simply due to an increase within the age group 15-44 in the proportion of women of early childbearing ages — the period when the majority of first and second births occur.

We can gauge the reduction in fertility more accurately from the total fertility rate and the gross reproduction rate. The total fertility rate is derived from female age-specific birth rates. It may be interpreted as the number of children born to a hypothetical group of 1,000 women who went through the reproductive years bearing children at the given age-specific rates. It is sometimes interpreted as the average family size of a hypothetical group of women. Thus if Canadian women were to pass through their reproductive years having children at the 1973 age-specific rates, in 1973 each woman would have had 1.9 children — a decline since 1961 of almost 2 children per woman.

The gross reproduction rate is similar but represents the average number of live daughters that would be born to a hypothetical group of women who are moving through the reproductive years subject to current age-specific fertility rates and having an assumed mortality rate of zero before age 50. A rate of 1.000 would indicate that, on the basis of fertility in the given period unadjusted for mortality of mothers during their childbearing years, the hypothetical group of women would exactly reproduce themselves.

The data on the total fertility rate and the gross reproduction rate not only summarize the decline in Canadian fertility from 1926 onward, but show that, from 1972 onward, the age-specific fertility rates were such that if women reproduced according to these rates over their reproductive lifespans, they would not numerically maintain themselves. Because of the prevailing age structure and the continued addition of immigrants to the Canadian population, these rates do not mean that Canada is now experiencing zero population growth. But they do suggest that, if age-specific fertility rates remain at their current levels, women now entering their reproductive years will have small completed families.

22 Table 2.8

Fertility Rates, Canada, Selected Years, 1926-73

	Age-Specific Rate						Total Fertility Rate	Gross Reproduction Rate
	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	
1926-30	30.0	140.7	174.4	149.4	110.1	48.3	5.8	3,293
1931-35	27.7	121.7	159.3	136.0	96.8	40.6	5.2	2,937
1936-40	27.0	119.4	145.8	123.3	84.9	34.0	4.1	2,692
1941	30.7	138.4	159.8	122.3	80.0	31.6	3.7	2,832
1946	36.5	169.6	191.4	146.0	93.1	34.5	3.8	3,374
1951	48.1	188.7	198.8	144.5	86.5	30.9	3.1	3,503
1956	55.9	222.2	220.1	150.3	89.6	30.8	2.9	3,858
1961	58.2	233.6	219.2	144.9	81.1	28.5	2.4	3,840
1966	48.2	169.1	163.5	103.3	57.5	19.1	1.7	2,812
1971	40.1	134.4	142.0	77.3	33.6	9.4	0.6	2,187
1972	38.5	119.8	137.1	72.1	28.9	7.8	0.6	2,024
1973	37.2	117.7	131.6	67.1	25.7	6.4	0.4	1,931

Source: Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics*, Preliminary Annual Report, 1973.

Table 2.8 further suggests the increasing tendency of Canadian women to compress their childbearing into a shorter time span. In 1926-30 the age-specific fertility rate of women aged 40-44 was 48.3, but by 1973 it had dropped to 6.4. This evidence, in combination with the drop in age-specific fertility rates of women aged 30-34 and 35-39 indicates that more women now restrict their childbearing to the under-thirty years.

Another method of assessing changes in fertility is through parity progression ratios. These measure the proportion of ever married women (all those who have ever been married) who, having had a certain number of children (nth parity), go on to have one more (n+1 parity). Thus the third-parity progression ratio is the proportion of women who have had three children and will have a fourth. The parity progression rates of women aged 20-29 in 1961 and in 1971 provide a basis for assessing changes in the reproductive behaviour of women in their prime childbearing years. Table 2.9 shows that 58 percent of all ever married women aged 20-24 in 1971 were likely to bear a first child. Of those women who had borne a first child, 42 percent were likely to bear a second, and so on. The ratios for ever married women aged 25-29 are higher than those for women aged 20-24, reflecting, among other things, the longer time they have been married. The data suggest that 79 percent of ever married women aged 25-29 would bear a first child, that 69 percent of those who had a first child would have a second, and so on. The comparison between 1971 and 1961 shows that, in 1971, women in both age groups were less likely to have a first child than they would have been in 1961; if they had a first child, they were less likely to have a second, and so on.

Table 2.9

Parity-Progression Ratios for Ever Married Women Aged 20-29, Canada, 1961 and 1971

<u>Age group</u>	<u>a₀</u>	<u>a₁</u>	<u>a₂</u>	<u>a₃</u>	<u>a₄</u>	<u>a₅</u>
20-24:						
1961	.737	.530	.363	.293	.265	.300
1971	.580	.422	.245	.233	.286	.250
25-29:						
1961	.864	.757	.557	.467	.433	.431
1971	.793	.694	.422	.358	.349	.345

Sources: 1971 Census of Canada, *Population*; for 1961, J. Henripin, *Trends and Factors of Fertility in Canada* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1961), Table 2.11.

Overall, therefore, since the mid-fifties Canadian women have tended to bear fewer children than they had before. Having fewer children, especially when they are born within a shorter time span,

significantly alters the mother role. At age six each child starts compulsory schooling, and the housewife-mother roles change accordingly. Some women choose at this point to join (or rejoin) the labour force, while others remain at home, but in either case the mother has more flexibility of movement. Restricting fertility to about two children per family constitutes — regardless of whether this was a motivating factor — a partial reduction of the mother role.

Postponement of Births

We have seen that the fertility of Canadian women has declined. This decline could be due to changes in the age at marriage and/or to changes in marital fertility. Since the age of women at marriage is decreasing, the reduced fertility would appear to be due to changes in marital fertility. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that even when age and age at marriage — both of which influence fertility — are held constant, the 1971 fertility levels are lower than the 1961 fertility levels for women aged 15-29.³⁹

Since young Canadian women who show this reduced marital fertility have not yet completed their fertility — they are still biologically capable of bearing children — we cannot make any categorical statements about the future fertility of these women. However, we can seek an immediate explanation of the reduced fertility observed so far. One such factor might be the postponement of childbearing. Unfortunately, accurate Census data on birth intervals are not available,⁴⁰ so this hypothesis cannot be tested. However, Vital Statistics data on the age of the mother at the birth of each child (Table 2.10) suggest that the average (median) age of first- and second-parity mothers has been increasing steadily since 1968.

Table 2.10

**Median Age^a of Mother at First and Second Births, Canada,^b
Selected Years, 1946-73**

<u>Date</u>	<u>First Birth</u>	<u>Second Birth</u>
1946 ^c	23.9	26.8
1951 ^c	23.7	26.7
1956	23.4	25.1
1961	22.8	25.0
1966	22.4	25.0
1971	22.8	25.4
1973	23.2	26.0

^a Based on five-year age intervals; excludes mothers for whom age and parity are unknown.

^b Excludes Newfoundland for all years.

^c Excludes Yukon and Northwest Territories.

Sources: Statistics Canada, *Canada Year Book*, 1948-49, 1954, 1957-58, 1969; Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics* annual reports, 1961-65, 1967-73.

These data, in conjunction with declining age at first marriage, suggest that some postponement of births is indeed occurring. Whatever the reasons for this change in pattern may be — they must certainly include both improved birth control technology and prolonged educational training — they have strong implications for the housewife-mother-wife roles. If women postpone their first pregnancy, it has the effect of separating the wife role from the mother and full-time-housewife roles. If wifehood and motherhood follow very closely together, the woman must adjust to two new roles almost simultaneously, making it difficult to separate the demands and effects of each. If there is a period of delay before pregnancy, this role confusion is less likely to occur. We know that young married women without children are most likely to be in the labour force. These women experience a period in which they are wives but play only a partial housewife role (as a supplement to being a labour force participant) and no mother role. This experience emphasizes for them that paid employment and wifehood are not necessarily mutually exclusive and is also likely to engender expectations that affect their future behaviour. Postponing births and participating in the labour force may make the economic and physical restrictions of most young mothers and full-time housewives harder to bear. This, in turn, may lead women to bear fewer children in order to shorten the period of active motherhood and to rejoin the labour force at the earliest opportunity. Of course, there are also women who enjoy full-time motherhood and housewifery and wish to keep these two roles as their exclusive occupation, but the actual behaviour of young Canadian women indicates that their numbers are decreasing.

There is another, more drastic step that some women take — namely, complete avoidance of one or the other of the two roles considered here. By definition, the housewife role cannot be completely avoided if a woman becomes a wife or a wife and mother, but insofar as the wife declines to become a mother, or decides to participate in the labour force, we can assume that a partial reduction of the housewife role has taken place. We have already seen, in the discussion of marriage rates, that there is no evidence of an increase in avoidance of the wife role. We shall now examine whether there has been an increase in avoidance of the mother role.

Childlessness

Childlessness implies the complete elimination of the mother role and thus a very significant deviation from the pattern of the wife-housewife-mother. Childlessness may be voluntary or involuntary. If we assume that the proportion of women who are sterile or who are married to sterile husbands remained stable between 1961 and 1971, any increase in childlessness that might be found in the decade would have to be attributed to voluntary childlessness. Data from 1961 and 1971 (Table 2.11) suggest that the proportion of married women who are childless has indeed increased. The increase in the incidence of

childlessness is particularly marked for women aged 20-24, of whom 26.3 percent were childless in 1961, but 42 percent of whom were childless in 1971. The 25-29 age group is also characterized by increasing childlessness in 1971 compared to 1961 — in 1961, 13.6 percent of them were childless; in 1971, 20.7 percent. The increased childlessness in the 20-29 age group does not mean that all of these women will remain childless, but it suggests at least a delay of first birth, and as Grindstaff notes:

In general, temporary delay will foster a life style, especially relating to career opportunity and advancement for women, that will ultimately result in permanent postponement of childbearing.⁴¹

Childlessness may result not only from conscious rejection of motherhood, but from active acceptance of a career-oriented life, which eventually results in childlessness. Unfortunately, for many women career and parenthood still make conflicting demands, while for most men no such direct conflict exists. Perhaps one key to reducing the conflict lies, in this case, not so much with the women, but with their husbands. By shouldering a larger share of parental obligations, even at some cost to their careers, husbands could reduce the conflict for their wives.

Table 2.11

Percentage of Ever Married Women Who Are Childless, for Selected Age Groups, Canada, 1961 and 1971

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Percentage Childless</u>	
	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>
15 and over	13.7	15.8
15-19	42.3	49.7
20-24	26.3	42.0
25-29	13.6	20.7
30-34	9.7	9.4
35-39	9.2	7.4
40-44	10.3	8.2
45-49	13.1	9.6
50-54	15.2	11.8
55-59	15.5	14.5
60-64	14.6	16.6
65 and over	13.0	15.0

Sources: 1961 Census of Canada, *Population*, Cat. No. 98-507, Table G1; 1971 Census of Canada, *Population*, Cat. No. 92-718, Table 24.

Summary of Trend Data

We have looked at several trends in the behaviour of Canadian women in the aggregate. Changes that have occurred, such as increased divorce and illegitimacy, suggest that the family as an institu-

tion is under greater strain than previously. Women are apparently more affected by these strains, since they petition for divorce more often than men and since divorces have increased even among families with children. Men are slightly more likely to remarry than women, and the reluctance or inability of women to remarry has increased slightly in comparison with the remarriage rate of men. Part of the increased strain could be explained by the greater number of options now available to women. Women are, indeed, taking advantage of these options as expressed in their increased labour force participation. This, in turn, is likely to increase dissatisfaction and strain for some of those women who remain in the traditional roles of full-time housewife, mother, and wife.

The vast majority of women still perform the wife-mother-housewife roles, and there is no indication that women are tending to avoid marriage. Some trends, however, point towards curtailment of parts of the housewife and mother roles. These include reduced fertility, delayed first childbirth, and participating in the labour force. This last trend prevents the social isolation and economic dependency of housewifery, even though it generates its own strains through increased demands on the woman's time.

Certainly, all these changes are significant. They not only affect the conjugal relationship but have implications for the future. If the wife earns money, the familial dominance pattern changes, and so does the division of labour within the family. Children are socialized differently when their mothers participate in the labour force. Daughters whose mothers participate in the labour force are, for example, more likely to be career-oriented than daughters whose mothers do not participate in the labour market. By somewhat limiting their family roles, women are free to expand their other roles.

The composite picture that has emerged so far is very interesting. By itself, however, this picture may be misleading, as it is based only on trends in the overall changes that affect the roles of women in the family. Of necessity, we have looked at average behaviour, but statistical averages may hide significant deviations. Subgroups of women may show different degrees of variation from these typical patterns of behaviour. In order to investigate some of the relationships that predispose a woman to curtail her family roles, we have performed a statistical analysis to complement the trend data. Since reduction of fertility is the major means by which women curtail family roles, the remainder of this chapter will investigate several factors which predispose a woman towards higher or lower fertility at a single point in time — 1971.

Differences in the Reduction of Fertility in Subgroups of Women

Multiple classification analysis (MCA) is used to examine differences in fertility in subgroups of women. This statistical technique examines

the interrelationship between predictor variables and a dependent variable where the former are expressed as categories and the latter is in an interval or numerical scale.⁴² In this case, the technique is used to show how the mean number of children (dependent variable) varies for selected predictor variables before and after adjusting for the influence of age, age at marriage, and education.⁴³

The analysis is based on a one-in-five sample of the individual file of the Public Use Sample Tape, prepared from the 1971 Census. This tape provides a subsample that is representative of the Canadian population as a whole.⁴⁴

The following data provide a summary of variations in current fertility among different groups of women aged 15-44 in Canada. They tell us clearly that young women are not homogeneous with respect to their fertility; instead, we find considerable variability exhibited, depending on social-background characteristics.

The results presented in Table 2.12 are restricted in two important ways. First, the analysis covers women aged 15 to 44 who have not yet completed fertility. A supplementary analysis of the fertility of women aged 45 and over who have completed fertility appears in Appendix Table A.2.1. In general, similar results are obtained for women aged 45 and over as for women aged 15 to 44. Second, Table 2.12 presents only those factors affecting fertility that are of immediate relevance to the preceding discussion of changes in family structure and functions. A more complete analysis of factors influencing fertility rates, which is of inherent demographic interest, is presented in Appendix Table A.2.2.

Table 2.12

Mean Number of Children Born to Ever Married Women Aged 15-44, by Social Demographic Characteristics, Canada,^a 1971

	Mean Number of Children		
	Unadjusted	Adjusted for Age and Age at Marriage	Adjusted for Age, Age at Marriage, and Education
Total	2.33	—	—
Age:			
15-19	.54	—	—
20-24	.90	—	—
25-29	1.72	—	—
30-34	2.65	—	—
35-39	3.17	—	—
40-44	3.37	—	—
Age at marriage:			
15-19	2.71	—	—
20-24	2.23	—	—
25-29	1.91	—	—
30+	1.41	—	—

Table 2.12 (cont'd)

	Mean Number of Children		
	Unadjusted	Adjusted for Age and Age at Marriage	Adjusted for Age, Age at Marriage, and Education
Education:			
<9, no additional training	3.02	2.72	—
<9, additional training	2.54	2.45	—
9-13, no additional training	2.18	2.24	—
9-13, additional training	1.96	2.12	—
University	1.71	2.01	—
Marital status:			
Married	2.31	2.33	2.33
Separated	2.72	2.54	2.55
Divorced	2.05	1.65	1.70
Widowed	3.07	2.49	2.47
Place of residence:			
Rural farm	3.16	2.85	2.82
Rural non-farm	2.75	2.69	2.67
Urban, <30,000	2.43	2.44	2.43
Urban, ≥30,000	2.12	2.16	2.17
Immigration:			
Native-born	2.40	2.26	2.41
Immigrated before 1946	2.61	2.05	2.11
Immigrated 1946-60	2.23	1.99	1.95
Immigrated 1961-71	1.76	2.09	2.06
Parental origins:			
Both born in Canada	2.40	2.49	2.47
Both born out- side Canada	2.20	2.04	2.05
Mother only born in Canada	2.30	2.17	2.24
Father only born in Canada	2.17	2.10	2.18

^a To maintain confidentiality, no data on Prince Edward Island residents were included in the Public Use Sample Tape.

Source: One-in-five sample, Statistics Canada Public Use Sample Tape on Individuals.

In Table 2.12 the column labeled "unadjusted mean" refers to means unadjusted for the influence of age, age at marriage, and education, while the "adjusted mean" columns present the mean number of children for various groups of Canadian women after statistical adjustments have been made for age, age at marriage, and education.

When we compare those women who are least likely to restrict their fertility with those women who are most likely to restrict their fertility, a composite picture of two quite different groups of women emerges. Women who are most likely to restrict fertility — i.e., women who tend to have fewest children — are characterized by the following factors: they marry late rather than early; they have high rather than low education; they live in highly urbanized rather than rural areas; and they and/or their parents are immigrants rather than native-born. All these relationships obtain even when age, age at marriage, and/or education are controlled. In other words, we would attribute some effect on fertility not only to age at marriage and education but to living in an urban rather than a rural area or to being an immigrant rather than native-born.

The obverse is that women having higher-than-average fertility are women who marry early rather than late, have low education, live in rural rather than in urban areas, or tend to be native-born or have parents who are native-born.

It is interesting to observe that the women who have the highest average (mean) number of children, after age, age at marriage, and education are controlled, are also the ones who are likely to be separated, while the women who have the lowest average number of children are likely to be divorced. This pattern is complemented by evidence that divorced and separated women aged 25 to 44 in 1971 tended to contract their first marriage at a younger age than women who are currently married (excluding separated). As is evident in Appendix Table A.2.3, divorced women have the highest level of formal education, while separated women have the lowest level of formal education, of the three marital status groups. This suggests that the resolution of an unhappy marital situation differs according to the educational level of women.

The composite picture that emerges from Table 2.12 is congruent with trends over time that have been noted earlier. We know that overall fertility in Canada has declined. This, we would now suspect, is partially due to the increasing education of women, documented in Chapter 3, and to increasing urbanization. If these two trends were to continue, we would expect fertility to decline further.

We have previously defined a reduction in fertility as a means of adapting to changes that have occurred within the family and have interpreted the phenomenon as a curtailment of the mother role. It now seems that, with an increasing presence of alternatives, women are more likely to adopt this behaviour pattern. As women become more educated, they will be more aware of alternatives to the full-time motherhood role, and they will, in fact, have more attractive options open to them. Living in highly urbanized areas, in turn, is likely to offer women more opportunities for labour force participation or, in general, for activities unrelated to household matters. It is particularly interesting to note that women who are native to Canada have on the average

more children than women who immigrated or whose parents are immigrants. Migration from one country to another involves a break with one culture and an adaptation to another and thus by necessity involves a comparison of normative systems. One would expect migration to encourage all migrants, whether male or female, to evaluate critically which aspects of a normative system should be retained in the new country and which should be replaced by others. It seems that with the opportunity for such a review, women tend to restrict rather than to enlarge their fertility. Another factor contributing to the relatively low fertility of immigrant women might be their higher labour force participation rate relative to native-born women.

The relationship between labour force participation and fertility is a very complex one. The basic problem in measuring this is that both labour force participation and fertility occur over an extended period of time. To understand the relationship fully would require detailed family and work histories gathered over time.⁴⁵ Yet many of the data available, including those in Table 2.13 below, are cross-sectional: that is, the labour force status of women at one point in time is related to their cumulative fertility up to that point. The result is a static analysis of a dynamic process.

Notwithstanding this limitation, Table 2.13 gives us information about the relationship between fertility and labour force participation for three age groups of women: all women over age 15, women aged 15 to 44 (that is, women with incomplete fertility), and women aged 45 and over (that is, women with completed fertility). For all three age groups the data on labour force experience show that fertility is highest for women who have never worked in the labour force. Women who are in the labour force in 1971 have, on average, one child less than women who have been full-time housewives since marriage. This relationship holds when age, age at marriage, and education are controlled.

However, of those women who participated in the labour force prior to 1970, women aged 15 to 44 exceed the mean (2.33 children) for their group, whereas women aged 45 and over have fewer children than the mean of their group. Further, working in 1970 but not in 1971 seems to reduce average fertility much more for women over 45 than it does for women aged 15 to 44. The reasons for these disparate findings for women who have not yet completed fertility may arise from the timing of both childbearing and labour force participation. Perhaps women aged 15 to 44 who worked previously but were not in the labour force in 1971 left the labour force in anticipation of, or as a consequence of, childbearing. If this is the case, it is not unreasonable to find that these women would have higher fertility than those women of the same age group who are still working in 1971. It is difficult to interpret the variations in fertility by recent labour force participation for women aged 45 and over in 1971. Overall, however, we find that fertility declines as involvement in the labour market

42 Table 2.13

Mean Number of Children Born to Ever Married Women, by Age Group and Labour Force Characteristics, Canada,^a 1971

	Mean Number of Children							
	15 and over		15-44				45 and over	
	Unadjusted at Marriage	Adjusted for Age, Age at Marriage, and Education	Unadjusted at Marriage	Adjusted for Age, Age at Marriage, and Education	Unadjusted at Marriage	Adjusted for Age, Age at Marriage, and Education	Unadjusted at Marriage	Adjusted for Age, Age at Marriage, and Education
Labour force experience:								
Never worked	3.90	3.57	3.46	3.36	3.07	2.97	4.18	3.93
Worked prior to 1970	2.79	2.77	2.79	2.61	2.56	2.56	2.98	3.05
Worked in 1970 but not in 1971	2.08	2.47	2.50	1.85	2.24	2.26	2.59	2.63
Worked in 1971	2.22	2.36	2.40	1.89	1.96	1.98	2.76	2.92
1970 work activity:								
Not applicable	3.20	3.06	3.02	2.80	2.69	2.66	3.52	3.44
Full-time	1.97	2.24	2.29	1.61	1.84	1.87	2.61	2.80
Part-time	2.66	2.65	2.71	2.49	2.29	2.33	2.93	3.12
Class of worker: ^b								
Not applicable	3.23	3.07	3.04	2.84	2.72	2.68	3.53	3.45
Wage earner	2.08	2.32	2.38	1.77	1.93	1.96	2.67	2.87
Unpaid family worker	3.18	2.99	2.97	3.02	2.65	2.63	3.38	3.36
Self employed	2.58	2.38	2.42	2.50	2.22	2.27	2.63	2.67

^a To maintain confidentiality, no data on Prince Edward Island residents were included in the Public Use Sample Tape.
^b Based on job held in the week prior to census enumeration, if employed, or the job of longest duration since January 1, 1970, if not employed in that week.

Sources: Statistics Canada Public Use Sample Tape on Individuals; 1971 Census of Canada, Population.

increases. In all age groups, full-time housewives tend to have more children than part-time workers, who, in turn, tend to have more children than full-time workers. Similarly, we can observe that as labour force participation becomes more recent, a woman's fertility declines.

We cannot give a causal explanation for the consistent correlation of active female participation in the labour market with low fertility, because the causality could go both ways: women may work because they have few children and therefore find it easier to arrange care for the few children they have and to meet the time demands of both. Alternatively, women may have few children because they wish to maintain their involvement in the labour market and see this as possible only with a limited number of children. An important consideration for which we have no information here is motivation to work and motivation to have children — in all likelihood, we are dealing with an interactive process in which every decision affects the feasibility of other decisions. For instance, early involvement in the labour force may lead to postponement of birth and to career advancement, which may lead to a desire to maintain a career, which may lead to a reduction of the number of children desired, and so on. Alternatively, restriction to the household may lead to quick birth(s), which may lead to perceived inability to participate in the labour market because of the child or children, causing a delay in re-entering the labour force. This, in turn, may lead to an actual deterioration of a woman's chances of finding a satisfactory job when she is older and has little or no previous experience. In each case the chance for women to become actively involved in the labour force or to have one or more children differs increasingly over time. All we can observe here is that there is, in fact, a positive correlation between declined fertility and increased labour force participation.

However, two possible explanations for the association between fertility and labour force participation are suggested by the data. We can observe a decreased fertility by type of work performed. The mean number of children for women aged 15 to 44 (with age, age at marriage, and education controlled) is 2.68 for housewives, 2.63 for unpaid family workers, 2.22 for self-employed workers, and 1.93 for wage earners. If we assume that the housewife has the most control over her time and the wage earner the least and that children demand a certain amount of flexibility in time on the part of the main caretaker, the flexibility of time associated with different types of work may constitute a partial explanation of this pattern.

An alternative interpretation of this pattern is that fertility declines with a woman's increasing involvement in the labour force. Table 2.13 indicates that for all Canadian women, including those with incomplete and completed fertility, the mean number of children is less than average for women who are wage earners or self-employed and higher than average for women who did not participate in the labour

force in 1970 or who were unpaid family workers.

Housework is distinguished from other work by the fact that it lacks the reward of a wage. Housework also results in few visible and comparable achievements. One could, therefore, argue that the higher-than-average number of children that full-time housewives or unpaid family workers produce is the result of an attempt to justify the housewife role through increased productivity in the one area that is comparable across families: the number of children. The lack of monetary rewards might then be offset by a feeling of achievement that a higher-than-average number of children may convey, especially if the woman identifies strongly with her family.⁴⁶

Conclusion

Over the past few decades the family has gone through many changes. These changes have affected all family members, but particularly women who have performed the three roles of wife, mother, and housewife within the family. Earlier we suggested that the mother and housewife roles had become increasingly strenuous. An analysis of trend data and of aggregate data from 1971 suggests that women have reacted to the increased strain in a variety of ways, but primarily by reducing fertility and by increasing involvement in the labour force. Both these changes in behaviour have important implications for the present and the future of the whole of Canadian society. A gradual change to a typical family with two main wage earners — wife and husband — would be comparable in importance to the change that occurred during the transition from an agricultural to an industrial society. The asymmetrical economic dependence of the wife on the husband would be considerably lessened, and in cases in which economic equality prevails, it would be abolished. Marriage could increasingly become a union of economic equals rather than of an economic superior with an economic dependent. This could alter fundamentally the attitudes of many female and male children to the sexes, probably in the direction of less sex differentiation. Such changes in attitudes could result in a significant expansion of the range of choice for both women and men in Canada and have profound implications for educational, labour force, and policy choices discussed in subsequent chapters.

Table A.2.1

Mean Number of Children Born to Ever Married Women Aged 45 and Over, by Social Demographic Characteristics, Canada, 1971

	Mean Number of Children		
	Unadjusted	Adjusted for Age and Age at Marriage	Adjusted for Age, Age at Marriage, and Education
Age:			
45-49	3.20	—	—
50-54	3.14	—	—
55-59	3.02	—	—
60-64	3.09	—	—
65-69	3.23	—	—
70+	3.73	—	—
Age at marriage:			
15-19	4.40	—	—
20-24	3.58	—	—
25-29	2.72	—	—
30+	1.73	—	—
Education:			
<9, no additional training	3.85	3.72	—
<9, additional training	2.66	2.83	—
9-13, no additional training	2.80	2.87	—
9-13, additional training	2.39	2.62	—
University	2.36	2.79	—
Marital status:			
Married	3.16	3.25	3.26
Separated	3.27	3.32	3.30
Divorced	2.16	2.16	2.24
Widowed	3.58	3.35	3.33
Place of residence:			
Rural farm	4.12	4.13	4.07
Rural non-farm	4.09	3.99	3.93
Urban, <30,000	3.67	3.60	3.58
Urban, ≥30,000	2.81	2.86	2.89
Ethnicity:			
British	2.86	2.86	2.94
French	4.36	4.39	4.26
Other Northwest European	3.17	3.18	3.15
All other European	3.08	3.00	2.89
Jewish	2.26	2.25	2.33
Indian	5.59	5.49	5.26
Other	2.79	2.82	2.77

(cont'd on p. 46)

Table A.2.1 (cont'd)

	Mean Number of Children		
	Unadjusted	Adjusted for Age and Age at Marriage	Adjusted for Age, Age at Marriage, and Education
Mother tongue:			
English	2.88	2.88	2.96
French	4.40	3.38	4.30
German	3.18	3.13	3.03
Italian	3.52	3.37	3.16
Ukrainian	2.99	2.86	2.72
Other	3.00	2.98	2.92
Immigration:			
Native-born	3.41	3.44	3.44
Immigrated before 1946	2.98	2.75	2.77
Immigrated 1946-60	2.55	2.72	2.73
Immigrated 1961-71	2.99	2.93	2.89
Parental origins:			
Both born in Canada	3.67	3.70	3.67
Both born out-side Canada	2.82	2.78	2.80
Mother only born in Canada	2.71	2.70	2.82
Father only born in Canada	2.69	2.77	2.84
Religion: ^a			
Catholic	4.02	4.04	3.95
Jewish	2.24	2.24	2.32
Fundamentalist Protestant ^b	3.38	3.19	3.20
Non-fundamentalist Protestant ^c	2.71	2.71	2.79

^a Data for Greek Orthodox, no religion, and other religion are not presented.

^b Baptists, Mennonites, and Hutterites.

^c Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and United Church.

Source: One-in-five sample from Statistics Canada Public Use Sample Tape on Individuals.

Table A.2.2

Mean Number of Children Born to Ever Married Women Aged 15-44, by Social Demographic Characteristics, Canada, 1971

	Mean Number of Children		
	Unadjusted	Adjusted for Age and Age at Marriage	Adjusted for Age, Age at Marriage, and Education
Age:			
15-19	.54	—	—
20-24	.90	—	—
25-29	1.72	—	—
30-34	2.65	—	—
35-39	3.17	—	—
40-44	3.37	—	—
Age at marriage:			
15-19	2.71	—	—
20-24	2.23	—	—
25-29	1.91	—	—
30+	1.41	—	—
Education:			
<9, no additional training	3.02	2.72	—
<9, additional training	2.54	2.45	—
9-13, no additional training	2.18	2.24	—
9-13, additional training	1.96	2.12	—
University	1.71	2.01	—
Marital status:			
Married	2.31	2.33	2.33
Separated	2.72	2.54	2.55
Divorced	2.05	1.65	1.70
Widowed	3.07	2.49	2.47
Place of residence:			
Rural farm	3.16	2.85	2.82
Rural non-farm	2.75	2.69	2.67
Urban, <30,000	2.43	2.44	2.43
Urban, ≥30,000	2.12	2.16	2.17
Ethnicity:			
British	2.31	2.28	2.35
French	2.49	2.53	2.45
Other Northwest European	2.23	2.24	2.27
All other European	2.01	1.97	1.90
Jewish	1.72	1.80	1.95
Indian	4.30	4.17	4.00
Other	2.11	2.20	2.15

(cont'd on p. 48)

Table A.2.2 (cont'd)

	Mean Number of Children		
	Unadjusted	Adjusted for Age and Age at Marriage	Adjusted for Age, Age at Marriage, and Education
Mother tongue:			
English	2.27	2.28	2.36
French	2.51	2.53	2.42
German	2.30	2.16	2.13
Italian	2.10	2.01	1.72
Ukrainian	2.27	1.99	2.06
Other	2.25	2.28	2.19
Immigration:			
Native-born	2.40	2.26	2.41
Immigrated before 1946	2.61	2.05	2.11
Immigrated 1946-60	2.23	1.99	1.95
Immigrated 1961-71	1.76	2.09	2.06
Parental origins:			
Both born in Canada	2.40	2.49	2.47
Both born outside Canada	2.20	2.04	2.05
Mother only born in Canada	2.30	2.17	2.24
Father only born in Canada	2.17	2.10	2.18
Religion: ^a			
Catholic	2.45	2.48	2.42
Jewish	1.83	1.85	1.98
Fundamentalist Protestant ^b	2.47	2.52	2.53
Non-fundamentalist Protestant ^c	2.21	2.16	2.22

^a Data for Greek Orthodox, no religion, and other religion are not presented.

^b Baptists, Mennonites, and Hutterites.

^c Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and United Church.

Source: One-in-five sample from Statistics Canada Public Use Sample Tape on Individuals.

Table A.2.3

Educational Attainment for Ever Married Women, by Current Marital Status and Selected Age Groups, Canada, 1971
(percentages)

Age and Education	Marital Status		
	Married	Separated	Divorced
25-29	100.0	100.0	100.0
<9, no additional training	18.5	21.1	12.4
<9, additional training	1.1	1.3	1.2
9-13, no additional training	46.0	49.7	49.1
9-13, additional training	22.4	18.9	24.9
University	12.0	9.0	12.4
30-34	100.0	99.9 ^a	100.1 ^a
<9, no additional training	25.3	28.7	14.0
<9, additional training	1.3	1.3	1.6
9-13, no additional training	45.1	47.1	47.7
9-13, additional training	18.7	15.2	23.5
University	9.6	7.6	13.3
35-44	100.0	100.0	100.0
<9, no additional training	33.3	38.6	20.1
<9, additional training	1.5	1.7	1.8
9-13, no additional training	42.7	40.3	45.5
9-13, additional training	15.3	13.2	21.0
University	7.2	6.2	11.6

^a Does not sum to 100.0 percent because of rounding.

Source: Unpublished Statistics Canada tabulations.

Notes

*We wish to acknowledge the useful comments made on an earlier draft by Paul Reed, Leroy Stone, and Miles Wisenthal of Statistics Canada and the assistance of Christine Feaver, McMaster University, with respect to the Public Use Sample Tape. We also wish to thank Gail Cook for her consistent help in the preparation of this chapter.

¹ In 1953, 62.57 percent of all Canadian households had hot and cold running water; by 1968, 90.97 percent had it. In 1948, 48.49 percent of households had gas or electric stoves; by 1968, 94.03 percent. In 1948 only 29.26 percent of households had mechanical refrigerators; by 1968, 97.44 percent. In 1948, 59.21 percent of households had electric washing machines; by 1968, 83.57 percent — and most of the rest of the households could be assumed to have access to a laundry service or laundromat. See *Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970), Table 3, p. 34.

² There are, unfortunately, no historical time budget studies for Canada. The statement is based on a comparison of recent Canadian time budget studies with historical and recent U.S. time budget studies. For a comprehensive analysis of U.S. time budget studies, see Joann Vanek, *Keeping Busy: Time Spent in Housework, United States, 1920-1970* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1975). For Canadian data, see William Michelson and Paul Reed, "The Time Budget," in W. Michelson, ed., *Behavioral Research Methods in Environmental Design* (Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania: Dowden, Hutchinson and Ross, 1975). Preliminary figures were provided by Ellen Derow, who assisted with this study.

³ In 1950, for instance, John Bowlby studied the needs of homeless children on behalf of the World Health Organization. In his influential ensuing publication, *Maternal Care and Mental Health*, he maintained that "motherlove in infancy and childhood is as important for mental health as are vitamins and proteins for physical health" (p. 158), and he suggested that "since the mother of young children is not free, or at least *should not be free, to earn*, there is a strong argument for increased family allowances for children in these early years" (p. 91, emphasis added). It is statements such as these that lend credence to the theory of the indispensability of the biological mother.

⁴ It is one of the better-documented findings in the sociology of the family that the wife's marital power increases with independent income (see, for example, Eugen Lupri, "Contemporary Authority Patterns in a West German Family: A Study in Cross-National Validation," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 31, No. 1 [1969], pp. 134-44).

⁵ Jessie Bernard, *The Future of Marriage* (New York: Bantam, 1972).

⁶ For the corresponding chart see Chart 2.3 in Statistics Canada, *Perspective Canada* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974).

⁷ Marriage rate index:

$$1,000 \left(\frac{\text{number of marriages in a year}}{0.6 (\text{number unmarried females 15 and over}) + 0.4 (\text{number unmarried males 15 and over})} \right)$$

⁸ See 1961 Census of Canada, *Population*, Cat. No. 92-552, and 1971 Census of Canada, *Population*, Cat. No. 92-730.

⁹ In 1971 there were more younger women than in 1961, and younger women tend to be unmarried. If we adjust for differences in age structure by standardization of the 1961 data to the 1971 age distribution of women aged 15 and over, we find that the proportion of married women would have been 64.0 and 63.9 percent, respectively, assuming the 1961 and 1971 female population had the same (1971) age composition. Likewise, the proportion of ever married women, after age standardization, was 74.5 and 75.0 percent in 1961 and 1971, respectively.

¹⁰ From Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics*, Vol. 2, *Marriages and Divorces*, 1973 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), Table 6.

¹¹ Statistics Canada, *Canada Year Book*, 1973 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), Table 5.24, p. 217.

¹² *Ibid.*, Table 5.28, p. 218.

¹³ For a summary of empirical studies of pre-marital intercourse and their methodological problems, see Joseph P. Hornick, "Premarital Sexual Attitudes and Behaviour: A Reference Group Contingent-Factor Theory," Ph.D. diss., University of Waterloo, 1975, pp. 18-40.

¹⁴ In an unpublished report on illegitimacy in Greater Winnipeg, prepared for the United Church Home for Girls in Winnipeg, John Hofley found that approximately 50 percent of unwed mothers chose to keep their children in 1972, compared with approximately 10-20 percent prior to 1967.

¹⁵ Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics*, Vol. 1, *Births*, 1973 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), Table 9.

¹⁶ The illegitimacy ratio has been sharply criticized by Stephane Ventura ("Recent Trends and Differentials in Illegitimacy," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 31 [1969], pp. 446-50), who notes: "The numerator — illegitimate births — is affected by the size of the unmarried female population and the rate of illegitimacy. The denominator — total number of live births — is primarily affected by factors that affect marital fertility, including changes in the spacing and completed family size and the proportion of women who are married. If this changes, the ratio will change even if the numerator remains the same."

¹⁷ Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics*, Vol. 1, *Births*, 1973, *op. cit.*, Table 9.

¹⁸ The illegitimacy rate compares the frequency of the occurrence to the population at risk — or "it indicates whether illegitimacy is increasing or decreasing in relation to its opportunities" (see Clark Vincent, "Teen-Age Unwed Mothers in American Society," *Journal of Social Issues* 22 [1966], pp. 22-33).

¹⁹ Raghubar D. Sharma, "Pre-Marital and Exnuptial Fertility (Illegitimacy) in Canada, 1921-72," paper presented at Canadian Population Society meetings, Edmonton, May, 1975, Table 4.

²⁰ For an excellent review of illegitimacy trends, see Sharma, *op. cit.*

²¹ Benson C. Morah, "The Demographic Consequences of the Liberalized Abortion Law in Canada," paper presented at Canadian Population Society meetings, Edmonton, May, 1975.

²² Prior to the new legislation, adultery was, with very rare exceptions, the only ground for divorce. In 1968, sixteen justifiable grounds for divorce were recognized: adultery, sodomy, bestiality, rape, homosexual act, subsequent marriage, physical cruelty, mental cruelty, imprisonment for an aggregate period of not less than three years, imprisonment for not less than two years on sentence of death or sentence of ten years or more, addiction to alcohol, addiction to narcotics, whereabouts of spouse unknown, non-consummation, separation for not less than three years, and desertion of petitioner for not less than five years. The most frequent reasons for divorce in the period 1969-71 were, in decreasing order, separation, adultery, and desertion (see Statistics Canada, *Canada Year Book*, 1973, *op. cit.*, p. 233).

²³ Prior to 1968 the domicile of the wife was under all circumstances that of her husband. Therefore, if a husband chose to desert his wife and move out of the province, or if his whereabouts were unknown, the wife could not file for divorce, since the petition had to be filed at the husband's residence. This requirement was abolished in 1968.

²⁴ Statistics Canada, *Canada Year Book*, 1973, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

²⁵ Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics*, Vol. 2, *Marriages and Divorces*, 1973, *op. cit.*, Table 22.

²⁶ Statistics Canada, *Canada Year Book*, 1973, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

²⁷ Children here refers to children living with parents at the time of divorce and not all children born of the marriage. This includes all children of 16 years or younger and still-dependent children over 16.

²⁸ Between 1969 and 1971 the mother was granted custody in almost 75 percent of all cases, and the father' in about 13 percent. In the remaining cases, custody was either divided or not awarded. Even when the husband is the petitioner, the wife is more likely to be granted custody of the child(ren) (Statistics Canada, *Canada Year Book*, 1973, *op. cit.*, Table 5.56, p. 234).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

³⁰ Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics*, Vol. 2, *Marriages and Divorces*, 1973, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

³¹ Women's Bureau, Labour Canada, *Women in the Labour Force: Facts and Figures* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974) Table 86, p. 227.

³² In 1945, at the end of the war, women constituted 31.4 percent of the labour force, and their participation rate was 33.2 percent. By 1946, women made up only 22.7 percent of the labour force, and their participation rate decreased to 25.3 percent within this one-year period (*ibid.*).

³³ *Ibid.*, Table 16, p. 33.

³⁴ Statistics Canada, "Working Mothers and Their Child Care Arrangements in Canada," *The Labour Force*, September, 1975.

³⁵ This is indicated by all available time budget studies (for example, Vanek, *op. cit.*).

³⁶ Statistics Canada, *Canada Year Book*, 1973, *op. cit.*, Section 5.6.

³⁷ Jacques Henripin and Jacques Légaré, "Recent Trends in Canadian Fertility," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 8 (1971), p. 109.

³⁸ Computed from Statistics Canada, *Canada Year Book*, 1973, *op. cit.*, Table 5.37, and *Vital Statistics*, Preliminary Annual Report, 1973, Table 8.

³⁹ 1961 Census of Canada, *Population*, Cat. No. 98-507; 1971 Census of Canada, *Population*, Cat. No. 92-718.

⁴⁰ Unfortunately, the way in which age at marriage was coded in the 1971 Census rendered estimates of birth intervals unobtainable.

⁴¹ Carl F. Grindstaff, "The Baby Bust: Changes in Fertility Patterns in Canada," paper presented at Canadian Population Society meetings, Edmonton, May, 1975, p. 8. See also J. Veevers, "Childlessness in Canada: An Analysis of Census Data," *Social Biology* 19 (September, 1972), pp. 266-73.

⁴² For a detailed explanation of this technique, see Frank Andrews, James Morgan, and John Sonquist, *Multiple Classification Analysis* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1969), Chap. 1.

⁴³ Tests were made for interaction between age and age at marriage and for age at marriage and education. No significant interaction effects were found when number of children born was the dependent variable.

⁴⁴ A comparison of the marginals from the Public Use Sample Tape and from the one-in-five subsample shows the two sets to be very similar. Supporting evidence is available from the authors.

⁴⁵ See Karen Oppenheim Mason, *Women's Labour Force Participation and Fertility*, Final Report to National Institute of Health, United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Washington, D.C., July, 1974).

⁴⁶ In the discussion above we have treated fertility as the result of a voluntary action. Another possibility is, of course, that subfecundity is the result of male or female inability to have (more) children and that women, as a consequence, joined the labour force.

3

Education: Enrolment and Attainment

A. Leslie Robb and Byron G. Spencer*

Education is a particularly important vehicle by which individuals develop their own capacities, not only for their personal betterment, but for the benefit of their communities and of humanity at large. Through the educational system, the individual acquires knowledge that it has taken many thousands of years to develop. Furthermore, if the system is working well, the individual will be equipped to utilize and extend that knowledge in the context of everyday life.

It is presumably faith in the efficacy of the educational system that has persuaded reformers over the last several decades of the importance of equal access to that system. In Canada, particular attention has been paid to the limited educational attainment of such groups as the native peoples, low-income families, and the French-speaking population. More recently, much attention has been focused on that 50 percent of the population whose common characteristic is not ethnic background, income, or language, but rather the fact of being female. There is a modern ring to the words of John Stuart Mill, written more than a century ago, in *The Subjection of Women*: "The claim of women to be educated as solidly, and in the same branches of knowledge, as men, is urged with growing intensity, and with a great prospect of success; while the demand for their admission into professions and occupations hitherto closed against them, becomes every year more urgent."¹ Clearly, if women are still being denied equal access to the educational process, then they are denied the opportunity to develop their potential to the same extent as men. If such is the case, then not only do women suffer as individuals, but society as a whole suffers from the presence of individuals who are less well educated than they might be. To quote Mill again, "any limitation of the field of selection deprives society of some chances of being served by the competent without ever saving it from the incompetent."²

In what follows we hope to see how far we in Canada have come, to gain some perspective on how far there is to go, and to consider the obstacles that remain. The chapter begins by documenting the most important aspects of the educational attainment of women in

Canada in terms of both the current situation and developments over the last several decades. Inasmuch as the educational attainment of women cannot usefully be viewed in isolation or in absolute terms, the results are compared with those for men. The results for men, however, are not used as a standard of reference, in the sense of a desirable goal, but simply for comparative purposes, to give the figures a context, and to allow consideration of differences in patterns of education between the sexes.

After documenting certain differences in the educational streaming of males and females, the chapter goes on to explore the more difficult, but also more interesting, question of why these differences exist. To this end, educational patterns are analyzed to point up psychological, social, and economic influences that may account for the observed differences. In particular, we consider whether measured differences in abilities between the sexes could account for observed differences in occupational streaming. Social and economic factors that have a bearing on an individual's continuation in the educational system are then considered. In this connection, we analyze such "background variables" as the educational attainment of each of the parents and the family income, while taking into account ethnic and geographic factors. The object is to determine whether observed differences in the educational enrolment of males and females are attributable specifically to these background variables or whether they must be explained with reference to more general social phenomena.

The Education Profile: An Analysis of Trends

In considering the education of a population, one can look at the flow dimension — enrolment in the educational system at various points in time — and at the stock dimension — the accumulated education of the population at any point in time. The flow dimension clearly concerns only those currently involved in the educational system — primarily the young — whereas the stock dimension takes into account the completed education of the entire population, young and old.

Whether one is concerned with the stock or with the flow, any attempt to describe the educational system as a whole meets with a number of difficulties arising from its varied and diverse nature. It is relatively straightforward, for example, to talk of the "formal" educational stream, starting with elementary schools and progressing through secondary schools to post-secondary institutions, whether they be universities or non-university professional or technical institutions. It is much more difficult to evaluate the wide range of alternatives outside the formal educational stream (for example, continuing education), because they tend not to have their activities fully recorded. Such alternatives are, nonetheless, important components of the overall educational experience of the population and should not be overlooked.


We start by describing some major trends in enrolment in formal educational programs. Most of our data reflect recent experience, but where possible, we attempt to provide an historical perspective.

Enrolment in Full-Time Education

Consider first Figure 3.1, which displays for males and females, over the period 1911 to 1971, the percentage of the population of various age groups that are at school. Over time, and especially in the last two decades, the fraction of most age groups attending school has increased substantially. The increases for both males and females are most noticeable in the youngest age group (presumably because of a substantial increase in the availability of kindergartens) and in the older age groups, 15-19 and 20-24. While only 41 percent of those aged 15-19 attended school in 1951, by 1971 the figure had increased to 74 percent for males and 71 percent for females. And for those 20-24, the enrolment rate over the same period roughly quadrupled for both males and females.

Figure 3.1

Percentage of Population Aged 5-24 at School, by Sex and Age Group, Canada,^a 1911-71



^a Not including Newfoundland, Yukon, and Northwest Territories prior to 1961.

Sources: Based on data published in the 1951, 1961, and 1971 Censuses of Canada.

While the major observed change is one of substantial growth in the age-specific enrolment rates for both sexes, there is also a noticeable change in the male-female pattern: prior to about 1951 the female enrolment rate for those of high school age (age 15-19) exceeded that of males, while since that time the reverse has been true. One might speculate that the more rapid increase in male enrolment as compared to female enrolment reflects the relative responsiveness of the sexes to the increased demand for a more highly educated labour force in Canada.

Some aspects of the sharp increase in enrolment are more fully documented in Table 3.1, which provides more detail on enrolment rates. From the table it can be seen that the increase in enrolment rates for 5-year-olds has been very sharp — in fact, the rates trebled between 1951-52 and 1966-67, supporting our earlier statement about the greater availability of kindergarten. It is perhaps more surprising to see the sharp rise in the rate for 6-year-olds, from about 80 percent in 1951-52 to about 97 percent (or full attendance) in 1971-72. Virtually full attendance at school is maintained over the period for those aged 7 through 14, and the rates are not recorded.

Two points of special interest emerge from the table. One is that the recent increase in enrolment in full-time studies applies to both males and females at each of the ages 15, 16, and 17. There has been, in other words, a substantial reduction in the attrition or drop-out rate. Whereas about 70 percent of 15-year-olds attended school in 1951-52, the 1971-72 figure was close to 95 percent; for 17-year-olds, the increase was from less than 32 percent to more than 60 percent.

The second point is the reversal of the male and female enrolment rates noted above. While the enrolment rates up to age 17 were higher for girls than for boys in 1951-52, the reverse was true by 1961-62 and has remained so since that time, although in recent years the difference has been diminishing. Finally, we note that the older the age group, the greater the extent to which male enrolment rates exceed female rates.

In post-secondary education we distinguish between those enrolled in non-university institutions and those in universities. Within the non-university category we note separately university transfer students (those at community colleges, but enrolled in programs leading to university studies); within the university category we distinguish between undergraduate and graduate students. Suitable data are not available by single years of age, so enrolment is expressed as a percentage of the population age group from which the great majority of the students are drawn. To the extent that students are outside these age ranges, the rates for specific ages are overstated.

The numbers in non-university post-secondary education have grown substantially, coincident with development of community colleges. Figure 3.2 provides detailed information for the period from 1960-61. As is evident from the figure, the bulk of the enormous

Table 3.1

**Enrolment Rates in Full-Time Education, Canada,
Selected Years**
(percentages)

Level of Education		1951-52	1961-62	1966-67	1971-72
Elementary-secondary:					
Age 5	M	27.7	57.7	70.3	n.a.
	F	28.9	58.4	70.6	n.a.
Age 6	M	79.9	96.4	96.7	96.6
	F	80.3	97.2	96.8	98.2
Age 15	M	69.7	88.9	94.7	94.7
	F	70.8	87.1	94.0	94.5
Age 16	M	50.6	70.0	83.4	84.9
	F	53.1	65.1	80.7	83.5
Age 17	M	31.5	50.8	63.2	64.8
	F	31.9	41.5	55.4	58.7
Non-university, post-secondary (relative to 18-21 age group):					
	M	1.4	3.2	5.3	12.0
	F	5.0	7.3	6.6	10.3
University transfer ^a (relative to 18-21 age group):					
	M	n.a.	n.a.	0.3	4.2
	F	n.a.	n.a.	0.1	2.8
University undergraduate (relative to 18-21 age group):					
	M	11.0	17.5	20.6	22.9
	F	3.1	6.3	10.5	14.0
University graduate (relative to 22-24 age group):					
	M	1.0	1.8	3.9	4.9
	F	0.2	0.3	0.8	1.4


n.a. — not available.

^a University transfer students are registered in non-university post-secondary institutions and, as such, comprise part of the above category.

Sources: Based on statistics provided by the Education Division, Statistics Canada, and on the 1961 Census of Canada, *Population*, Cat. No. 92-543. The 1972-73 figures are based on preliminary data.

increase in enrolment in the 1960s and early 1970s took place in the community colleges. Including transfer students, who are particularly important in Quebec, the number of students increased more than eighteen-fold between 1960-61 and 1972-73, from less than 9,600 to more than 173,000. As indicated in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2, expansion of non-university post-secondary education has involved pro-

Figure 3.2
Full-Time Enrolment in Post-Secondary Non-University Education, by Program and Sex, Canada, 1960-61 to 1972-73
(thousands)



Notes: The figures plotted as "community college" exclude transfer students and nurses in training at community colleges; the latter are included in nursing. Male enrolment in nursing is not plotted because the numbers are very small.

Source: Based on data provided by the Education Division of Statistics Canada.

portionately more males than females. In part, this simply reflects the fact that before the 1960s, non-university post-secondary education was principally available at teachers' colleges and schools of nursing.

The expansion of the university system over the past two decades has also been substantial, though the rate of growth has been less than that of the non-university system. For example, as indicated in Table 3.1, between 1951-52 and 1971-72 the proportion of males in university undergraduate studies relative to the male population aged 18-21 more than doubled, while for females the proportion more than quadrupled. In the case of graduate students, the corresponding proportions increased almost fivefold for males and sevenfold for females. If one were to include university transfer students in the count of undergraduates, the increases would be even sharper. However, it should be noted that even after the recent higher growth rates for female enrolment, males still account for more than 60 percent of all university students.

Table 3.2 shows university undergraduate enrolment, by field of study, for 1962-63 and 1972-73. One impression gained from the table is that female enrolment has become less concentrated; for example, there have been sharp increases in female enrolment in such male-dominated areas as science, business, law, and medicine, although the total numbers remain small.

In very broad outline, then, the enormous increase in students in full-time study in Canada has included both sexes. While male enrolment has increased somewhat more than female enrolment in the elementary-secondary and non-university post-secondary systems, the opposite is true of university level study. At the university level, however, women in 1951-52 had a substantial amount of catching up to do; the gap has been narrowed only in relative terms, it has not been eliminated.

University Part-Time Enrolment

Part-time study at university during the regular academic year has also increased sharply over the last few years, as indicated in Table 3.3.³ We see that for both sexes, at both undergraduate and graduate levels, the numbers involved in part-time study during the regular session have increased greatly; it is also evident that the increase in female enrolment has been proportionally greater. At the undergraduate level, there has been a big increase in the number of part-time students per 100 full-time students, suggesting that part-time studies have recently become a more important component of post-secondary education. At the graduate level, where part-time studies have traditionally had a significant role, part-time enrolment has grown at a somewhat slower pace than has full-time enrolment. The most striking observation, however, is that part-time university studies are substantially more important for women than for men.

80 Table 3.2

Full-Time Undergraduate Enrolment, by Sex and Field of Specialization, Canada, 1962-63 and 1972-73

Field	1962-63		1972-73	
	Males (%)	Females (%)	Males (%)	Females (%)
Arts	38.5	50.3	31.0	44.5
Science	12.7	6.2	19.3	11.3
Commerce and Business Administration	7.7	0.8	10.1	2.8
Education	7.4	19.8	8.5	18.4
Fine and Applied Arts	0.0	0.2	0.8	1.7
Household Science	0.0	4.7	0.0	3.2
Law	2.9	0.4	3.8	1.3
Music	0.2	1.1	0.7	1.3
Medicine	4.0	1.2	3.1	1.4
Nursing	0.0	5.7	0.0	4.3
Other health	1.4	3.2	1.0	3.1
Social Work	0.2	0.9	0.4	1.5
All other	28.6	5.5	21.3	5.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number, all fields	95,827	36,854	175,377	109,781
				62.6

^a No ratio is reported when the number of male registrations is fewer than 0.1 percent of the total male enrolment.

Source: Based on data provided by the Education Division, Statistics Canada. The 1972-73 figures are based on preliminary data.

Table 3.3

Part-Time Fall Enrolment in Universities, by Level of Study and Sex, Canada, Selected Years

<u>Level of Study and Sex</u>	<u>1962-63</u>	<u>1967-68</u>	<u>1972-73</u>
<i>Undergraduate students</i>			
Total numbers:			
Male	22,727	50,245	62,520
Female	15,912	36,923	69,981
Part-time students per 100 full-time students:			
Male	24	33	36
Female	43	47	64
<i>Graduate students</i>			
Total numbers:			
Male	4,438	8,126	15,310
Female	913	2,570	5,172
Part-time students per 100 full-time students:			
Male	62	42	56
Female	72	55	58

Source: Based on data provided by the Education Division, Statistics Canada; the 1972-73 figures are based on preliminary data.

A number of reasons might explain the relatively large enrolment of women in part-time studies at universities. One, related to the occupational structure already noted, is the large number of women in teaching. Many teachers, particularly at the elementary level, begin their teaching careers without a university degree and undertake part-time studies to upgrade their qualifications. Second, women, on the average, marry younger than men, which may necessitate postponing further education or continuing it on a part-time basis. A third factor, which may encourage relatively heavy part-time enrolment by young women, is difficulty in arranging financing for full-time studies. For example, female students typically have more problems than do male students in finding high-paying summer jobs.⁴

Continuing Education

A further dimension of the educational system — but one which is less well documented — is that of continuing (or adult) education. Continuing education refers to the "process in which adults undertake learning activities with the intent of effecting changes in knowledge, skills, and attitudes to meet personal, occupational, or community needs."⁵ The process can take place at any point in the educational stream,

from the most elementary level through to the university level. Its primary characteristic is that it can involve adults at any time in their lives rather than only in their youth.

It is difficult to know the extent of continuing education at a particular time. Problems arise from the range of the levels of study, the informal nature of much of the activity, and the variety of subjects. While it seems likely that much of the expansion in continuing education has taken place over the past several years, the total numbers are simply not known.

While the overall growth of continuing education cannot be documented, we do have information on the growth of specific major components, such as enrolment in programs organized by school boards. The figures, reported in Table 3.4, suggest that there was at least a threefold increase in the number of adults enrolled from 1959-60 to 1972-73. As far as one can tell, female enrolment has been a major part of the total, but the data are too incomplete to permit comment on trends in female registration.

Table 3.4

Estimated Student Enrolment in School Board Continuing Education Programs, Canada, Selected Years
(thousands of persons)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Part-Time Credit Programs</u>			<u>Formal Non-Credit, General Interest Programs</u>		
	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>
1959-60	n.a.	n.a.	25	n.a.	n.a.	100
1964-65	n.a.	n.a.	55	n.a.	n.a.	127
1969-70	101	75	176	77	197	274
1970-71	123	103	226	61	181	242
1971-72	95	104	199	70	206	276
1972-73	n.a.	n.a.	133	n.a.	n.a.	366

n.a. — not available.

Notes: (1) The 1959-60 and 1964-65 credit program figures exclude those involved in secondary level vocational studies. In 1969-70, for example, about one student in four was in this category. (2) No sex breakdown appears to be available, except as reported above; revised total figures are available for 1971-72, but since no sex breakdown is provided, the unrevised figures are reported.

Sources: Statistics Canada, *Continuing Education*, Part I, Cat. No. 81-224, June, 1973, and April, 1974; Statistics Canada, *Service Bulletin*, Cat. No. 81-001, Vol. 3, No. 9.

School boards probably account for a large fraction of all formally organized adult education programs in Canada; however, we cannot be certain of this, since data relating to other programs are even less complete. Other major types of adult education include provincial and private correspondence schools, non-degree programs of colleges and universities, and courses offered through such organizations as the YMCA and the public libraries.

While no suitable time-series data on enrolment in provincial correspondence programs exist, one recent publication reports that more than 66,000 adults were registered in the 1972-73 period,⁶ and earlier publications have suggested that more than half those enrolled were female.⁷ College and university adult education appears to be considerably greater, but is not much better documented. In 1972-73, for example, more than 119,000 adults were reported registered in part-time credit continuing education programs in colleges, and almost 104,000 in general interest courses. The corresponding figures for university enrolment in credit programs were discussed above; in non-credit programs, total enrolment in 1972-73 was 117,000.⁸ While female enrolment is evidently large, documentation is incomplete.⁹

Manpower Training Programs

This review of various aspects of the overall educational system in Canada closes with a brief discussion of the role of a variety of Canada Manpower Training Programs (CMTP), financially supported by the Canada Department of Manpower and Immigration. These programs are best viewed as a component of continuing education. The programs fall into two broad categories — those involving institutional training and those involving industrial training. Institutional training programs take place in various institutions of learning across the country — notably in such places as community colleges and institutes of technology. Industrial training programs, in contrast, take place in industry and not in educational institutions. As a result, those enrolled in the institutional programs are included in the figures presented above, while those in the industrial programs are not.

Table 3.5 gives an indication of the size of the various programs and highlights female participation. The four institutional training programs are Basic Training for Skill Development (BTSD), Language Training, Apprenticeship Training, and Skill Training. The first of these, BTSD, is designed to upgrade basic mathematical, science, and verbal skills to the high school level, as required for entry into various occupational training programs. Language Training, in English and French, is again fairly basic and is primarily for recent immigrants. Apprenticeship Training provides periodic classroom instruction for individuals enrolled in formal apprenticeship programs. Skill Training is oriented towards acquisition of specific occupational skills and often follows BTSD.

It is clear from the figures in Table 3.5 that women are relatively concentrated in the BTSD and Language Training programs — the programs requiring the least prior training. During the three-year period 1971-72 to 1973-74, female enrolment in skill-training programs grew substantially, but enrolment in apprenticeship programs remained extremely low. The overall proportion of female enrolment in institutional training programs has been growing rapidly. Whereas in 1971-72 there were 34 females enrolled for every 100 males, that number increased to 42 in 1972-73 and to 56 in 1973-74.

Table 3.5

**Enrolment in Canada Manpower Training Programs,
1971-72 to 1973-74**

Training	<u>1971-72</u>	<u>1972-73</u>	<u>1973-74</u>
<i>Institutional training</i>			
Enrolment, full-time:			
Total	226,753	204,247	193,144
Females per 100 males	34	42	56
Relative to labour force:			
Females per 100 members of female labour force	2.1	2.1	2.2
Males per 100 members of male labour force	2.9	2.4	2.0
Program of study (females per 100 males):			
BTSD	53	77	112
Language	85	101	104
Apprentice	4	3	3
Skill	34	39	50
All programs	34	42	56
<i>Industrial training</i>			
Training in industry:			
Total enrolment	31,500	40,500	33,700
Females per 100 males	39	43	39
Training on the job:			
Total enrolment	44,000	36,643	9,404
Females per 100 males	42	39	39

Notes: The institutional training programs are described in the text. For part-time institutional trainees, no sex detail is available; we note, however, that the part-time program is sizeable, involving about one-third as many students as the full-time programs, and that almost all the students are involved in skill training.

Sources: Based on tabulations made available by the Department of Manpower and Immigration, and on Statistics Canada, *The Labour Force*, Cat. No. 71-001, various issues.

It is also informative to compare overall enrolment figures for males and females in institutional training to the size of the labour force. As is evident from Table 3.5, the number of women enrolled per 100 members of the female labour force remained roughly constant from 1971-72 to 1973-74, while the proportion for males declined to a comparable level. While three years is too short a period from which to draw firm conclusions, we can say that if this trend is maintained, earlier concern about general underrepresentation of women in Canada Manpower Training Programs would no longer be valid for institutional training programs as a whole.¹⁰

With respect to the industrial training programs, the figures presented in the lower part of Table 3.5 show that the number of women per 100 men did not increase over the period 1971-72 to 1973-74. An

increase in the enrolment of women in these programs is necessary if female participation relative to the female labour force is to be raised to the level for males.

Educational Enrolment, 1971

In Table 3.1 we were able to report certain information for those of younger ages; however, for other age groups, enrolment data are available by program of study but not by age and sex of student. To provide a picture of the educational activity of the general population at a point in time, we have drawn on the 1971 Census of Canada. The results are reported in Table 3.6, which displays the enrolment rates for both full-time and part-time study at schools or universities, for both males and females.¹¹

Table 3.6

Enrolment Rates in Education, by Sex and Age, Canada, 1971
(percentages)

Age	Full-Time		Part-Time	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
16-19	70.6	63.6	3.7	3.2
20-24	23.5	12.4	8.3	5.9
25-34	3.9	2.1	8.2	5.7
35-44	1.0	1.4	5.4	3.7
45-54	0.6	1.0	3.8	2.8
55-64	0.4	0.4	1.5	1.1
65+	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3

Source: Based on the 1971 Public Use Sample Tape on Individuals.

The enrolment rates for those aged 16-19 and 20-24 confirm the impressions gained earlier — namely, that male enrolment is substantially greater than female enrolment at these ages and that, for women aged 20-24, part-time studies are relatively more important than they are for men. For the age groups 35-44 and 45-54, however, we note that female enrolment in full-time studies exceeds male enrolment. It is at these ages that women often return to further studies and to the labour force, once they have completed childbearing.

While full-time enrolment rates decline consistently with age, and part-time rates peak at an early age, it is notable that formal educational activity takes place at all ages, for both sexes.

Educational Attainment of the Population, 1961 and 1971

We have considered thus far only those currently in the educational stream. Yet, as we have seen, for the majority of the population, school attendance — especially on a full-time basis — is a thing of the past. While we have some information about overall educational

attainment based on enrolment data of earlier years, figures relevant to those over 40 are fragmentary and do not reflect the subsequent loss of educational experience associated with those who have died or emigrated, or the gain associated with those who have immigrated. Thus we would like to be able to go beyond current enrolment figures to take stock at a point in time of the net effect of the educational process as it has developed over the years. Some tabulations based on the 1961 and 1971 Censuses will serve this purpose.

Consider first Figure 3.3, which plots for each sex the educational level attained by each of seven age groups at the time of the 1961 Census. For each group, the figure portrays the percentage of individuals of each sex who had attained a certain level. The most obvious comment is that the general level of attainment had increased sharply among the young. By 1961, the "no schooling" response had virtually disappeared for the younger age groups. Moreover, about one-third of those in the age group 20-24 had four to five years of secondary school or more, and among those 55-64 the figure was about 15 percent. The age pattern is roughly the same for males and females, though it is again clear that women of all ages had attended university in smaller proportions than had men, though a larger fraction of women had completed four to five years of secondary school.

Figure 3.4 provides similar information from the 1971 Census, with greater detail on educational attainment. The figure includes data on apprenticeship and vocational training programs as well as non-university post-secondary education which were not available from the 1961 Census. Figure 3.4 also shows attainment data by language spoken in the home (English, French, and other). Taking each language group separately, it is again clear that the age pattern of educational attainment is broadly similar for males and females. Much more substantial differences arise when making comparisons among language groups than between the sexes within one language group. Thus we find, for example, that while about 38 percent of English-speaking women aged 20-24 had some post-secondary education, the corresponding figure for French-speaking women was about 30 percent and for others about 24 percent. The lowest level of educational attainment — elementary school incomplete — involved about 3 percent of English-speaking women aged 20-24, 12 percent of French-speaking, and 29 percent of other language groups. Similar comments apply to the educational attainment of males.

Our main interest, however, is in differences between the sexes after accounting for other systematic influences. In this connection we note that females of each language group tend to be under-represented in the higher levels of educational attainment, compared to males. Thus, for example, among English-speaking 25- to 34-year-olds, about 28 percent of the males have post-secondary education, compared to 23 percent of the females. This particular difference decreases among older age groups.

Figure 3.3
Educational Attainment of the Population 15 Years and Over, by Sex, Age, and Level of Attainment, Canada, 1961





Figure 3.4
Educational Attainment of the Population 15 Years and Over, by Sex, Age, Language of the Home, and Level of Attainment, Canada, 1971



Source: Based on tabulations of the 1971 Census provided by Statistics Canada.

Summary

There has been an enormous expansion in the number of Canadians participating in various educational programs. This expansion has been especially pronounced over the past two decades and has extended to the post-secondary educational system, both university and non-university, and also to programs of continuing (or adult) education. Both males and females have shared in the overall expansion, though not always equally. Thus in post-secondary education as a whole, female enrolment rates have recently increased more rapidly than have male rates. However, the growth in male enrolment rates has been somewhat more rapid in non-university post-secondary education, and the growth in female enrolment rates has been greater in university education. Furthermore, in recent years female enrolment has increased sharply in a number of traditionally male-dominated fields of study, such as law, medicine, and commerce, though the total female enrolment remains small.

Even with the substantial increase in both male and female enrolment and the changes that have occurred in fields of study, women do remain concentrated in their "traditional" areas, such as arts, education, and nursing. Are there strong reasons why such streaming should persist? Are women especially well-suited for these roles, or have they undertaken them largely because society, in one way or another, has discouraged them from other activities? We will now investigate factors influencing males and females at various crucial points in the educational process.

Factors Influencing Educational Attainment

Casual observation suggests that not all individuals born today have an equal chance of attending university in twenty years' time. Our purpose here is to assess the current social science literature which discusses those factors that appear to be important in determining who will attend university in twenty years' time and who will not. Such factors are often referred to as "determinants."

It should be emphasized that no social scientist would attempt to predict what a particular individual might be doing at some point in the fairly distant future. Clearly there are a myriad of forces influencing the educational choice of a specific individual. A social scientist would attempt, however, to isolate systematic influences on the educational choices of large groups of individuals. Our concern is to focus on systematic influences that may help explain the differing educational choices of males and females; we are not concerned here with overall change in the level of attainment, as discussed above, although that, too, is obviously important for society as a whole.

Among social scientists, those who have been most concerned with sex differences in educational attainment are economists, psychologists, and sociologists. It is convenient to discuss the literature under three headings: that relating to the economic influences, a

discussion to which both economists and sociologists have contributed; that relating to forces of socialization, a discussion to which social psychologists and sociologists have contributed; and that relating to intellectual abilities, an area in which psychologists have played the major role.

Economic Factors

Economists treat education as a combined investment and consumption decision. The distinction is based on whether the education will lead to a higher income as the result of lifetime activity (investment) or whether it will simply yield satisfaction in other ways (consumption).

On the investment side, education is viewed as a preparation for a career. Individuals are presumed to forego income in the current period in order to reap higher income in the future. This view leads to consideration of the costs and benefits of education. If the costs rise or the benefits fall, fewer people will choose to continue their education. (The costs include direct costs, such as tuition fees, and foregone opportunities, such as income that could have been earned, while the benefits include future income prospects.) Even with the student aid programs available in Canada, all students may not be able to finance their educational choice, and thus it is possible that higher enrolment rates in education are associated with higher family income. Further, given income, the larger the family and the more children to be financed, the more difficult the financing problem. Moreover, not all students will estimate the monetary rewards of further education equally well; one would expect that the information available to children would vary with their socio-economic background.

Unfortunately, these propositions about educational choice are indistinguishable from propositions that follow from the view of education as a consumption activity. In this view, education is perceived much like a consumer good, yielding satisfaction to child and parent — both at the time the education is undertaken and after it is completed. Treating education as a consumer good implies that the amount consumed will decrease as the cost rises and increase as family income rises.

With regard to sex differences, the investment view leads to the proposition that if returns to investment are lower for women, or costs higher, less investment will be undertaken. The returns might be lower either because, on the average, women spend fewer years in the labour force (and have less time to recoup their investment) or because salary differentials between men and women are greater for the more educated. It is also possible that certain occupations, such as nursing or teaching, are more compatible with childbearing, since they allow for movement into and out of the labour force without great loss of seniority.¹² Thus some occupational streaming may reflect the life-

time earnings potential of the occupations. From the consumption view, propositions about male-female differences are less clear. This leads to consideration of how parents view their male and female children's success in life and brings us to the other theories on educational determinants.

Abilities and Social Conditioning

One major difference between the economic literature and that concerned with abilities and social conditioning is that the latter emphasizes influences present at a much earlier age. The economic literature is concerned with students who have reached an age at which they can make decisions and who have stayed in the educational stream, so that they have not already precluded future educational opportunities. In contrast, the literature on abilities and social conditioning emphasizes such matters as intellectual capacity, parental influences, social class pressures, and peer group influences.

Abilities

After an extensive survey of the literature, Maccoby and Jacklin¹³ list only three differences between the intellectual abilities of boys and girls, and Cattell¹⁴ and Hutt¹⁵ report similar findings. All suggest that, on the average, girls have greater verbal ability than boys, while boys excel in visual-spatial and mathematical abilities. Parenthetically, we note that whether the differences are innate or the result of social conditioning appears to be an open question. The measured differences seem to arise among those old enough to have their interests influenced to a considerable extent already. As a result, one can speculate that reinforcement of certain "male" interests, such as sports and mechanical things, might be associated with superior male performance on visual-spatial and mathematical tests, while reinforcement of "female" interests, such as reading, would be associated with superior verbal abilities.

Since neither sex is found to be superior in all attributes, the implications for the educational attainment of the sexes are unclear. That different educational paths are followed by the sexes has already been noted. It has been suggested that differing abilities may play a role in this streaming. If this is true, and the different streams involve different lengths of formal education, then differences in educational enrolment and attainment will result.

On the assumption that sex differences in average abilities exist, the question is whether they are sufficient to account for differences between the sexes in educational streaming. To address this question, we have considered, as an example, the suggestion that the lack of females in architecture and other technical-scientific occupations may be related to the weaker visual-spatial and mathematical abilities of women.¹⁶ To assess this argument, we have considered the extent to which male and female distributions of visual-spatial ability overlap. Specifically, we have taken the means and standard deviations of test

scores of males and females on a three-dimensional visualization test, assumed these distributions to be normal, and then calculated the proportion of women who would score higher than the top 5 percent or 10 percent of males (that is, higher than the 95th or 90th percentile of the male scores). It turns out that the distributions overlap considerably and, as reported in the lower part of Table 3.7, for every 100 males with visualization skills above the male 95th percentile, there are about 27 females. If one can then argue that the skills involved in being an architect require scoring above, say, the male 95th percentile, then 5 percent of the male population would be able to be architects. It follows that for every 100 males eligible, 27 females are eligible. In fact, we find, as reported in the upper part of Table 3.7, that in Canada in 1971 there were just under 3 female architects per 100 male architects.

It might be argued that this comparison is inappropriate, since many females have chosen not to be in the labour force, so that some of these 27 should be excluded. Allowing for this and assuming that the ability of those in the labour force is distributed in the same way as that of the general population, the labour force includes about 14 females per 100 males with this high level of visual skill (see the last row of Table 3.7). If we were to assume that 10 percent of the male population has the necessary abilities, then the number of eligible females in the labour force per 100 males (both with the requisite skills) rises to about 18; if the cutoff is extended to 15 percent, the number rises to 21. This evidence, while not conclusive, suggests fairly strongly that differences in abilities will not explain a great deal of the existing variation in educational attainment and career choice.¹⁷

Some anomalies in the occupational distribution of men and women reinforce this view (see Table 3.7). Women form a larger proportion of architects than of engineers, and the proportion of women in architecture is growing much faster, which is inconsistent with the view that lack of visual-spatial ability, presumably as crucial for architects as engineers, is the cause of these differentials. Furthermore, that the proportion of women in the commercial art and photography occupational group, a group that no doubt has high visual-spatial ability requirements, is so much higher suggests that other factors are the major cause of occupational differences.

Social Conditioning

The literature on social conditioning of children is extremely wide-ranging, covering family influences, peer group pressures, sex stereotyping within education, and cultural considerations. All of these influences are no doubt important in determining the age at which a child will leave the formal educational process. In the discussion that follows we concentrate on family characteristics and influences, although we recognize that some of the discussion would also apply to the broader community's influence, since the members of a family associate mostly with others of similar socio-economic status. It has been

found, for example, that children of parents with higher socio-economic status and higher education will, on the average, continue longer in the educational process.¹⁸ Within socio-economic groups, however, it is unclear what differences we should expect to find between males and females.

Table 3.7

Females in Selected Occupations Requiring High Visual-Spatial Ability, Canada, 1971, and Frequency of Occurrence of High Visual Abilities

	<u>Females per 100 Males</u>	<u>Females per 100 Males (under age 34)</u>	<u>Females per 100 Males (age 35 and over)</u>
<i>Occupations</i>			
All occupations	52.3	59.2	46.4
Architects	2.9	4.7	2.0
Occupations in Natural Sciences, Engineering, and Mathematics	7.9	9.7	5.5
Engineers	1.5	1.6	1.4
Occupations in Fine and Commercial Art, Photography and Related Fields	34.6	36.5	32.6
<i>Frequency of high visual abilities</i>			
Females with ability greater than the 90th percentile of males, per 100 males:			
In the population	35.1	35.1	35.1
In the labour force	18.4	20.8	16.3
Females with ability greater than the 95th percentile of males, per 100 males:			
In the population	27.2	27.2	27.2
In the labour force	14.2	16.1	12.6

Note: The distribution of visual abilities is based on a three-dimensional visualization test of grade 12 students in the United States, conducted in connection with Project Talent. The means and standard deviations (in brackets) are: males, 9.69 (3.38); females 8.40 (3.10).

Sources: 1971 Census of Canada, *Occupations*, Cat. No. 94-723, and *Project Talent: The American High School Student* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1964), pp. 2-46 (test number R-282).

There are two areas in which one might expect to find evidence of differences in treatment of the sexes that could translate into differences in educational attainment. These are the role of imitation and modeling in the development of young children and sex-type reinforcement by parents. In regard to the first of these, there has been a widely held view that children tend to imitate and model themselves after the parent of the same sex,¹⁹ but recent work on young children does not support this view. Maccoby and Jacklin, for example, summarize their findings as follows: "Children do imitate models, but they do not systematically imitate a same-sex model. Hence, they ought to resemble both their parents, not particularly the same-sex one."²⁰

Turning to sex-typed reinforcement, the differences seem more obvious. From an early age, children are dressed in sex-appropriate ways, and the toys provided are typically sex-typed. Moreover, there is an attempt to discourage activities considered sex-inappropriate, perhaps more strongly in the case of boys. These pressures in early childhood may encourage career choices that have traditionally been accepted as suitable for the child's sex. However, Maccoby and Jacklin report that, in a variety of other types of parent-child interaction, there appears to be little or no difference in the treatment of boys and girls. These include the amount of verbal interaction, parental warmth, parental restrictiveness, dependency weaning, permission of aggressiveness (although there is some suggestion that fathers will tolerate more aggression and insolence in girls, and vice versa for mothers), and achievement pressure. A number of these interactions differ noticeably by social class, however. Despite the absence of differences in observed achievement pressure, there is some evidence to support the proposition that parents (both mothers and fathers) more often express the hope that their boys will go on to higher education.

Summary

The literature on the socialization of children provides us with little guidance in framing hypotheses about how the differing backgrounds of parents influence differentially the educational attainment of males and females. It appears that there is little evidence to support the view that the educational attainment of a child of given sex will be more influenced by one parent than by the other. Also, the differences in abilities between the sexes give little help in framing hypotheses about differential educational attainment, nor are they likely to be the cause of the observed differential streaming. At the same time, there do appear to be good reasons to expect that the socio-economic background of the parents will be an important influence on the educational attainment of both male and female children.²¹ Moreover, we have suggested that both economic considerations (regarding the flexibility of occupations with respect to mobility into and out of the labour force) and social conditioning of children (regarding sex-

appropriate behaviour) can encourage the maintenance of past occupational patterns. We now consider some recent Canadian data in the light of these comments.

An Analysis of Factors Influencing Enrolment

To analyze the determinants of educational enrolment, we have drawn heavily on data from the 1971 Census. Although information on family background is limited, we have been able to obtain information on the following characteristics of young persons: school attendance, geographic location, educational level of father and mother, language of the home, and family size. We first consider a set of tables based on the 1971 Census and concerned with enrolment rates in full-time education. Tables 3.8 to 3.12 display the proportion of males and females of various age and family income groups who are full-time students, in each case cross-classified by the other characteristics mentioned above. Since the rates can be calculated only for children who are enumerated with their parents,²² the levels of these rates must be interpreted cautiously; differences in the levels in various cells are more meaningful.²³

Table 3.8 displays the enrolment rates for each of the major geographic regions in Canada and for Canada as a whole. For Canada as a whole, enrolment rates at each age for each sex increase with family income. This pattern also holds true in all the regions separately, with the exception of the Prairie region, where female enrolment rates are higher for low- than for medium-income groups at ages 18 and 19. Further, female rates tend to be higher than male rates at low income levels (all ages) and low ages (all income levels), and the reverse is true elsewhere. Thus there is a tendency (except in the youngest age group) for female enrolment rates to rise less with income than do male rates.²⁴ Also, rates for both sexes decline noticeably with age.

The highest enrolment rates are found in the Atlantic region for medium- and high-income groups, while at the low-income level, enrolment in the Prairies is high for males. The lowest rates for females are consistently found in Quebec; for males, the lowest rates are in Quebec for younger ages and in British Columbia for higher ages. Comparing males and females directly, we note that in British Columbia and in the Prairie and Atlantic regions, the female rates tend to be higher than the male rates, while the reverse is true in Quebec. The Ontario pattern is much like the overall Canadian pattern mentioned above.

Table 3.9 displays similar information on enrolment rates according to the level of the father's education. Enrolment rates for both males and females at all income levels rise with the father's educational level. Variations within each income class, allowing education to vary, tend to be greater than variations between income classes for a given level of education. For example, for children of age 19 whose

Table 3.8

Enrolment Rates in Full-Time Education, by Sex, Age, Family Income, and Region, Canada, 1971

Family Income	Region	Ages 16 and 17		Age 18		Age 19		Ages 20 and 21	
		Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Low income (less than \$7,000)	Atlantic	77	83	59	64	45	49	30	34
	Quebec	74	75	54	51	42	38	28	23
	Ontario	81	85	63	70	48	53	35	35
	Prairies	83	88	63	74	43	60	32	42
	British Columbia	80	85	61	69	41	46	27	37
Medium income (\$7,000 to \$11,000)	Canada	78	82	59	62	44	46	30	30
	Atlantic	87	89	75	76	60	62	46	45
	Quebec	84	82	69	60	52	44	39	30
	Ontario	87	89	73	73	59	55	43	38
	Prairies	88	90	72	71	53	53	42	42
High income (more than \$11,000)	British Columbia	87	90	67	71	46	46	33	37
	Canada	86	87	71	69	55	51	41	36
	Atlantic	92	92	85	85	76	75	62	65
	Quebec	89	89	78	74	69	61	56	46
	Ontario	91	92	82	83	73	70	61	58
British Columbia	Prairies	90	91	75	77	62	64	54	60
	British Columbia	90	92	74	74	54	61	47	50
	Canada	91	91	79	79	68	66	57	55

Note: The family income figure refers to the calendar year 1970, education status to the academic year 1970-71, and other figures to the time of the Census (June 1, 1971). The tabulation is restricted to responses for children whose parents were present at the time of the Census, and whose fathers were in the labour force.

Source: Data provided by Statistics Canada, 1971 Census.

fathers have high school education, the difference in the proportion at school between the low-income and the high-income groups is 17 points for males and 10 points for females; within an income class the differences are much larger. This suggests that a greater proportion of the overall variation in enrolment rates is accounted for by the father's education than by family income.

In Table 3.10, similar information is presented, this time controlling for the mother's education. There is a tendency for enrolment rates to rise with the mother's education, although the pattern occasionally reverses itself for both males and females between the two highest education classes. The pattern of greater variation in enrolment rates among educational levels within each income group than among income groups for a given level of education is again apparent. Further, the pattern of higher female than male enrolment rates at younger ages and low income levels seems to follow for all income and age groups if the mother has ever been to university.²⁵

In Table 3.11 we report enrolment proportions associated with the language of the home. The results for English- and French-language homes yield much the same information as the regional tabulation discussed above. For the "other" category, primarily composed of recent immigrants, the enrolment rates typically lie between the English and the French groups, except in the youngest age and lowest income groups, for which they are below the French. The male-female difference displays no consistent pattern, which is not surprising, given the heterogeneity of the group.

Finally, in Table 3.12, we consider family size and educational enrolment. The 1971 Census provides two pieces of information on family size: the number of persons in what is defined as the Census Family, and the number of live births of the mother. We chose to work with the number of live births of the mother in order to include in our measure of family size children who had already left home. At ages 16 and 17, lower enrolment rates tend to be associated with one-child families and large families (6 or more live births), while by ages 20 and 21, we find that enrolment rates typically decline with family size.

These cross-classifications indicate how enrolment rates vary with certain background characteristics of the individual, but other important characteristics have not simultaneously been taken into account. For example, we noted that enrolment rates at all income levels tend to rise with the education of each parent. We know, however, that highly educated mothers are likely to be married to highly educated fathers, hence the variation in enrolment rates connected with the education of one parent should perhaps be attributed to the education of the other. To try to isolate the separate effects with cross-classification analysis would require us to hold one parent's education constant, as well as family income, while varying the education of the other. Such tables would be extremely large, and the procedure unmanageable. A more convenient method by which to analyze the

78 Table 3.9

Enrolment Rates in Full-Time Education, by Sex, Age, Family Income, and Father's Educational Level, Canada, 1971

Family Income	Father's Education	Ages 16 and 17		Age 18		Age 19		Ages 20 and 21	
		Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Low income (less than \$7,000)	Elementary or less	75	79	54	58	40	42	26	26
	High school	85	86	68	70	51	54	38	37
	University 1 or 2 years	88	89	77	77	60	62	52	44
	University 3 years plus	90	88	78	76	67	69	52	52
	Total	78	82	59	62	44	46	30	30
Medium income (\$7,000 to \$11,000)	Elementary or less	83	84	67	64	49	45	35	30
	High school	89	89	75	72	60	55	45	39
	University 1 or 2 years	91	88	79	77	68	63	59	53
	University 3 years plus	91	91	84	82	72	70	68	61
	Total	86	87	71	69	55	51	41	36
High income (more than \$11,000)	Elementary or less	86	88	68	71	55	54	42	38
	High school	91	92	80	78	68	64	56	52
	University 1 or 2 years	93	92	84	83	79	76	67	67
	University 3 years plus	95	94	88	89	82	84	77	76
	Total	91	91	79	79	68	66	57	55

Note and Source: See Table 3.8.

Table 3.10
Enrolment Rates in Full-Time Education, by Sex, Age, Family Income, and Mother's Educational Level, Canada, 1971

Family Income	Mother's Education	Ages 16 and 17		Age 18		Age 19		Ages 20 and 21	
		Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Low income (less than \$7,000)	Elementary or less	74	79	53	56	39	40	26	23
	High school	84	88	68	72	52	55	37	40
	University 1 or 2 years	89	92	75	81	53	70	47	59
	University 3 years plus	85	84	68	70	63	69	53	53
	Total	78	82	59	62	44	46	30	30
Medium income (\$7,000 to \$11,000)	Elementary or less	83	83	66	62	49	44	35	28
	High school	89	90	75	73	59	56	46	40
	University 1 or 2 years	91	91	79	80	69	68	53	61
	University 3 years plus	87	87	77	85	67	71	65	72
	Total	86	87	71	69	55	51	41	36
High income (more than \$11,000)	Elementary or less	86	87	69	69	57	52	43	36
	High school	91	92	81	80	70	67	59	56
	University 1 or 2 years	94	93	85	87	77	79	71	72
	University 3 years plus	94	94	88	91	83	85	76	81
	Total	91	91	79	79	68	66	57	55

Note and Source: See Table 3.8.

80 Table 3.11

Enrolment Rates in Full-Time Education, by Sex, Age, Family Income, and Language of the Home, Canada, 1971

Family Income	Language of the Home	Ages 16 and 17		Age 18		Age 19		Ages 20 and 21	
		Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Low income (less than \$7,000)	English	80	87	63	70	46	53	48	36
	French	74	75	54	53	42	39	27	23
	Other	71	72	56	56	46	44	34	31
	Total	78	82	59	62	44	46	30	30
Medium income (\$7,000 to \$11,000)	English	87	89	72	72	56	54	41	38
	French	84	82	68	61	52	44	38	30
	Other	84	81	70	69	61	56	48	45
	Total	86	87	71	69	55	51	41	36
High income (more than \$11,000)	English	91	92	80	80	69	68	58	58
	French	89	88	76	73	68	60	54	44
	Other	85	88	76	76	68	71	59	52
	Total	91	91	79	79	68	66	57	55

Note and Source: See Table 3.8.

Table 3.12
Enrolment Rates in Full-Time Education, by Sex, Age, Family Income, and Number of Live Births to Mother, Canada, 1971

Family Income	Number of Live Births	Ages 16 and 17		Age 18		Age 19		Ages 20 and 21	
		Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Low income (less than \$7,000)	One	81	82	67	67	52	51	36	34
	Two or three	84	86	67	68	51	53	37	34
	Four or five	82	85	63	66	46	48	33	32
	Six or more	72	77	52	57	38	41	24	25
	Total	78	82	59	62	44	46	30	30
Medium income (\$7,000 to \$11,000)	One	85	87	74	75	62	55	47	42
	Two or three	89	89	77	73	61	55	46	39
	Four or five	87	88	72	69	55	51	41	36
	Six or more	82	83	63	63	48	45	34	29
	Total	86	87	71	69	55	51	41	36
High income (more than \$11,000)	One	90	89	82	79	73	67	63	58
	Two or three	92	92	83	81	72	69	61	58
	Four or five	91	92	79	79	68	66	56	54
	Six or more	87	88	70	73	59	58	46	46
	Total	91	91	79	79	68	66	57	55

Note and Source: See Table 3.8.

independent relations between enrolment rates and other variables is regression analysis. This type of analysis allows for systematic statistical testing to determine whether the influence of a specific set of variables contributes significantly to the explanation of the variation in enrolment rates while controlling for the influence of other factors.

We have used the Public Use Sample Tape on Individuals from the 1971 Census supplied by Statistics Canada.²⁶ The sets of variables that we have employed in this context are province of residence (9 provinces),²⁷ community size (urban with population above 30,000, smaller urban, rural non-farm, and rural farm), family size (sizes 3, 4, 5, 6, 7+),²⁸ language of the home (English, French, Italian, other), family income (less than \$3,000, \$3,000-5,999, \$6,000-8,999, \$9,000-11,999, \$12,000-14,999, \$15,000-19,999, \$20,000+), education of father (less than grade 8, grades 8-10, grades 11-13, some university, university degree), and education of mother (using the same categories as for the father). We have restricted our data set to children enumerated with their families and with both parents at home. The data set thus corresponds fairly closely to that employed in the earlier tabulations, with the main differences being that (a) the father is not restricted to being in the labour force, (b) for a number of variables, classes are subdivided more finely, (c) variables to represent community size have been included, and, importantly, (d) the income variable has been modified to family income net of any income attributable to the child.²⁹

We have run separate regressions for each sex and for each age 16 through 21 and have conducted suitable statistical tests to assess, for each set of variables, whether they contribute significantly to the explanation of the variation in enrolment rates. A summary of the regression results for ages 16, 18, and 21 is provided in Appendix Table A.3.1, along with a sample interpretation. Although the regression analysis leaves a large fraction of the observed variation in enrolment rates unexplained, the results of the analysis tend to support the earlier findings that enrolment rates for both sexes rise with education of the father, with the education of the mother, and, although with less consistency, with family income. Less support is found for independent systematic effects of province of residence, language of the home, and family size.

When other factors are taken into account, differences among the provinces are of little importance.³⁰ The pattern of high female rates noted in the Prairie region is no longer supported. However, the suggestion that female rates tend to be high in rural communities might account for this result. Community size appears to be important in about half the cases considered, with male rates generally declining as community size declines and, as mentioned above, female rates tending to increase. Finally, language of the home and family size contribute little to the explanation of the variation in enrolment rates when other factors are taken into account.


The effects of family income suggested by the cross-tabulations are supported by the regression results, although the patterns are less consistent than those noted earlier. Especially at younger ages (16-18), low enrolment rates seem to be associated with low family income. We suspect that this pattern is lost at older ages partly because of the bias in our sample. As mentioned earlier, we have not been able to include in our analysis children who have left home, and it is possible that children from very low-income families are more likely to leave home if they are not continuing their education. Nevertheless, at older ages a high family income (\$20,000+) tends to be associated with high enrolment rates. For the intermediate income classes the results are less clear; consistent patterns show up only at the extremes of the income distribution, and they do not differ by sex.

In the cross-tabulations, enrolment rates increased consistently with the level of education of each parent. This pattern is fully supported by the regression analysis, which simultaneously takes into account the education of both parents as well as the other influences on enrolment rates already discussed. Furthermore, the pattern that emerges from the regression analysis in connection with the parents' education is by far the most consistent of all the factors considered here, and the explanatory power associated with the education of the parents generally exceeds that associated with other factors.

Figures 3.5 and 3.6 display the impact, as estimated in the regression analysis, of the education of the parents on the enrolment rates of their children. Figure 3.5 shows the estimated impact of the education of the father on the enrolment rates of 16-, 18-, and 21-year-olds, males and females separately, while Figure 3.6 shows the estimated impact of the education of the mother. Consider first, Figure 3.5. In each case, the points plotted represent the incremental influence of the father's education, compared to a father with an education below grade 8. Thus, for example, looking at the 18-year-olds, our estimate is that, when the other variables specified in the regression model are held constant, the enrolment rate of 18-year-old males whose fathers have a grade 11-13 education is, on the average, about 17 percentage points above that of those whose fathers have less than 8 years of education; for females the difference is about 14 points. Looking now to 18-year-olds in Figure 3.6, the enrolment rate of males whose mothers have grade 11-13 education is, on the average, about 11 percentage points above those whose mothers have less than 8 years of education, while for females the difference is about 12 points.


It is clear from these figures that the enrolment rates of both sexes rise systematically with the level of parental education. There seems to be little difference, however, between the sexes. This lends support to the findings of the psychological literature discussed earlier, which found little tendency for a child of either sex to imitate one parent more than the other, or for parents to provide differential

Figure 3.5
Estimated Impact of Education of Father on Enrolment Rate of Children, Canada, 1971



Note: The above lines join only those points representing estimates that were statistically significant. The points marked *f and *m refer to estimates, for females and males, respectively, that are not statistically significant; therefore the lines exclude them.
Source: Based on regression results reported in Appendix Table A.3.1.

Figure 3.6
Estimated Impact of Education of Mother on Enrolment Rate of Children, Canada, 1971



Note and Source: See Figure 3.5.

encouragement to a child, depending on sex. One feature that stands out is that the lines become steeper as the age of the child increases. That is, the attrition rates of children whose parents have a high level of education are much lower than those of children whose parents have less education.

We have been able to conduct a similar regression analysis³¹ based on the 1974 Senior Secondary Student Survey of Career Decisions.³² Unfortunately, the results were obtained too late to permit us to incorporate them in a systematic way into the present discussion, but we are able to make a few comments.

The 1974 survey was conducted towards the end of the year in which students graduated from high school and enquired, among other things, about students' intentions for the coming fall. This survey has an advantage over the Census, by including all those who reach the final year of high school, which permits analysis of the factors influencing further educational plans. It thus avoids the bias caused by loss from the survey of those who undertake no further education and leave home after their final year of high school.

The analysis based on this later survey provides additional support for the conclusions as to the strong influence of the education of each of the parents on the education of the children. Again we detect no difference in the impact that the education of either parent has on the education of either sons or daughters.

Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter we have reviewed recent patterns of educational enrolment and attainment in Canada, paying particular attention to the different ways in which males and females have been involved. We have also analyzed some recent data drawn from the 1971 Census of Canada in an attempt to examine the determinants of educational enrolment in the light of literature drawn from the social sciences.

The past few decades have witnessed an enormous expansion in enrolment in education at all levels. This increase has been shared by both males and females. Even so, at the more advanced levels the enrolment rates of women remain substantially below those of men. Moreover, women in post-secondary education continue to enrol mostly in "traditional" fields, such as arts, education, and nursing. At the same time, the number of women enrolled in such traditionally male-dominated fields as law, medicine, and commerce has increased sharply, though the numbers remain small relative to males.

In our analysis we have not attempted to explain the sharp increase in educational enrolment in recent years; rather, we have focused on factors that might give rise to the persistent differences in enrolment rates of males and females. We have reviewed the relevant social science literature to develop hypotheses that would provide a suitable framework in which to analyze enrolment data drawn from the 1971 Census. We found that we could best use Census data to

address hypotheses concerned with the socio-economic status of the family.

The background variables we considered included family income, education of parents, community size, geographic location, language of the home, and family size. We found the education of both parents to be of special importance. Furthermore, we found no evidence to support the hypothesis that the mother's education, more than the father's, is an important influence on the education of the daughter. There was no evidence that the converse was true for the son. While this finding runs counter to some earlier literature, it is consistent with the recent literature on the psychology of sex differences, as discussed earlier. Background variables other than the education of the parents appear to influence the educational enrolment of children, but are not as important.

None of these background variables, however, account for the observed male-female differences in enrolment rates. Most of the variation in enrolment rates remains unexplained and leaves scope for speculation.

Other social and economic factors discussed in Chapters 2 and 4 of this book could explain some of these differentials. Differences in enrolment rates may be due to broad social pressures based on prevailing views of suitable roles for men and women. The roles of wife and mother for females are undoubtedly powerful influences on educational choices. The evidence in this chapter suggests that such pressures do not exhibit themselves through the variety of background variables which we have been able to consider. This finding does not remove the possibility that, in defining role patterns, a student's contemporaries, the media, and the school system itself may be important causes of the observed differences. In this case, fundamental changes in the way that people view the roles of men and women in society would be required to reduce the differentials.

The economic explanation of the enrolment differentials is based on the literature that treats education as an investment. It would be sensible for people anticipating a lower monetary return from education to spend fewer years in the educational system. Largely as a result of their roles as wives and mothers, women typically spend fewer years in the labour force than do men, and as a result their expected monetary return is lower. According to the education-as-an-investment explanation, education for women will become more worthwhile as more career opportunities open to them and as their participation in the labour force spans longer periods of time. As a result, enrolment differentials would narrow. Some changes in the division of household and child-care responsibilities and further changes in government policies affecting women in the labour force, as outlined in Chapters 4 and 5, would speed up this process.

Table A.3.1

Regression Results for Enrolment in Full-Time Education of Males and Females of Selected Ages, Canada, ^a 1971

Explanatory Variables	Males			Females		
	Age 16	Age 18	Age 21	Age 16	Age 18	Age 21
Province:						
Newfoundland	-.05	-.12*	.03	-.06	-.11	-.13
Nova Scotia	-.09*	-.08	.10	.02	.04	-.02
New Brunswick	-.05	.08	.05	.03	-.07	.03
Quebec	.02	-.07	.02	.03	-.12*	-.14*
Ontario	—	—	—	—	—	—
Manitoba	.03	-.04	.02	.01	-.14*	.17
Saskatchewan	-.02	-.11*	.03	-.02	-.06	-.17
Alberta	-.03	-.17*	.01	.03	-.10*	-.17*
British Columbia	-.02	-.09*	-.01	.00	-.10*	-.01
Number of children:						
One	—	—	—	—	—	—
Two	.05*	.02	.05	.02	.00	.02
Three	.05*	-.03	-.02	.03	.04	-.02
Four	.05*	-.05	.00	.02	-.01	.01
Five or more	.04*	-.11*	-.05	.02	-.04	.03
Education of father:						
Less than grade 8	—	—	—	—	—	—
Grades 8-10	.04*	.11*	.06*	.09*	.07*	.04
Grades 11-13	.06*	.17*	.14*	.08*	.14*	.10*
Some university	.08*	.06	.27*	.04	.17*	.14*
University degree	.08*	.20*	.23*	.08*	.26*	.27*
Education of mother:						
Less than grade 8	—	—	—	—	—	—
Grades 8-10	.03*	.09*	.06*	.06*	.06*	.06
Grades 11-13	.01	.11*	.19*	.07*	.12*	.20*
Some university	-.03	.15*	.27*	.09*	.04	.09
University degree	.04	.20*	.28*	.13*	.21*	.35*
Language of home:						
English	—	—	—	—	—	—
French	-.04	.03	.05	-.04	-.02	.04
Italian	-.05	-.06	.10	-.04	.08	-.04
Other	.01	-.05	.16*	-.08	.16*	.03
Family income (annual):						
Less than \$3,000	-.07*	-.09*	-.01	.03	-.16*	-.01
\$3,000-5,999	.00	-.15*	.07	.00	-.02	.04
\$6,000-8,999	—	—	—	—	—	—
\$9,000-11,999	-.01	-.08*	.06	.01	.02	.08*
\$12,000-14,999	.03	-.01	-.05	-.02	.00	-.11*
\$15,000-19,999	.02	-.01	.09*	-.05*	.02	.05
\$20,000 +	.01	-.04	.18*	-.04*	.03	.20*

Table A.3.1 (cont'd)

Explanatory Variables	Males			Females		
	Age 16	Age 18	Age 21	Age 16	Age 18	Age 21
Community size:						
Urban, over 30,000	—	—	—	—	—	—
Urban, under 30,000	.04*	-.01	-.05	.02	.07*	-.02
Rural, non-farm	-.03	-.03	-.06	-.03	.12*	.00
Rural, farm	-.03	.01	-.14*	-.05*	.23*	.08
Constant	.79*	.67*	.17*	.79*	.56*	.19*
\bar{R}^2	.03	.09	.10	.04	.09	.14
Sample size	1,927	1,525	922	1,752	1,353	572

a To maintain confidentiality, no data on Prince Edward Island residents were included in the Public Use Sample Tape.

Notes: (1) An asterisk attaching to an estimated co-efficient suggests that the estimate differs significantly from the omitted or reference category at the 10 percent level. In the cases of number of children, education, and income, a one-tail test was used; in other cases, a two-tail test. (2) For those who may wish to consider the results in greater detail and who are not familiar with the dummy variable regression procedure, the following remarks about interpretation are offered. The procedure involves selecting from each group of factors (such as "province") one class (such as "Ontario") which is omitted from the estimation of the regression equation. These omitted categories are then treated as the "reference" categories, and the estimates reported are by comparison with them. As an example, from the equation for 18-year-old females we would predict an enrolment rate for the reference case (i.e., a female living in Ontario, an only child, whose father and mother both have less than grade 8 education, whose language of the home is English, whose family's income is in the range \$6,000 to \$8,999, and who lives in an urban centre of over 30,000 people) to be 56 percent (i.e., the "constant" term). The rate for males with comparable characteristics is 67 percent. Returning to the case of the 18-year-old female, we note that if other things were unchanged except that she lived in Quebec rather than Ontario, a reduction of 12 percentage points is estimated; stated differently, from the equation we would predict that about 44 percent (.56 - .12) of such 18-year-old females in the province of Quebec would be enrolled in education. To take a final example, for an 18-year-old girl who satisfies all the "reference" classes except that both her father and her mother have attained education between grades 11-13 (rather than less than grade 8), from the equation we would predict that about 82 percent (.56 + .14 + .12) would be enrolled in full-time education.

Source: Based on the 1971 Census Public Use Sample Tape on Individuals.

Notes

*We wish to acknowledge numerous and fruitful exchanges during the preparation of this chapter. Our list of credits is unusually long, in part because we were anxious to solicit the views of others in this, our first attempt to analyze broad aspects of the Canadian educational system. In addition to the others contributing to this volume, and especially the editor, we wish to thank Frank Jones, Mel Kliman, Daphne Maurer, Marylee Stephenson, Bob Thompson, and Doug Welland, our colleagues at McMaster University; David Stager of the University of Toronto; Lauren Jay Harris of Michigan State University; Miles Wisenthal and his staff in the Education Division of Statistics Canada; David Zussman of Secretary of State; and Norman St. Onge and his staff in the Department of Manpower and Immigration. We wish also to thank our wives, Roberta Robb and Flora Spencer, for helpful comments at all stages. Christine Feaver and Dean Mountain undertook all the computer work connected with 1971 Census Public Use Sample Data, and the chapter owes much to their great care and interest.

¹ John Stuart Mill, *The Subjection of Women* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1869), p. 29.

² *Ibid.*, p. 40.

³ University summer school programs are also large, although little information is available about sex distribution or changes in enrolment over time. In 1972-73 there were 128,000 students enrolled in university summer session credit courses.

⁴ Porter, Porter, and Blishen (Marion R. Porter, John Porter, and Bernard R. Blishen, *Does Money Matter? Prospects for Higher Education* [Toronto: Institute for Behavioural Research, York University, 1973], p. 136) suggest that financial considerations may be especially important for women from lower-class families.

⁵ Statistics Canada, *Continuing Education*, Part I, Cat. No. 81-224 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), p. 11.

⁶ Statistics Canada, *Service Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 9, Cat. No. 81-001 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975).

⁷ Statistics Canada, *Continuing Education*, Part I, Cat. No. 81-224 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973 and 1974).

⁸ Statistics Canada, *Service Bulletin*, *op. cit.*

⁹ Statistics Canada, *Continuing Education*, Part II, Cat. No. 81-225 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), p. 26.

¹⁰ Such a concern was expressed in the *Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970, p. 197). However, it might be argued that since women are underrepresented in many occupations and in post-secondary education in general, they should be overrepresented relative to the labour force in the CMTP.

¹¹ This tabulation is based on the responses to the question asked in June, 1971, in the Census of Canada: "Have you attended school or university since last September?" It thus fails to include those who were involved in other educational activity such as training on the job and correspondence courses, as well as those who attended only summer schools.

¹² Whether the occupations innately possess these characteristics or have adjusted to the needs of women remains an open question.

¹³ Eleanor Emmons Maccoby and Carol Nagy Jacklin, *The Psychology of Sex Differences* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1974).

¹⁴ Raymond B. Cattell, *Abilities: Their Structure, Growth, and Action* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971).

¹⁵ Corinne Hutt, *Males and Females* (Middlesex: Penguin, 1972).

¹⁶ See, for example, Lauren Jay Harris, "Sex Differences in the Growth and Use of Language," in E. Donelson and J. Gullahorn, eds., *Women: A Psychological Perspective* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, forthcoming).

¹⁷ To use this approach in a more conclusive way would require us to know minimum required levels of acceptable abilities in various occupations (if such a statement can be made meaningful) and the joint distributions of these abilities for both males and females. It might turn out, for example, that engineering requires a combination of abilities seldom found in females.

¹⁸ Otis Dudley Duncan, David L. Featherman, and Beverly Duncan, *Socio-economic Background and Achievement* (New York: Seminar Press, 1972).

¹⁹ See Maccoby and Jacklin, *op. cit.*, Chap. 8.

²⁰ See Maccoby and Jacklin, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

²¹ Earlier studies of both educational enrolment and educational intentions have found socio-economic status of the family to be important in explaining differences in educational attainment of children. See, for example, Raymond Breton, *Social and Academic Factors in the Career Decisions of Canadian Youth* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972); Ronald M. Pavalko and David R. Bishop, "Socioeconomic Status and College Plans: A Study of Canadian High School Students," *Sociology of Education* 39 (1966); Porter, Porter, and Blishen, *op. cit.*; William H. Sewell and Vimal P. Shah, "Socioeconomic Status, Intelligence, and the Attainment of Higher Education," *Sociology of Education* 40 (1967); Charles E. Werts, "A Comparison of Male vs. Female College Attendance Probabilities," *Sociology of Education* 41 (1968); and Trevor H. Williams, "Educational Aspirations: Longitudinal Evidence on Their Development in Canadian Youth," *Sociology of Education* 45 (1972).

However, in almost all cases there has been no attempt to deal with the influences of each parent's background separately. Typically, the socio-economic variable considered is an index of the occupational status of the father. The study by Lagacé (Michel D. Lagacé, *Educational Attainment in Canada: Some Regional and Social Aspects*, Special Labour Force Studies, No. 7, Cat. No. 71-512 [Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968]) is the one study that we found that has dealt with the influence of each parent separately. Lagacé has studied the influence of each parent's educational background on the education of the child and has found that higher enrolment rates (of children) are positively related to the educational achievement of both parents. Moreover, he has found some evidence of a stronger association between daughter's educational attainment and mother's educational level than between daughter's attainment and father's educational level in the case of daughters with university education. However, in making these comparisons, Lagacé does not hold constant the education of the other parent, and the conclusion must be treated as tentative.

²² We expect this to bias enrolment rates upward, since students were enumerated with their parents, while children who had left home for other reasons were enumerated separately.

²³ This will be the case provided that there are no tendencies to leave home that vary systematically with the variables by which we are cross-classifying and which outweigh the influences on education. It may well be that the selection bias in our data would be most important in the case of family income, especially for older children.

²⁴ If one were to view education as a consumption good and to assume, as seems reasonable, that neither parents nor children view the consumption aspects of education as being predominantly male or female, then one would expect little difference in enrolment rates.

²⁵ This is similar to the findings of Lagacé (*op. cit.*) — see note 21.

²⁶ The responsibility for the use and interpretation of these data is entirely that of the authors.

²⁷ Data on Prince Edward Island are not included in the Public Use Sample Tape.

²⁸ Data from the Public Use Sample Tape on Individuals do not include the number of live births of the mother, so we have used family size at the time of the Census. This, of course, fails to include children who have left home.

²⁹ The family income variable used in the regression analysis has been defined

net of any income attributable to the child in order to have a concept that more closely approximates the ability of the family to support the child's further education. Inasmuch as children who are working full-time are likely both to contribute substantially to family income and not to be enrolled in further studies, the cross-tabulations discussed earlier will tend to understate the increase in enrolment rates associated with income.

³⁰ In the following discussion, reference to the importance of groups of variables is based on an F-test, whereas reference to individual co-efficients is based on a t-test.

³¹ We are grateful to David Zussman of the Policy Division, Department of the Secretary of State, for performing the regressions, and to the Education Division of Statistics Canada for making these data available.

³² The survey was conducted in Alberta, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and the Yukon and Northwest Territories. Our regressions were based on Alberta and New Brunswick.

4

Work Patterns

Morley Gunderson*

Productive contributions to the Canadian economy and society far exceed the work performed by members of the labour force. Yet work has been so consistently defined to mean paid activity that labour force activity and work have almost become synonymous. Although this chapter focuses on labour market behaviour of women, much activity outside the labour market is explicitly recognized here as work and is used to explain the labour force work patterns of women.

The labour market activity of women is examined in the context of the following four variables: labour force participation, unemployment, occupational distribution, and earnings. More specifically, we examine the factors determining whether women will participate in the labour force, their susceptibility to unemployment once they are in the labour force, the degree to which they are segregated into "female type" jobs, and the extent of earnings differentials between women and men.

The prevailing division of labour within the household and opportunities in the labour force are important factors explaining trends in the four labour market variables. The division of household responsibilities, for example, influences the labour market choices of women as well as their commitment to the labour force. Commitment, whether affected by home responsibilities or labour force opportunities, influences women's potential earnings, which in turn are an important determinant of the decision to engage in labour market activities.

Knowledge of women's labour force work patterns and the reasons for them are important for public policy. For example, demands for day care will depend on the growth of the female labour force; pressures for equal pay and equal employment opportunity laws will depend on how much of the difference in male-female wages and occupational distribution is due to discrimination; and demands for unemployment insurance compensation and retraining facilities will be influenced by female unemployment patterns. Knowledge of work patterns of women will also contribute to our understanding of pressures for flexible working hours, white collar unionization, and child-care arrangements. A final reason for concentration on the characteristics of labour market behaviour chosen here is the pragmatic one

of data availability: in particular, the 1971 Census provides consistent information on each of the four important variables.

The chapter goes beyond a purely descriptive analysis of extending the patterns of labour force participation, unemployment, occupational distribution, and earnings with data from the 1971 Census. We emphasize the reasons underlying changes in such patterns and seek to isolate the exact impact of specific factors, using the appropriate statistical methods. As will be shown, the more complicated statistical analyses support many of the general conclusions based on simpler tabulations, but in some cases the latter are shown to be deceptive.

Labour Force Participation

Labour force participation of women reflects motivations ranging from financial necessity to the contribution of a paid job to self-development. Although for many women both financial remuneration and interest in the job and its surroundings play a part in the decision to participate in the labour force, the changes in participation rates of women are examined in relation to family income, so as to provide some evidence on the strength of the financial motive in recent years. Evidence on the time spent on household duties by female participants in the labour force permits assessment of whether labour force participation for women constitutes emancipation from the home.

Irrespective of the motive, the decision to participate in the labour force is a decision to work, or to look for paid work, as opposed to spending more time in household work, leisure, volunteer work, unpaid creative activities, education, or training. Whether a woman chooses to look for a paid job depends on the relative attractiveness of each of these activities and is influenced by financial need, available opportunities, household responsibilities, and individual preferences. This section concentrates on the relationship between female labour force participation and major factors influencing female participation; these factors are grouped into three partially overlapping categories: labour market wage, non-market alternatives, and constraints and preferences. Discussion of these influences in general terms is followed by an assessment of their importance as revealed by the latest available data.

Factors Influencing Female Participation

For most workers, wages are the principal incentive for entering the labour force. Potential wages are affected by many factors, including education and training. Highly educated women are more likely to participate in the labour force because of their high earning capacity. However, they are also more likely to marry educated men with substantial earnings of their own, and hence these women are less likely to work from economic need. Since we do not know in advance which of these effects predominates, we must examine the data to see the

impact of a high potential wage rate on the labour force participation of women.

The labour force participation decision is strongly influenced by alternatives in the non-market sector: the more attractive one finds the alternatives to labour market work, the less likely one is to participate in the labour force. Cyclical factors alter the relative attractiveness of market or non-market work and also affect different groups of women in varying ways. In periods of high unemployment, some may become discouraged from looking for work and drop out of the labour force. Conversely, some may join the labour force to maintain family income if their husbands are unemployed. These two influences, associated with cyclical fluctuations in the labour market, are termed the discouraged- and added-worker effects.

Women, in general, are less likely to participate in the labour force than men. For women with young children, especially preschoolers, the necessity of undertaking, or arranging for, work in the home is a primary influence. This work continues to be primarily the married woman's responsibility whether or not she undertakes paid or unpaid work outside the home. Age affects the decision to look for paid work: young people may have the alternative of education, while older people may have the alternative of retirement. Place of residence also has an impact on the work decision. Rural and farm women are less likely to participate in the labour force because of increased alternatives to market work. They are also more likely to be able to contribute to family income without joining the labour force. Urban women, in contrast, have readier access to white collar jobs and are assisted by both social attitudes more favourable to women in paid employment and the availability of services such as day care or laundries and restaurants to substitute for the home product.

Perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of non-market work depend on economic factors, such as family income, and also on non-economic factors, including social pressures, education, and range of interests. Female success in the labour market may lead to pressure on the family group through such factors as the double work load imposed on women or a perceived threat to male self-esteem. Non-market activities of many women include creative outlets such as art and music and unpaid work in institutions, in politics, or in education. A recent study of volunteers in Canada shows that the image of the volunteer as a bored, middle-aged housewife is inaccurate. The findings showed a high percentage of male volunteers, a high proportion of volunteers without university degrees, and a striking number of volunteers with incomes under \$12,000.¹

Both economic and non-economic preferences of individual women and the particular constraints they face will also influence their labour force participation decision. Family need, as exemplified by a permanently or temporarily low family income, may induce people into the labour force, just as a high income would influence some not to

participate. The absence of child-care facilities, in the form of either urban day care or live-in relatives, is a major constraint on labour force participation. The participation decision is further influenced by attitudes formed by such factors as religion, immigrant status, education, age, or even residence and region. Tastes and preferences also change over time, partially in response to economic factors, but also for cultural, sociological, and other reasons.

Long-Run Changes in Female Participation in the Labour Force

Table 4.1 indicates the rapid growth of female labour force participation, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. Although this growth has occurred in all age categories, it is greatest for middle-aged and upper-middle-aged women. The participation rates of the oldest and youngest age groups of women have also increased despite retirement and increased time spent on education, which have been important factors in the long-run decline of the male participation rate in these age groups. Younger women aged 20-24 have always participated substantially in the labour force, so that, although their labour force participation rate is highest, it does not show the most growth.

For many women, working life has two phases: the first before marriage and childbearing, the second after childbearing has ceased. In the United States by 1960, participation of women in the "second phase" (after age forty) had surpassed that of the younger group of women. This is still not the case in Canada, confirming Ostry's earlier speculation that "a similar evolution in Canada by 1971 seems highly unlikely."² In fact, as the more detailed age breakdown in Table 4.2 shows, the second phase of working life for women is best described not as a second peak, but rather as a plateau, leveling off at a participation rate of 45 percent for women in all age groups between 25 and 55.

Although there has been a dramatic increase in the labour force participation of married women, this has not been accompanied by a more equitable sharing of household responsibilities. Studies³ on the division of labour, by sex, within the household indicate that women who engage in labour market activity retain most of their home responsibilities and that their husbands do not share in them significantly. The husband's contribution to household tasks does not alter appreciably when the wife has a paying job. Husbands, on the average, increase their participation in housework by one hour per week when their wives are in the labour force. A husband's total work load, including housework and paid job, varies little whether his wife works at a paying job full-time or part-time, but the total work load of a wife is consistently heavier when she is employed full-time. The presence of children in the family increases the amount of time both husbands and wives spend in household tasks, but their relative contributions remain about the same.

Table 4.1

Labour Force Participation Rates, by Age and Sex, Canada, Selected Years, 1921-71
(percentages)

Age	1921		1931		1941		1951		1961		1971	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
14-19 ^a	68	30	57	27	55	27	54	34	41	32	47	37
20-24	94	40	94	47	93	47	94	49	94	51	87	63
25-34	98	20	99	24	99	28	98	25	98	29	93	45
35-64	97	12	97	13	96	15	95	20	95	30	89	42
65+	60	7	57	6	48	6	40	5	31	6	24	8
Total ^b	90	20	87	22	86	23	84	24	81	29	76	40

^a For 1971 the youngest age group is 15-19.

^b Although not available for the separate age groups, the total participation rates for males and females in 1901 are 88 and 16, respectively, and 91 and 19 in 1911.

Sources: Sylvia Ostry and F. Denton, *Historical Estimates of the Canadian Labour Force*, 1961 Census Monograph (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), for 1921-61. Figures for 1971 computed from 1971 Census of Canada, *Labour Force and Individual Income*, Cat. No. 94-704, Bulletin 3.1-4, October, 1974, Table 9.

Table 4.2

Labour Force Participation Rates,^a by Sex, Age, Marital Status, Residence, and Region, Canada, 1971

<u>Category</u>	<u>Male</u> (%)	<u>Female</u> (%)	<u>Female/Male</u>
Age:			
15-19	46.4	37.1	.80
20-24	86.9	62.9	.72
25-34	92.9	44.6	.48
35-44	93.1	44.0	.47
45-54	90.8	44.6	.49
55-64	80.7	34.6	.43
65+	24.5	8.7	.36
Marital status:			
Single	64.2	54.2	.84
Married	85.0	36.3	.43
Other ^b	61.4	33.2	.54
Residence:			
Urban	77.9	44.2	.57
Rural ^c	70.8	31.3	.44
Farm	78.8	37.2	.47
Region:			
Maritimes	70.2	32.7	.47
Quebec	71.8	35.2	.49
Ontario	80.8	44.8	.55
Prairies	79.4	42.9	.54
British Columbia	77.9	40.7	.52

^a Excludes inmates of institutions or members of the armed forces.

^b Separated, widowed, divorced, or married and spouse absent.

^c Rural refers to municipality type and includes rural fringe and rural non-farm.

Source: Special 1971 Census tabulations from Statistics Canada.

Partly in response to this conflict between home and labour market responsibilities, the increased labour force participation of women — especially married women — involves increased part-time employment in the labour force.⁴ As we shall see later, the inequitable division of labour within the household and the increased part-time employment of women have implications for sex differences in unemployment, occupational distribution, and earnings.

Sex Differences in Labour Force Participation

Table 4.2 presents 1971 Census data on male and female rates of labour force participation. Men and women differ most in their participation pattern with respect to marital status. Married men have the strongest attachment to the labour force, while married women and

those who are separated, widowed, divorced, or married but with husband absent have the weakest attachment.

In general, these results are confirmed by the multiple regression analysis presented in Appendix Table A.4.1. The advantage of the multiple regression technique is that it permits the analyst to separate out the contribution of each factor in a complex relationship, so that the impact of each variable can be examined in isolation from the others. Other factors are controlled for, or held constant, while the impact of each individual variable is measured. The usefulness of this technique⁵ is confirmed in the present instance, where it establishes that, once the impact of having children is accounted for, married women are no less likely to participate in the labour force than are single women. Unfortunately, it was impossible to analyze the impact of children on the participation of married men in a similar way, since the particular data set (Public Use Sample Tape for Individuals) did not indicate the number of children for males.

For both sexes, participation rates are higher for urban dwellers, but this is especially true of women, possibly reflecting both the availability of white collar jobs and greater social acceptance of females' working. For both sexes, participation rates tend to be highest in Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia, and lowest in the Maritimes and Quebec. In addition, female participation rates tend to be higher relative to male rates in regions of generally high participation rates.

Factors Influencing Participation of Married Women

Since participation of *married* women in the labour force has shown the most rapid growth, it is interesting to analyze separately the various factors influencing their decision to work. Table 4.3 confirms that the labour force participation of married women is responsive to many of the factors outlined earlier.

More highly educated women are much more likely to participate in the labour force than are less educated women. This reflects their greater earnings potential as well as exposure to non-household activities. The presence of children, especially pre-school children, is a strongly inhibiting factor. The data show that the availability of income other than her own labour earnings decreases the likelihood of a married woman's participating in the labour force.⁶ Alternatively stated, economic necessity can be a strong force compelling married women to participate in the labour market. For example, Table 4.3 indicates that almost one-half of the women whose family income is less than \$3,000 exclusive of the woman's contribution ("own wage") would participate in the labour force. This evidence has implications for the analysis of poverty. In particular, if we use family income as a measure of poverty, we should realize that many low-income families may be beyond the poverty line only because both husband and wife are paid workers.

100 Table 4.3

Labour Force Participation Rates of Married Women, Husband Present, by Age, Education, School Level of Children, Income, Employment Status of Husband, and Residence, Canada, 1971
(percentages)

Variable	Age			
	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-64
Education:				
Incomplete high school	40	34	38	35
Complete high school	64	46	47	47
Complete university	78	55	46	49
				36
				50
				55
Children:				
No children	76	78	62	39
Pre-school children only	30	30	27	25
School children only	50	47	45	37
Both pre-school and school children	24	26	25	23
				25
Family income less own wage:				
\$3,000 or less	50	47	48	45
\$3,000-5,999	52	43	44	40
\$6,000-8,999	52	42	45	40
\$9,000-11,999	44	35	39	37
\$12,000-14,999	40	29	34	33
\$15,000 or over	42	26	27	26
				47
				44
				44
				38
				33
				27

Husband's employment status:

Employed	51	39	41	38	41
Unemployed	41	37	38	36	38

Residence:

Urban	53	40	41	38	41
Rural non-farm	35	32	38	36	35

Source: Special 1971 Census tabulations from Statistics Canada.

The fact that female participation in the labour force is sustained until family income reaches fairly high levels also suggests that economic pressures for married women to undertake paid employment can continue into higher income categories. The economic pressure at higher income levels may arise from the purchase of homes, consumer durables, higher education for children, and vacations — items that can be purchased by many families only if the wife earns income.

It is at first puzzling to note that the participation rate for women with unemployed husbands is lower than that for women whose husbands have jobs. We have noted the higher participation rates for women of low-income families, and we would assume unemployment means a drop in family income. A husband's unemployment, however, may not result in a decline in family income, especially if we consider permanent family income over a lifetime. The husband's unemployment may be temporary, it may be frictional (associated with job search that will ultimately raise family earnings), it may be voluntary and perhaps financed out of other sources of income, it may be seasonal and compensated for by higher wages for seasonal work, or its impact may be reduced by the availability of unemployment benefits. Obviously, in those cases where family income does not decline, little economic incentive exists for the wife to enter the labour force.

One additional factor may be reflected in the lower labour force participation rates of wives with unemployed husbands. These women may themselves be unlikely to find work and therefore be discouraged from entering the labour force to seek employment. They might also be among the women who work outside the labour force and are thus not captured in the statistics.

The higher participation rate for married women in urban centres reflects job availability, social attitudes, and the availability of substitutes for services that would otherwise be performed by the wife, particularly child care.

The results of Table 4.3 are confirmed by the multiple regression analysis of Appendix Table A.4.2. Inclusion of a regional variable confirms the low participation rate for married women in the Maritimes and Quebec and the higher rates in Ontario, the Prairies, and, to a lesser extent, British Columbia. This indicates that the regional variation in labour force participation is not simply due to regional differences in age structure, education, marital status, number of children, residence, or family income. Some of the variation may be due to differences in job availability or social attitudes, factors that were not included in the regression analysis.

Future Female Participation

The results of the preceding analysis can be used to speculate on future trends in female labour force participation: Increased education of women, more job-directed education and training, and greater

urbanization will all tend to increase female labour force participation. Perhaps the strongest force working in this direction in the future, however, would be a reduction of child-rearing responsibilities through greater availability of day care, a more equitable distribution of household responsibilities between husband and wife, or continuation of the trend towards fewer or no children, documented in Chapter 2. A variety of factors, though, will work in the opposite direction. Increases in family income over time will reduce the need for more than one family member to participate in the labour force. The "baby boom" group of women is now into childbearing age, which may reduce the proportion of women in the labour force, especially since the second phase of working life is not very prominent in Canada.

Unemployment

The decision to participate in the labour force does not guarantee employment, since the term "labour force" covers those working (employed) and those looking for work (unemployed). In this section we analyze the factors influencing the unemployment of women and, in so doing, address specific questions. Why, for instance, has the female unemployment rate generally been lower than the male rate but risen faster in recent years? Is the female rate less subject to cyclical fluctuations than the male rate? Since the definition of unemployment has important implications for the responses to these questions, the sources of data and their limitations are examined before addressing the issues directly.

Sex Bias in Unemployment Questionnaires

Differences in the way labour force questions are posed have given rise to large discrepancies between the female unemployment rate as measured by the 1971 Census and the corresponding rate obtained from the Labour Force Survey for May, 1971.⁷ The Labour Force Survey questions were indirect, asking: "What did this person do mostly last week?" "Did this person do anything else last week?" — for example, worked, looked for work, employed but not at work, kept house, went to school, retired or voluntarily idle? Many women with a marginal attachment to the labour force who actually did look for work would probably respond with the more socially acceptable "kept house," rather than "looked for work." The Census question on unemployment, in contrast, is much more direct and probing, asking: "Did you look for work last week?" — for example, contacted a Canada Manpower Centre, checked with employers, placed or answered newspaper ads? Women who both looked for work and kept house might well respond that they had looked for work in response to the Census question and that they had kept house in response to the Labour Force Survey. As a result, the female unemployment rate in the Labour Force Survey would be lower than that in the Census.

In actual fact the 1971 Census female unemployment rate was 8.9 percent,⁸ compared to the May Labour Force Survey rate of 5.0 percent. Which is correct? The answer depends on the extent to which persons who are marginally attached to the labour force and only casually looking for work should be counted as “unemployed.” The Labour Force Survey probably understates female unemployment by excluding this group, while the Census may overstate female unemployment by including some women who were not seriously looking for work.⁹

Omission of the “hidden unemployed” also biases unemployment rate data. Some people would be in the labour force looking for a job if economic conditions were better, but have become discouraged and are therefore not seeking work and not recorded as unemployed. The higher female unemployment rate in the Census as compared to the Labour Force Survey of the same time confirms that a more probing question concerning job search activities would uncover a number of hidden unemployed and that women constitute a disproportionate number of the hidden unemployed.

Reasons for Sex Differences in Unemployment Rates

The four different types of unemployment (cyclical, structural, frictional, and insurance-induced) are examined with a view towards understanding whether men or women are more susceptible to each type of unemployment. If such sex differences exist, policies to reduce a particular type of unemployment will have a different effect on males and females.

As the name implies, demand-deficient or cyclical unemployment is due to insufficient aggregate demand in the economy, a condition usually associated with the recession phase of the business cycle. It can be reduced by an increase in aggregate demand, at least until the point at which unacceptable inflation occurs. Female unemployment rates may be less susceptible to cyclical fluctuations in aggregate demand, since women tend to be concentrated in the less cyclically volatile white collar and service occupations. Also, in a cyclical downturn, rather than be unemployed, females tend to drop out of the labour force (the discouraged-worker effect). This tendency may be offset by the added-worker effect, whereby women enter the labour force in a cyclical downturn to maintain declining family income. In addition, women are often the last to be hired and the first to be laid off because many employers view women as having only a marginal or intermittent attachment to the labour force. Consequently, employers are reluctant to invest in the training of women for fear of being unable to recoup their training costs. Not having invested much in their female workers, firms are not concerned about losing them permanently should they be laid off in a recession. This outcome is reinforced by the fact that women tend not to be as unionized as men

and therefore do not have the job security associated with unionization.

Lack of training may, in turn, create a higher incidence of structural unemployment among females. Structural unemployment occurs when there is a mismatching of supply and demand in the job market because the unemployed do not possess the skills required for available jobs. Geographic immobility is another factor contributing to structural unemployment among women. The costs of moving may outweigh the benefits for a married woman if they include the economic and non-economic costs of the husband's relocation.

Frictional unemployment occurs as job seekers are being matched with available jobs. It occurs in an efficiently operating labour market when workers change jobs or enter the labour force in search of a job. Seasonal unemployment is often categorized with frictional unemployment because it also is inherent in the nature of the job and does not necessarily represent a malfunctioning labour market. Because they do not often work in the construction and primary sectors, women are less susceptible to seasonal unemployment. They may experience less frictional unemployment because their shorter and more intermittent stays in the labour force may not make it as worthwhile for them to search for the most desirable job. This may be offset, however, by longer job search owing to inexperience or access to other sources of income.

Canada's unemployment insurance legislation may also have a different effect on men than on women, especially since 1971, when sick and maternity benefits were expanded and eligibility criteria were relaxed to cover those with a shorter work history.

Various factors influencing the incidence of unemployment among men and women have been discussed, but one cannot predict unambiguously which sex will have the greater incidence of each type of unemployment without appeal to the empirical evidence.

Time Pattern of Unemployment


Figure 4.1 shows male and female unemployment rates in the post-World War II period in Canada as measured by the Labour Force Survey. Although the male rate has been consistently above the female rate in this survey, the gap has narrowed in recent years. For both sexes there appears to be an upward trend in the unemployment rate, although the male rate peaked around 1960 and the female rate in the early 1970s. In fact, the female rate was relatively constant around 2 to 3 percent until the late 1960s, when it began a climb to around 5 percent. Both rates have remained high in the post-1970 recession years.

Further analysis¹⁰ revealed that the ratio of female to male unemployment rates exhibited a U-shaped pattern over the years 1946-73 — that is, the female rate was high relative to the male rate in the immediate postwar period and in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Figure 4.1

Unemployment Rates, by Sex, Canada, 1946-74
(12-month averages)

Unemployment
Rate



Source: Special tabulations from the Labour Force Survey Division of Statistics Canada.

The gap between the two rates was widest in 1959.¹¹ On the basis of the analysis, the female rate was predicted to equal the male rate in 1976.¹² Regression analysis confirmed that business cycles do not significantly alter the ratio of female to male unemployment rates. It also indicated no significant alteration of the rate in the period after 1971, when changes in the Unemployment Insurance Act would have their impact. When we remove the effect of trend factors and the influences of the business cycle, the recent changes in our Unemployment Insurance Act have not had a different effect on female than on male unemployment rates.¹³ Recent high female unemployment relative to males can be attributed more to trend and cyclical factors than to unemployment insurance.

The time pattern of unemployment rates, in conjunction with the business cycle, suggests that both males and females are subject to cyclical or demand-deficient unemployment, with the male rate perhaps being slightly more volatile. The persistently lower female rate suggests that women are less susceptible to the frictional unemployment associated with job search or seasonal work. It may also reflect a different response to potential unemployment, since women may be more likely to drop out of the labour force completely, adding to the hidden unemployed. In recent years, however, the female rate has approached the male rate, suggesting that both males and females are now experiencing similar patterns of frictional unemployment. Although men and women may have experienced dissimilar unemployment problems in the past, recent evidence suggests that their unemployment problems have become more similar.

Differences in Unemployment, by Sex

The recent similarity of male and female unemployment rates is exhibited more clearly by the 1971 Census data, where the female unemployment rate was 8.9 percent and the male rate, 7.5 percent. As previously discussed, the Census question on labour force activity was more probing and direct than the Labour Force Survey question and included as unemployed many who categorized themselves as keeping house in the Labour Force Survey. About one-third of the unemployed females in the Census had never worked before or had not worked since January, 1970 — that is, they were members of the inexperienced labour force.¹⁴

Table 4.4 gives unemployment rates, by sex and occupation, for the experienced labour force. The considerably lower experienced female unemployment rate of 6.1 percent, versus 8.9 percent for the total female labour force, indicates that a large number of unemployed women had never worked or had not worked since January, 1970. Yet even in the experienced labour force, based on Census definitions, the female unemployment rate exceeded the male rate of 5.8 percent. Whether we use Census or Labour Force Survey definitions and the experienced or the total labour force, female unemployment rates in

Table 4.4

Unemployment Rates of Experienced Labour Force, by Sex and Occupation, Canada, 1961 and 1971

Occupation	1961				1971			
	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)	Female/ Male	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)	Female/ Male
Managerial	7.0	6.0	7.0	.86	1.3	2.9	1.5	2.23
Professional/ technical	8.0	5.0	7.0	.63	3.1	2.8	3.0	.90
Clerical	2.7	2.0	2.2	.74	5.4	5.9	5.7	1.09
Sales	2.6	2.8	2.6	1.08	3.6	6.9	4.6	1.92
Service	3.2	2.9	2.7	.91	6.3	7.8	7.0	1.24
Primary	—	—	—	—	5.1	2.4	4.7	.47
Blue collar ^a	4.4	3.3	4.3	.75	7.2	10.0	7.5	1.39
All occupations ^b	3.7	2.2	3.3	.59	5.8	6.1	5.9	1.05

^a Blue collar covers occupations 81-95, (which include transportation, communication, and construction) in the 1971 Canadian Classification and Dictionary of Occupations (CCDO). Because of changes in occupational coding between 1961 and 1971, the occupations may not be completely comparable.

^b Includes those not elsewhere classified or not stated.

Sources: 1961 Census figures from Sylvia Ostry, *Unemployment in Canada*, 1961 Census Monograph (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), p. 17. Figures from 1971 Census are computed as unemployed divided by labour force where unemployment is based on special tabulations from Statistics Canada and labour force is from 1971 Census of Canada, *Occupations by Sex*, Cat. No. 94-717, Bulletin 3.2-3, September, 1974.

Canada are rising faster than male rates and are rapidly approaching them (according to the Labour Force Survey) or have already surpassed them (according to the Census).

Table 4.4 also indicates that the higher female unemployment rate for the experienced labour force in 1971 persists across all occupations except the primary and professional sectors. In the primary sector women tend to work mainly in the low-unemployment farm area. In the professional sector they dominate the low-unemployment teaching and nursing jobs, but in most other subgroups in that sector they tend to have higher unemployment rates than males. Although women tend to have higher unemployment rates within each occupation, they tend not to be in the high unemployment occupations.

If females had the male occupational distribution but their own unemployment experience within each occupation, their employment rate in the experienced labour force would have been 9.6 percent¹⁵ instead of 6.1 percent, which would imply an unemployment rate of 13-14 percent in the total female labour force. Consequently, reduction of occupational segregation between the sexes would lead to higher female unemployment rates if women were to retain their same propensity to be unemployed within each occupation.¹⁶ To avoid extremely high female unemployment rates, therefore, occupational desegregation should be accompanied by efforts to reduce female unemployment within each occupation.

Appendix Table A.4.3 indicates that the higher female unemployment rate and the increasing ratio of female to male unemployment also persist across almost all industries, although, again, women tend not to be in industries with high unemployment rates. In 1971 if women had had the same industrial distribution as men but had retained the female propensity to be unemployed within each industry, their unemployment rate would have been 11 percent, nearly double their actual rate of 6.1 percent for the experienced labour force. As with occupational desegregation, industrial desegregation would be accompanied by higher female unemployment rates unless policies were initiated to reduce women's propensity to be unemployed within each industry.

Table 4.5 records male and female unemployment rates by age, education, marital status, occupation, residence, and region. The discussion that follows is based on these results, as well as on more detailed cross-tabulations of unemployment rates by factors not presented in the text and by the regression results contained in Appendix Table A.4.4. For both sexes, unemployment rates tend to decline with age, a pattern evident in both the 1971 and the 1961 Census data.¹⁷ The higher rates for young persons could reflect a higher incidence of all types of unemployment: lacking seniority and training, the young are first to be laid off in a cyclical downswing; they often do not possess the training and experience required for particular jobs and hence are structurally unemployed; they tend to search longer for jobs

and hence have high frictional unemployment;¹⁸ and they may be more willing and able to become unemployed to collect unemployment insurance.

Table 4.5

Unemployment Rates, by Sex, Age, Education, Marital Status, Occupation,^a Residence, and Region, Canada, 1971

<u>Category</u>	<u>Male</u> (%)	<u>Female</u> (%)	<u>Female/Male</u>
All categories	7.5	8.9	1.2
Age:			
15-19	22.2	23.9	1.1
20-24	11.5	9.7	.8
25-34	5.4	6.9	1.3
35-44	4.4	5.6	1.3
45-64	4.8	5.3	1.1
65+	9.1	6.6	.7
Education:			
Elementary or less	8.0	8.4	1.1
1-3 years high school	8.3	10.3	1.2
4-5 years high school	7.0	8.1	1.2
Completed university	3.5	6.1	1.7
Marital status:			
Single	15.2	12.7	.8
Married	4.2	6.9	1.6
Other ^b	10.6	7.6	.7
Occupation:			
White collar ^c	4.2	5.6	1.3
Blue collar ^d	6.8	8.1	1.2
Residence:			
Urban	7.7	9.1	1.2
Rural non-farm	8.0	8.8	1.1
Farm	3.8	5.4	1.4
Region:			
Maritimes	8.6	8.5	1.0
Quebec	9.9	10.4	1.1
Ontario	6.1	8.3	1.4
Prairies	5.6	7.4	1.3
British Columbia	8.4	10.3	1.2

^a Occupational unemployment rates are for the experienced labour force — i.e., they exclude those who have never worked or who last worked prior to January, 1970.

^b Separated, widowed, divorced, or married and spouse absent.

^c CCDO occupations 1100-6199.

^d CCDO occupations 7100-9900.

Source: Special 1971 Census tabulations from Statistics Canada.

For both sexes, higher education tends to reduce unemployment, although, for women, completion of university does not have as strong an impact as it does for men. The ratio of female to male unemployment for university graduates is 1.7, compared to 1.2 for other education levels. After controlling for the influence of other factors given in Appendix Table A.4.4, having a university degree as opposed to an elementary school education or less did not significantly reduce female unemployment, but did reduce male unemployment.

Unemployment rates are extremely high for single persons of both sexes. Married women experience higher unemployment rates than do married men. Although married women have a lower unemployment rate than do single or other women, the ratio of female to male unemployment is extremely high (1.6) for married persons, compared to the low ratios of .8 and .7 for single persons and others. In fact, the regression equation of Appendix Table A.4.4 indicates that, when other factors are held constant, marriage per se actually raises female unemployment by about two-thirds of a percentage point and lowers male unemployment by slightly over five percentage points. The fact that, other things held equal, marriage increases unemployment for females but reduces unemployment for males reflects the differential impact of marriage on labour force behaviour discussed earlier.

The unemployment rate is considerably lower in the farm sector than in the urban or rural non-farm sectors, reflecting the availability of non-market work. In all regions the female unemployment rate equals or exceeds the male rate, although the difference is slightly more pronounced in the low-unemployment regions of Ontario and the Prairies. Perhaps in these areas the tighter labour market keeps women in the labour market looking for work. As the regression equation of Appendix Table A.4.4 indicates, however, after accounting for the effect of other variables (e.g., marital status, education), there is no significant difference in female unemployment rates across regions, except for the higher rates in British Columbia.

Occupational Distribution

The occupation in which one works is as important as participating in the labour force and participating as an employed person. Much of the recent work on the economics of sex discrimination focuses on the segregation of females into certain "female type" jobs, creating an excess supply of labour, which, in turn, depresses wages in female-dominated jobs.

This section presents evidence concerning the extent of female-dominated occupations in 1971 and changes in occupational segregation over time. The reasons for this segregation are examined, and the effectiveness of equal opportunity laws in altering the occupational distribution of women is assessed. Looking to the future, projections of the demand for labour in various occupations are used in conjunction with the current occupational distribution of women to specify whether

women are in growing or in contracting sectors of the economy and are therefore more or less likely to have employment problems in the future.

Choice or Discrimination?

International comparisons indicate that, although occupational and industrial segregation is a fairly universal phenomenon, the patterns differ from country to country. For example, in the USSR three-quarters of the doctors and about one-third of the lawyers are women; in France and Germany about 20 percent of the executives, managers, and high-level administrative personnel are women.¹⁹ Although the evidence is by no means systematic, it does illustrate that occupational distribution is not immutable.

This diversity of the female occupational distribution across countries suggests that neither men nor women have a natural monopoly, by virtue of their sex, on any job. It seems that if women in one country have a comparative advantage in certain occupations, then they would have a similar advantage in them in other, similar countries; yet there is a notable international diversity in the female occupational distribution that appears inexplicable on economic grounds alone.

Job choices and opportunities for women are influenced by previous decisions, such as getting married and having children and level of education or training. Some women do choose occupations on the basis of complementarity with household activities. Part-time jobs, or those with flexible hours, enable many women to combine work in the market sector with work at home. Some women choose occupations that permit short or intermittent periods in the labour market, allowing more flexibility for childbearing and child-raising, but often limiting advancement. Other women choose occupations, such as health care and education of the young, that are an extension of the type of work performed in the home. Education obviously influences choices for men as well as women, but as we saw in the previous chapter, there is considerable debate over influences on the educational choices of women and their impact on future career opportunities.

One facet of current changes in the traditional view of family roles is the considerable pressure for more equitable distribution of household tasks. Currently, women still tend to maintain most of their domestic activities when taking on market work, which certainly impinges on choice of job, as well as on performance and remuneration.

Occupational Distribution in 1971

Table 4.6 indicates that almost one-third of the female labour force is in the clerical category. A large proportion (15.1 percent) are in service jobs; and more disaggregated categories, not presented in the text, show that few are in the more highly paid protective service

subcategory. These more detailed occupational categories also indicate that, although there are women in professional categories in significant numbers, they are mostly lower-paid teachers (181,000) and nurses (205,000), with few working in the higher-paid categories of doctor, lawyer, or engineer.

Table 4.6

Occupational Distribution of the Experienced^a Labour Force, by Sex, Canada, 1971

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Labour Force</u>		<u>Percentage of Total Labour Force^b</u>	
	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Managerial	313,935	58,305	5.5	2.0
Professional	567,050	526,055	10.0	17.8
Clerical	433,385	940,180	7.6	31.6
Sales	567,985	247,760	10.0	8.4
Service	521,935	447,985	9.2	15.1
Primary	556,595	109,155	9.8	3.7
Blue collar ^c	2,286,840	312,495	40.5	10.6
Not stated	418,000	319,275	7.4	10.8
All occupations	5,665,725	2,961,210	100	100

^a Experienced labour force excludes those who do not have a current usual occupation — i.e., have never worked or who last worked prior to January, 1970. These tabulations include members of the armed forces.

^b Calculated for each sex as a percentage of the labour force in a particular occupation.

^c CCDO occupations 81-95, which include craft, production, transportation, communication, and construction workers.

Source: Computed from 1971 Census of Canada, *Occupations by Sex*, Cat. No. 94-717, Bulletin 3.2-3, September, 1974.

The twenty-five occupations employing the largest number of women are listed in rank order in Table 4.7. About half of these occupations are predominantly female (i.e., over 80 percent female), and almost all have more than proportional representation of females. Although changes in the occupational definitions make comparisons with earlier periods difficult, a comparison with the 1961 rankings indicates a fair degree of stability in the occupations employing women heavily.

Many of the predominantly female occupations have been characterized as dead-end jobs: they are not conducive to career advancement or to independent decision-making, and few are stepping-stones to more challenging jobs. In addition, many jobs, such as cooking, cleaning, or taking care of children, are extensions of household activities.

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Leading^a Occupations of Female Labour Force, Canada, 1971

Rank	Occupation (and CCDO Number)	Female Labour Force	% of Female Labour Force in this Occupation^b	Females as % of Labour Force in Each Occupation^c	1961^d Rank
1	Secretaries/stenographers (4111)	239,810	8.1	97.4	1
2	Sales clerks (5137)	159,820	5.4	66.0	2
3	Bookkeepers/account clerks (4131)	136,435	4.6	67.6	
4	Elementary teachers (2731)	120,160	4.1	82.3	6
5	Waitresses (6125)	105,410	3.6	82.9	
6	Tellers and cashiers (4133)	103,455	3.5	91.3	5
7	Farm workers (7182)	93,500	3.2	46.2	7
8	Nurses, graduate (3131)	90,850	3.1	95.8	10
9	Typists & clerk-typists (4113)	84,880	2.9	95.6	
10	General office clerks (4197)	79,340	2.7	62.2	
11	Sewing machine operators (8563)	57,320	1.9	90.1	
12	Personal service n.e.c. (6149)	56,325	1.9	92.0	
13	Janitors/cleaners (6191)	54,790	1.9	32.4	9
14	Nursing aids & orderlies (3135)	52,770	1.8	74.4	
15	Secondary school teachers (2733)	49,465	1.7	44.5	
16	Other clerical n.e.c. (4199)	44,075	1.5	62.0	
17	Receptionists (4171)	42,475	1.4	92.6	
18	Supervisors: sales (5130)	41,975	1.4	16.8	
19	Chefs and cooks (6121)	39,280	1.3	50.2	13
20	Packaging n.e.c. (9317)	37,480	1.3	56.3	
21	Barbers & hairdressers (6143)	35,620	1.2	63.2	14
22	Telephone operators (4175)	30,445	1.3	95.9	11
23	Library & file clerks (4161)	27,080	0.9	82.2	

24	Labour & elemental work (6198)	23,765	0.8	47.0	19
25	Baby sitters (6147)	20,225	0.7	96.6	24
	Total in 25 leading occupations	1,826,750	61.7	65.9	

a Defined as having 20,000 or more women.

b. Defined as having 20,000 or more women labour force in each occupation as a percentage of total female labour force of 2,961,210.

Female labour force in each occupation as a percentage of total labour force of that occupation.

^c Female labour force in each occupation as a percentage of total labour force of that occupational group. ^d 1961 rankings are based on the 1951 Census occupational groups. Since a complete matching of the old and new occupational classifications was not available at the time of this report, only the 1961 occupations whose titles closely matched the 1971 titles are included.

Sources: 1971 Census of Canada, *Occupations by Sex*. Cat. No. 94-717. Bulletin 3-2-3, September, 1974. 1961 rankings are from Sylvia Ostry, 'The Occupational Distribution of the Canadian Labour Force, 1961 Census Monograph (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), p. 76.

Changes over Time

The large growth in the female labour force noted earlier has occurred mainly in white collar clerical and sales jobs. Table 4.8 shows that between 1901 and 1971 the sustained increase in female representation in all occupations (from 13.4 to 34.3 percent) was exceeded in the lower-status clerical and sales groups and in the higher-status managerial jobs, although in the latter group women are still few in number and are mainly managers of retail or personal service establishments. Although the representation of women in the total labour force almost tripled over the period, proportions in the professions and in blue collar occupations remained roughly constant, and in the services they have declined somewhat.

The coefficient of variation given at the bottom of Table 4.8 indicates the extent to which women are evenly distributed across the occupations: the smaller the coefficient of variation, the more even the distribution. The fact that the coefficient of variation consistently declined over the 1901-71 period indicates that the distribution of females across all of the broad occupational categories consistently became more even, although, as the actual proportions indicate, women are by no means evenly distributed across all occupations. It appears that the growth of the female labour force was accompanied by a moderate decline in occupational segregation over the period. Within each of the broad occupational groups, however, women may still be segregated into the lower-paid, low-status jobs.

The corresponding coefficient of variation for males remained roughly constant at the lower level of .30 during the period 1901-71. The lower coefficient indicates that the male labour force is more evenly distributed across all occupations; the constancy of the coefficient indicates little change in distribution over the past seventy years.

Equal opportunity, or fair employment, laws generally came into force in Canada during the 1960s. They were designed to reduce discrimination in recruiting, hiring, and promotion. To the extent that they were successful, one might expect the occupational distribution of females to have become more even during the 1960s as women gained access to jobs from which they had previously been excluded. Although the data do not provide a rigorous test, it appears that the occupational distribution of females did not change dramatically over the 1960s. The coefficient of variation dropped by about 8 percent, from .626 to .577, which was a fairly typical decrease for a decade over the seventy-year period.

Industrial Distribution

Women are segregated in certain industries as well as occupations. This is illustrated by analysis of the proportion of women in each industry for the Census years from 1931 to 1971.²⁰ Women have been

Table 4.8

Women As a Proportion of Total Labour Force, by Occupation, Canada, Selected Years, 1901-71
(percentages)

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>1901</u>	<u>1911</u>	<u>1921</u>	<u>1931</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971^a</u>
Managerial	3.6	4.5	4.3	4.9	7.2	8.9	10.3	15.7
Professional	42.5	44.6	54.1	49.5	46.1	43.5	43.2	48.1
Clerical	22.1	32.6	41.8	45.1	50.1	56.7	61.5	68.4
Sales ^b	10.4	20.2	25.6	26.0	32.1	38.3	40.3	30.4
Service	68.7	64.8	58.6	62.1	65.0	47.8	50.0	46.2
Primary	1.1	1.5	1.6	1.9	1.5	3.1	9.2	16.4
Blue collar ^c	12.6	10.2	10.1	8.5	11.0	11.5	10.6	12.0
All occupations	13.4	13.2	15.4	17.0	19.9	22.0	27.3	34.3
Coefficient of variation ^d	.985	.844	.786	.792	.744	.666	.626	.577

^a 1971 figures are based on the CCDO occupational groupings, whereas the 1901-61 figures are based on the 1951 Census categories. Thus the 1971 figures may not be completely comparable with those of earlier years. A complete matching of the old and the new occupational classifications was not available at the time of this report, but a discussion of the main differences is given in Statistics Canada, *The Labour Force*, Cat. No. 71-001, August, 1973. Probably the main effect on the table is that many persons who were classified as managers under the old scheme are classified as sales persons under the CCDO scheme. If proportionately more male managers were reclassified as sales persons, this could account for the large increase between 1961 and 1971 in the proportion of women classified as managers and the decline in proportion in sales.

^b 1901-61 figures are for the commercial occupation division.

^c 1901-61 figures consist of manufacturing, mechanical, construction, labourers in the non-primary sector, and transportation and communications occupations. The aggregate figures were obtained from Table 3 in Ostry, cited below. 1971 figures consist of CCDO occupations 81-95, which include craft, production, transportation, communication, and construction workers.

^d The coefficient of variation indicates the relative dispersion of the figures for each year. It is the standard deviation of the distribution divided by its mean.

Source: 1901-61 figures adapted from Sylvia Ostry, *The Occupational Composition of the Canadian Labour Force*, 1961 Census Monograph (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), Table 8, pp. 77-78. 1971 figures computed from 1971 Census of Canada, *Occupations by Sex*, Cat. No. 94-717, Bulletin 3.2-3, September, 1974.

overrepresented in non-durable manufacturing (especially knitting and clothing); retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; and services. The proportion of women in these industries has remained roughly constant, while women's relative importance in the total labour force has increased, indicating that they have made inroads into some of the male-dominated industries. The coefficient of variation indicates that the distribution of the female labour force across all industries became slightly more even over the period 1931-71.²¹ As with occupational distribution, it appears that some desegregation has occurred, yet considerable segregation of the female labour force remains.

Future Occupational Demands

Occupational demand projections²² indicate that future labour demand will be highest in white collar occupations (professional, managerial, clerical, sales, and service), lower in blue collar occupations (manufacturing, mechanical, construction, labourer, transportation, and communication), and lowest in the primary sector. Although this suggests that job opportunities for women should be expanding, since women tend to work in white collar occupations, certain caveats should be kept in mind. First, within these broad occupational categories, women tend to be employed in specific suboccupations for which demand may not be increasing. Within the professional category, for example, women are often employed as teachers, and the demand for teachers may not be sustained, given the changing age structure of our population. Moreover, the heavy demand for nurses associated with the phenomenal increase in health care in the 1960s, may not be characteristic of the 1970s. Second, occupational demand projections are hazardous because they do not fully account for the possibility of substitution. It is not clear, for example, that the demand for clerical workers will be sustained with increased use of computers and office automation. In the words of an OECD report:²³ "The introduction of the computer has slowed up the rate of increase in the demand for clerical workers but has not led to an absolute reduction. In the long run, however, when the full effects of office automation become apparent it is reasonable to expect a reduction in the demand for clerical workers." For Canada, perhaps the safest generalization to make is that, although the demand for female workers is not expected to be unfavourable, continuation of the recent unusually high demand associated with specific professions and with the sustained general prosperity of the 1960s is unlikely.

Earnings

Earnings are perhaps the single most important indicator of labour market progress, since they reflect occupational distribution as well as the individual's past history of labour force participation and unemployment. Various questions emerge concerning differences between the sexes in earning power: What are the reasons for these

differences in earnings? In particular, how much of the earnings gap reflects differences in productivity associated with differences in education, training, and past commitment to the labour force, and how much reflects discrimination? In what occupations is the earnings gap largest, and does this shed light on possible sources of discrimination — the employer, the customer, or the co-worker? What would happen to the earnings gap if females had the same occupational and industrial distribution as males? In an attempt to answer these questions, we first document the existence of an earnings gap between males and females and then use 1971 Census data to indicate a variety of factors that influence this gap.

Reasons for Sex Differences in Earnings

Male-female earnings differentials might arise because of differences in labour market productivity or because of discrimination, which is reflected in wages varying systematically with sex rather than with contributions to economic output. Productivity and discrimination are interrelated, since current productivity differences may result partly from past discrimination or pre-labour market conditioning, perhaps from the family or educational institutions. Even before entering the labour market, many females are channeled into educational streams that are not market-oriented. In addition, they are often conditioned by home environments that encourage household work rather than labour market activity. These factors are bound to affect women's "choices" when they enter the labour market, and they also affect labour market performance and hence remuneration. Productivity differences, regardless of source, will influence earnings because they affect performance, which is the employer's principal concern.

Productivity differences also arise because women tend to stay in the labour force for shorter and more intermittent periods when they engage in household activities, especially child-raising. Because of this weaker commitment to the labour force, women in general do not acquire as much labour market experience as men. In many cases women and their employers have been unwilling to make substantial investments in training and labour-market-oriented education, in case the women leave the labour force and do not use the training.

Productivity differences may also arise because of differences in absenteeism and turnover. Female turnover usually arises because women quit their jobs in order to leave the labour force,²⁴ which lowers wages for reasons explained earlier. Men, in contrast, tend to leave their jobs to obtain better-paying ones. Consequently, turnover has a differential effect on male than on female earnings. Although we do not have systematic data on absenteeism, indirect evidence²⁵ indicates *slightly* higher absenteeism for women than men. Much female absenteeism is due to pregnancy and to taking leave to care for other members of the family who are ill. Low-pay and dead-end occupations also cause absenteeism and turnover: cause and effect can work in

both directions. Lack of systematic data for similar jobs in the same occupation and industry prevents comparisons of absenteeism and turnover, by sex, within the same job environment. Suffice it to say that if family responsibilities were more equally shared, absenteeism and turnover among women would be reduced substantially.

Discrimination also gives rise to earnings differentials. In the labour market, discrimination can come from employers, customers, or co-workers. It arises from motives including prejudice, custom, misinformation, and concern for job security. Whatever the source or reason, discrimination results in a reduced demand for female labour, which in turn reduces wages and employment opportunities. In addition, females may be crowded into "female type" jobs, with the resultant excess supply of labour further reducing wages.

Clearly, isolating the part of the male-female wage gap that is due to discrimination rather than to productivity-related factors is a hazardous undertaking. The problem is compounded by the fact that many of the productivity differences may themselves be a result of discrimination or pre-labour market conditioning. The variety of results that occur in the empirical studies²⁶ arise, at least in part, because of differences in the handling of productivity-related factors, including education, training, experience, absenteeism, and turnover. Although the results vary considerably, a pattern is discernible: females typically earn 50-80 percent of male earnings, and when adjustments are made for productivity differences, they typically earn 80-90 percent of male earnings. The extent of the differential that can be attributed to discrimination depends on the extent to which productivity differences themselves arise from sex discrimination. If one argues that current productivity differences are due to past discrimination, then all of the unadjusted wage gap can be attributed to discrimination. Alternatively, if one argues that current productivity differences reflect rational choices, especially with respect to household responsibilities, then only a small portion of the wage gap can be attributed to discrimination. But even if we use the more conservative productivity-adjusted wage gap, a substantial differential of approximately 10 percent still exists.

There are few systematic studies of the time-pattern of male-female earnings differentials in Canada, partly because of the lack of historical earnings data by sex. Ostry²⁷ suggests that the unadjusted male-female earnings gap may have actually widened slightly between the Census years 1951 and 1961. Based on nine occupations that had continuous data, the author concluded in an earlier study²⁸ that the male-female wage gap widened slightly over the period 1946 to 1971. No evidence was found in that study of a narrowing of the differential in response to the equal pay legislation of recent years. This lack of any impact of equal pay legislation was also found in another study based on cross-sectional data of a larger number of occupations.²⁹

In the empirical work that follows, 1971 Census data provide current information on the male-female earnings gap. Although the available data do not enable one to remove all of the effect of productivity-related factors from the earnings differential, they shed light on many of the questions raised earlier.

Earnings Differences, by Occupation and Industry

Table 4.9 gives the ratio of female to male earnings for various occupational groups. It shows changes that occurred between 1961 and 1971 as well as indicating how the wage gap varies between all wage earners and full-year, full-time wage earners.

Table 4.9

Ratio of Female Earnings to Male Earnings,^a All and Full-Time Wage Earners, by Occupation, Canada, 1961 and 1971

Occupation	1961 Census ^b		1971 Census	
	All Wage Earners	Full-Year, ^c Full-Time	All Wage Earners	Full-Year, ^c Full-Time
Manager/Professional ^d	.46	.56	.49	.56
Clerical	.61	.74	.59	.67
Sales	.35	.45	.34	.49
Service	.47	.47	.37	.50
Primary	.43	.60	.38	.47
Blue collar ^e	.53	.59	.47	.53
Other	—	—	.47	.55
All occupations	.54	.59	.50	.59

^a Earnings figures are for wage and salary earners and exclude self-employed in unincorporated business. 1961 and 1971 ratios are not strictly comparable. In 1961, wage and salary data were collected, with fine breakdowns to the income level of \$12,000, with an open-end class of \$15,000 or more. For calculating averages, all incomes of \$15,000 or more were given the value \$15,000. This means that, for occupations that had any incomes of \$15,000 or more, the averages are too low. The groups most likely to be affected are the managerial and professional. In 1971, actual earnings were collected, so that the same bias does not exist in 1971 data.

^b 1961 occupational groupings are based on the 1951 Census categories and are not directly comparable with the 1971 figures, which are based on the CCDO groupings (see notes to Table 4.8).

^c Worked 49-52 weeks for 35 or more hours per week.

^d 1961 figures are an unweighted average of the ratios for managers and professional and technical, used because the two groups had approximately equal numbers in 1961.

^e 1961 ratios are a weighted average of the ratios for transportation and communication with craft, production, and related workers. The latter ratio was weighted by 3 to reflect the fact that there were approximately 3 times as many craft, production, and related workers as transportation and communication workers. 1971 figures consist of CCDO occupations 81-95, which include crafts, production, transportation, communication, and construction workers.

Sources: 1961 data are derived from Sylvia Ostry, *The Female Worker in Canada* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), Table 16. 1971 data are from special 1971 Census tabulations from Statistics Canada.

Overall it appears that the wage gap increased slightly over the decade of the 1960s, remaining constant for full-year, full-time workers but increasing slightly for all wage earners. The increased gap for "all" wage earners may have occurred because of the previously documented growth in part-time or part-year employment among females. For both 1961 and 1971 the earnings ratio in every occupation was higher for full-year, full-time workers than for all wage earners, indicating that proportionately more females work part-time or part of the year. This was especially true for sales and service occupations in 1971, when the ratio of female to male earnings was quite low.

Because full-year, full-time workers are, regardless of sex, most alike in their commitment to the labour force, the remainder of our discussion will focus on this group. In 1971 the earnings of females relative to males were highest in the predominantly female clerical occupation. In this occupation we would expect less discrimination from all sources: employers are less likely to discriminate, since they may consider this a job best performed by women; co-workers are less likely to discriminate, since they are predominantly female also; and customer discrimination is not important because customer contact is minimal, except in sales, where the ratio of female to male earnings is markedly low.

It is interesting to examine what happens to the overall ratio of female to male earnings if females are assumed to have the same occupational distribution as males but retain their own earnings within an occupation. Based on the broad occupation categories of Table 4.9, females were given the male occupational distribution³⁰ as presented in Table 4.6, but retained their own earnings within each occupation. On this basis, average female wages would be \$4,270, and the ratio of female to male earnings would be approximately .54 — less than the actual ratio of .59 for full-year, full-time workers.³¹ (If more narrowly defined occupation groups are used,³² then the ratio, adjusted for differences in the occupational distribution, becomes .58.) Adjusting for differences in occupational distribution by sex does not by itself raise the ratio of female to male earnings. For the broader occupational groupings, occupational desegregation would not reduce the wage gap unless accompanied by more equal wages within each occupation. Equalizing the occupational distribution would, to a large extent, transfer women from clerical and teaching occupations, where the earnings differential is small, to primary and blue collar jobs, where the earnings gap is large. Thus the moderate decline in occupational segregation that was observed earlier is consistent with the widening of the earnings gap over time: females may be losing ground in occupations where the earnings gap is small and gaining where the earnings gap is large. To the extent that females have the low-wage jobs within each broad grouping, desegregation within occupations would obviously narrow the earnings gap.

The ratio of female to male earnings did not vary substantially from one broad industry category to another, as is indicated in Table 4.10. One would expect less inter-industry variation than inter-occupational variation, since mobility reduces earnings differentials and it is easier to move between industries than between occupations. It is easier, for example, for a female cleaner to move from the manufacturing sector to the trade sector than to become a manager. Further calculations based on five broad industrial categories, assigning females the same industrial distribution as males, did not narrow the earnings gap. Since little variation in the gap exists across these broad industry aggregates, desegregation, by itself, will not narrow the earnings gap. To the extent that females occupy the low-wage jobs within each sector, however, industrial desegregation *within* the broad industry aggregates would narrow the gap.

No substantial variation in the ratio of female to male earnings across the regions of Canada is indicated in Table 4.10. The residence variable, however, indicates that the earnings ratio is lower in urban centres than in rural or farm areas. This may reflect the importance of sales and service occupations, where female earnings are low relative to male earnings, or it may reflect an abundance of female labour supply in urban areas.

Earnings Differences, by Age, Marital Status, and Education

Younger, single, and educated females tend to do better relative to males than do older, non-single, and less educated females, according to evidence presented in Table 4.10. These results are consistent with the notion that productivity differences between males and females are smaller for these groups. Younger or single females are unlikely to have had their employment interrupted by periods of child-bearing or child-raising, or even by household activity. Similarly, educated females are more likely to have a stronger commitment to the labour force than are less educated females. Table 4.10 also shows that, for both sexes, earnings rise with age, although the peak for females is age 35-44 and for males, 45-54. This may reflect the fact that many older females have their labour market employment interrupted for household activities; hence their earnings peak earlier than those for males, who accumulate labour market experience.

These statements are generally confirmed by the results of the regression analysis contained in Appendix Table A.4.5. The different effect of marriage on earnings for males and females is clearly indicated by this analysis. Married men can expect to earn about \$3,000 more than single men, although slightly less if the male is separated, widowed, or divorced or the wife is absent. The earnings difference between married and single women, in contrast, is insignificant. For males, marriage is associated with job commitment; for females, marriage is associated with lack of job commitment, as women are more

124 Table 4.10
Annual Earnings for Full-Year, Full-Time Workers, by Sex, Occupation, Industry, Age, Marital Status, Education, Residence, and Region, Canada, 1971

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Male Earnings (\$)</u>	<u>Female Earnings (\$)</u>	<u>Female/Male Earnings Ratio</u>
Occupation:			
Managerial/professional	11,566	6,492	.56
Clerical	7,139	4,801	.67
Sales	8,377	4,059	.49
Service	6,802	3,389	.50
Primary	5,621	2,656	.47
Blue collar	7,585	4,008	.53
Other	7,256	4,826	.55
Industry:			
Primary and construction	7,746	4,288	.55
Manufacturing	8,329	4,542	.55
Transportation, communication, utilities	8,361	5,461	.65
Trade	7,587	4,187	.55
Finance, service, public administration	8,666	5,157	.60
Age:			
15-19	3,286	2,919	.89
20-24	5,600	4,300	.77
25-34	7,944	5,321	.66
35-44	9,141	5,132	.56
45-54	9,095	5,051	.56
55-64	8,191	4,906	.60
65+	6,124	3,590	.59

Marital status:			
Single	5,740	4,771	.83
Married and spouse present	8,650	4,847	.56
Separated, widowed, divorced, married and spouse absent	7,562	4,869	.64
Education:			
Elementary or less	6,610	3,638	.55
1-3 years high school	7,681	4,459	.58
4-5 years high school	8,818	5,269	.60
B.A. or first degree	12,768	8,184	.64
M.A. or Ph.D.	14,430	10,259	.71
Residence:			
Urban	8,504	4,905	.58
Rural	6,949	4,357	.63
Farm	5,277	3,862	.73
Region:			
Maritimes	6,905	3,963	.57
Quebec	7,822	4,702	.60
Ontario	8,825	5,190	.59
Prairies	7,709	4,602	.60
British Columbia	8,853	5,223	.59
All wage earners	8,178	4,826	.59

Note: Occupation, industry, and regional figures are for full-year wage earners in the experienced labour force. Other figures are for full-year, full-time wage earners.

Source: Special 1971 Census tabulations from Statistics Canada.

likely to interrupt their work for household activities, especially child-bearing, child-raising, and caring for other family members.

For both sexes, increased education (especially a university degree) is associated with increased earnings. In addition, the dollar increment for high school or university graduation is actually higher for women in the labour force than for men.³³ Since female earnings are typically lower than male earnings, the greater absolute monetary benefit from education for females serves to reduce the wage gap for educated females relative to educated males. Perhaps, for females, education is associated with a stronger labour market commitment as well as with higher productivity, and remuneration reflects this additional factor.

The results of Appendix Table A.4.5 can also be used to estimate earnings that women would receive if they were paid according to the pay structure for males.³⁴ Paying both sexes according to the male pay structure would raise female earnings from 60 percent of male earnings to 93 percent.³⁵ The remaining 7 percent gap is due to differences in age, marital status, education, and residence between males and females. Although these calculations are only meant to be illustrative, they do suggest that about four-fifths of the original wage gap of 40 percent would be closed if females were paid according to the male pay structure.

Evidence from the 1971 Census and from earlier empirical work confirms the existence of a substantial earnings gap between males and females, some of which may be due to discrimination and some due to productivity-related factors. Many of the productivity-related factors can themselves be attributed to past discrimination or to an uneven distribution of household responsibilities between males and females. This knowledge of the factors influencing the earnings gap provides a basis for an evaluation in Chapter 5 of alternative policies that have been suggested to alter the male-female wage differential.

Summary

The principal findings of each major section of the study are summarized here as background for the conclusions. They should be considered in light of the qualifications made earlier in the chapter.

Labour Force Participation

- A continuing increase in participation by females, especially those of middle and upper-middle age, is confirmed by the 1971 Census data.
- In Canada, women's return to the labour force during a second phase of working life has not reached the proportions of the first phase, as it had in the United States by 1960.
- The presence of children, not marriage itself, is the strongest force inhibiting female participation in the labour force.

- Married women of low family income are more likely to participate in the labour force than are women of high family income, suggesting that such activity is usually undertaken to increase family income.
- Married women are more likely to participate in the labour force, other things being equal, if they are educated, with subsequent access to better job opportunities and higher wages.

Unemployment

- The gap between male and female unemployment rates in Canada that has existed since World War II is rapidly narrowing (according to the Labour Force Survey) or has completely closed (according to the Census), which shows that female rates for 1971 are higher than male rates.
- More female unemployment may be “hidden,” since women are more likely to drop out of the labour force during periods of recession.
- The data do not indicate women to be substantially more prone than men to unemployment induced by recent liberalization of Canada's unemployment insurance legislation.
- Women tend to have higher unemployment rates than men in almost every occupation and industry, but women tend not to be clustered in high-unemployment industries or occupations.
- Marriage is associated with a higher unemployment rate for females and a lower unemployment rate for males, other things being equal.
- Unemployment decreases as education increases for both sexes, but university education does not have as strong an impact for women as for men.

Occupation

- The rapid expansion of the female labour force has occurred mainly in white collar and sales jobs.
- The occupational distribution is uneven, with women especially overrepresented in lower-wage clerical and service jobs.
- Occupational segregation has somewhat diminished over the past seventy years, and industrial segregation has decreased moderately over the past forty years.

Earnings

- A substantial earnings gap exists between males and females. Women typically earn 50-80 percent of male earnings, and adjustment for productivity differences raises this percentage to about 80-90. Differences in productivity may reflect discrimination, especially prior to labour market participation.
- Existence of an earnings gap between males and females is generally consistent with theories of discrimination and with the impact of greater household responsibility on women.
- The earnings gap is increasing, which may reflect an increase in part-time employment of women owing to increased participation of married women in the labour force.

Opportunity for Choice

- If females were paid according to male pay structures, the earnings gap would decrease substantially.
- Education, especially university education, has a large impact on reducing the earnings gap.
- The ratio of female to male earnings is highest for younger, single, and educated females.
- Marriage is associated with increased earnings for males but not for females.
- Widening of the earnings gap may be associated with the moderate decline in occupational segregation, since females may be losing ground in occupations where the earnings gap is small, such as clerical and teaching positions, and gaining in primary and blue collar jobs, where the earnings gap is large.
- The earnings gap is greatest for those with weak attachment to the labour force — married, middle-aged, low-educated, part-time workers.

Conclusions

We have seen that marriage has a positive effect on the labour market behaviour of men, and the opposite on that of women, illustrating clearly the impact of household responsibilities on women. Marriage increases labour force participation and earnings and decreases unemployment for men, but has the opposite effect for women. Marriage has typically been associated with one particular division of work responsibilities, with females responsible for household work and males for labour market work. Even though married women are increasingly engaged in labour market activities, they still retain many of their household responsibilities, and this influences their occupational choices as well as their labour market productivity and hence earnings. Responsibility for the care of children, for example, gives rise to shortened or intermittent stays in the labour force. This in turn reduces earnings and limits occupational choices to those compatible with household work. In fact, the occupations that females enter are often an extension of their household activities, which implies that changes in household responsibilities will have to accompany changes in the labour market behaviour of women. To a certain extent, changes in household responsibility will come about *because* of changes in female labour market activity. Yet full equality of opportunity will not occur without more changes in household responsibilities. To put it more strongly, equal pay and equal employment opportunity are not possible without an equitable division of labour in the household.

The opportunities available to women in the labour market are obviously affected by other factors, principally education or training. Education, especially university education, provides females with increased opportunities and substantially higher earnings, which in turn encourages their participation in the labour force. The occupations

and industries open to women are limited, although there is evidence that their areas of choice are expanding somewhat. The urban environment appears to offer more labour market opportunities and perhaps a social environment that is more conducive to women working.

The high participation rate of married women in low- and middle-income families suggests that economic necessity can be an important factor motivating women to participate in the labour force. Given the opportunity not to do labour market work — an opportunity that is enhanced if family income is high — many married women tend to leave the labour market and engage in non-market activities. Whether they actually choose household and other non-market activities, or merely accept them because of family and societal pressure, is an unresolved question.

Commitment to the labour force has an important effect on all aspects of female labour market behaviour. Women are more likely than men to have shorter or more intermittent stays in the labour force and to work only part-time or part of the year, which often restricts their occupational choice to white collar or sales jobs, where commitment to the labour force may not be so important. It also reduces earnings, as evidenced by the fact that the male-female earnings gap is largest for females who have characteristics associated with a weak attachment to the labour force. There are signs, however, that more women are becoming more permanently attached to the labour force.

The interrelationships among all aspects of female labour market behaviour have been illustrated throughout this chapter. The decision to participate in the labour force, for example, depends on the occupations available as well as on the earnings anticipated, and these are affected, in turn, by levels of female participation in the labour force. Wages of women are influenced by occupational crowding as well as by absenteeism and turnover, which may, in turn, be a response to earnings and the nature of the job. The growing wage gap between the sexes reflects, in part at least, an increase in part-time employment of females, a phenomenon related to the increased labour force participation of married women. The household responsibilities of females influence their commitment to the labour force and hence their choices and opportunities in the labour market. This, in turn, makes labour market activity less attractive to women, and the cycle continues.

Perhaps the most important interrelationships that exist are those between the labour market and the demographic, social, educational, and policy aspects discussed in the other chapters of this book. The labour market must be placed in this broader context if the work patterns of women are to be properly understood.

130 Table A.4.1

Regression Results for Labour Force Participation Rates of Males and Females, Canada, 1971^{ab}

Explanatory Variables	Male ^c			Female		
	Regression Coefficient ^d	t-Statistic	F-Statistic ^e	Regression Coefficient	t-Statistic	F-Statistic
Age:			402*			38*
15-24						
25-34	13.93*	11.53		9.51*	4.89	
35-64	8.44*	7.77		5.60*	3.23	
65+	-53.22*	-25.55		-33.90*	-8.01	
Marital status:			195*			105*
Single						
Married	19.31*	18.95		-22.99*	-13.99	
Other ^f	9.15*	5.39		-9.82*	-4.10	
Residence:			12*			16*
Urban						
Rural	-4.07**	-4.17		-10.82*	-5.26	
Farm	1.91	1.45		-6.58*	-2.33	
Region:			31*			14*
Maritimes						
Quebec	-2.98*	-2.13		-0.92	-0.34	
Ontario	5.95*	4.61		10.30*	3.96	
Prairies	5.91*	4.08		9.39*	3.24	
British Columbia	5.55*	3.62		7.57*	2.45	
Constant	61.28*	44.45		52.96*	20.04	

R ²	0.99	0.96
Sample size	180	180
<p>^a For a general interpretation of regression results, see Chapter 3, Appendix Table A.3.1, Note 2. The regression analysis above is based on a complete cross-tabulation by all of the explanatory variables for male and female participation rates. The participation rate (in percentages) is used as the dependent variable, with the number of observations equal to the number of cells. The explanatory variables are a set of dummy regressors (coded 1 if the observation comes from that particular dummy variable category, 0 otherwise). For each variable a reference category is omitted, and the regression coefficients are interpreted as the effect of being in the actual category as opposed to the reference category.</p> <p>^b Generalized least-squares estimates are used because the regression is based on group means (cell proportions) of unequal cell counts and hence the error terms are heteroskedastic. Multiplying each observation by the square root of the cell count would discount observations of a small cell count and yield homoskedastic errors (see, for example, E. Malinvaud, <i>Statistical Methods of Econometrics</i> [Amsterdam, North Holland, 1966], pp. 242-46).</p> <p>^c Separate regressions were run for males and females because a Chow test yielded an F-statistic of 38.55*, indicating differences in the underlying structure determining male and female unemployment rates.</p> <p>^d Significance at .01 level is * and at .05 level is **.</p> <p>^e The F-test is appropriate for testing the significance of a categorical variable as represented by more than one regressor (see, for example, A. Goldberger, <i>Econometric Theory</i> [New York: John Wiley, 1964], pp. 117 and 217).</p> <p>^f Includes separated, widowed, divorced, or married and spouse absent.</p> <p>Source: Special 1971 Census tabulations from Statistics Canada.</p>		

Table A.4.2

Regression Results for Labour Force Participation Rates of Non-Farm, Married Women with Husband Present, Canada, 1971^{ab}

Explanatory Variables	Regression Coefficient^c	t-Statistic	F-Statistic^d
Age:			680.10
15-24	—	—	
25-34	- 2.26*	- 4.19	
35-44	- 7.77*	-12.62	
45-64	-20.79*	-36.54	
Education:			917.14
Incomplete high school	—	—	
Complete high school	13.75*	37.96	
Complete university	22.13*	26.83	
Number of children:			2,024.80
No children	—	—	
Pre-school children only	-37.58*	-66.63	
School children only	- 9.44*	-20.09	
Both pre-school and school children	-34.50*	-54.97	
Income:			283.11
Less than \$3,000 ^e	—	—	
\$3,000-5,999	0.36	0.57	
\$6,000-8,999	- 1.45**	- 2.41	
\$9,000-11,999	- 8.43*	-12.66	
\$12,000-14,999	-15.04*	-17.62	
\$15,000+	-22.94*	-26.57	
Residence:			
Urban	—	—	
Rural non-farm	- 1.70*	- 3.81	
Region:			209.34
Maritimes	—	—	
Quebec	- 0.70	- 0.98	
Ontario	11.65*	17.24	
Prairies	9.52*	12.74	
British Columbia	4.07*	5.14	
Constant	62.36*	70.32	
R ²	0.97		
Sample size	2,160		

^{a-d} Correspond to notes a, b, d, and e, respectively, of Appendix Table A.4.1.

^e Income is the family income less the wife's wage.

Source: Special 1971 Census tabulations from Statistics Canada.

134 Table A.4.3

Unemployment Rates, by Sex and Industry, Canada, 1961 and 1971

Industry	1961			1971			Change in Female/ Male Ratio
	Male		Female/ Male	Male		Female/ Male	
	Male	Female		Male	Female		
Agriculture	0.9	0.6	0.67	1.9	2.3	1.21	+0.54
Forestry	15.1	8.2	0.54	16.5	8.3	0.50	-0.04
Fishing and trapping	5.4	2.9	0.54	6.1	8.3	1.36	+0.82
Mines, quarries, and oil wells	4.1	2.8	0.68	6.4	6.6	1.03	+0.35
Manufacturing	3.3	3.1	0.94	5.9	9.0	1.53	+0.59
Durables	3.7	2.8	0.76	6.1	9.1	1.49	+0.73
Wood products	5.9	3.4	0.58	8.2	8.0	0.98	+0.40
Furniture and fixtures	3.8	3.2	0.84	6.4	8.6	1.34	+0.50
Primary metal	2.8	2.1	0.75	4.2	6.7	1.60	+0.85
Metal fabricating	4.3	3.2	0.74	6.5	8.5	1.31	+0.57
Machinery (except electrical)	2.7	2.1	0.78	5.2	8.4	1.62	+0.84
Transportation equipment	3.5	3.2	0.91	6.8	10.0	1.47	+0.56
Electrical products	2.2	2.4	1.09	5.1	10.3	2.02	+0.93
Non-metallic mineral products	3.6	2.6	0.72	5.5	8.0	1.45	+0.73
Non-durables	2.9	3.2	1.10	5.7	9.0	1.58	+0.48
Food and beverages	3.4	4.8	1.41	6.0	10.9	1.82	+0.41
Tobacco products	4.1	3.0	0.73	5.3	8.7	1.64	+0.91
Rubber	2.4	2.9	1.21	5.7	9.3	1.63	+0.42
Leather	3.4	2.9	0.85	8.1	9.5	1.17	+0.32
Textile	2.8	2.7	0.96	6.2	8.5	1.37	+0.41
Knitting mills	5.5	3.8	0.69	7.8	9.9	1.27	+0.58
Clothing	3.6	2.7	0.75	7.5	8.0	1.07	+0.32
Paper and allied industries	2.8	3.0	1.07	6.2	8.3	1.34	+0.27
Printing, publishing, etc.	2.0	2.8	1.40	4.6	8.4	1.83	+0.43

Petroleum and coal products	1.3	1.5	1.15	3.3	5.2	1.58	+0.43
Chemical and chemical products	2.4	2.0	0.83	4.2	7.7	1.83	+1.00
Miscellaneous manufacturing	3.0	3.4	1.13	6.1	9.3	1.52	+0.39
Construction	8.8	2.1	0.24	10.2	7.3	0.72	+0.48
Transportation, communication, and other utilities	3.5	1.9	0.54	4.7	5.7	1.21	+0.67
Transportation	4.0	2.1	0.53	5.3	5.9	1.11	+0.58
Storage	2.8	3.1	1.11	5.6	10.6	1.89	+0.78
Communication	1.9	1.8	0.95	3.3	5.6	1.70	+0.75
Electrical power, gas and water utilities	3.0	1.6	0.53	3.6	4.4	1.22	+0.69
Trade	2.9	2.7	0.93	5.1	7.4	1.51	+0.58
Wholesale	2.8	3.0	1.07	4.9	7.9	1.61	+0.54
Retail	3.0	2.6	0.87	5.3	7.3	1.38	+0.51
Finance, insurance, and real estate	1.2	1.6	1.33	2.8	5.1	1.82	+0.49
Community, business, and personal services	2.7	1.8	0.67	5.3	5.1	0.96	+0.29
Education	1.0	0.5	0.50	2.8	2.5	0.89	+0.39
Health and Welfare	1.4	1.0	0.71	2.8	3.1	1.11	+0.40
Religious organizations	0.8	0.3	0.38	1.4	2.3	1.64	+1.26
Motion picture and recreation	6.8	4.1	0.60	11.2	12.3	1.10	+0.50
Services to business management	1.9	2.3	1.21	5.0	7.3	1.46	+0.25
Personal services	4.0	2.7	0.68	5.1	7.0	1.37	+0.69
Miscellaneous services	4.0	2.7	0.68	7.5	7.4	0.99	+0.31
Public administration and defence	2.5	1.4	0.56	3.5	3.9	1.11	+0.55
All industries	3.7	2.2	0.59	5.8	6.1	1.05	+0.46

Sources: 1961 figures from S. Osty, *Unemployment in Canada*, 1961 Census Monograph (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), p. 19. Figures for 1971 are computed as unemployed/labour force where unemployment figures are based on special tabulations from Statistics Canada, and labour force is from 1971 Census of Canada, *Industries by Sex*, Cat. No. 94-740, Bulletin 3.4-3, December, 1974.

136 Table A.4.4

Regression Results for Unemployment Rates for Males and Females, Canada, 1971^{ab}

Explanatory Variables	Male ^c			Female		
	Regression Coefficient ^d	t-Statistic	F-Statistic ^e	Regression Coefficient	t-Statistic	F-Statistic
Age:			129.48*			205.78*
15-24	—	—		—	—	
25-44	- 4.47*	-16.56		- 5.30*	-21.64	
45-64	- 4.90*	-15.35		- 6.33*	-21.55	
65 +	- 0.04	- 0.08		- 5.45*	- 6.72	
Education:			11.46*			21.45*
Elementary	—	—		—	—	
1-3 years high school	- 1.09*	- 4.66		0.46	1.74	
4-5 years high school	- 1.47*	- 5.40		- 1.26*	- 4.30	
Complete university	- 1.32*	- 2.63		- 0.69	- 1.32	
Marital status:			262.97*			9.63*
Single	—	—		—	—	
Married	- 5.12*	-20.00		0.63*	2.69	
Other ^f	0.11	0.28		1.56	4.38	
Occupation:						
White collar ^g	—	—		—	—	
Blue collar ^h	2.20*	10.76	74.87*	3.51*	14.66	12.08*

Region:				
Maritimes	0.28	0.85	- 0.04	- 0.09
Quebec	- 2.77*	- 8.35	0.14	0.37
Ontario	- 3.74*	- 9.74	- 0.50	- 1.19
Prairies	- 0.24	- 0.62	2.16*	5.02
British Columbia	14.25*	36.75	9.23	21.03
Constant				
R ²	0.94		0.92	
Sample size	421		372	

^a The regression analysis is based on a complete cross-tabulation by all of the explanatory variables for male and female unemployment rates for the experienced labour force. The unemployment rate (in percentages) is used as the dependent variable, with the number of observations equal to the number of usable cells, in this case having 10 or more unemployed. The explanatory variables are a set of dummy regressors, coded 1 if the observation comes from that particular dummy variable category, 0 otherwise. For each variable a reference category is omitted, and the regression coefficients interpreted as the effect of being in the actual category as opposed to the reference category.

^{b-f} Correspond to notes *b* through *f* of Appendix Table A.4.1.

^g CCDO occupations 1100-6199.

^h CCDO occupations 7100-9900.

Table A.4.5

Regression Results for Earnings of Full-Year, Full-Time Workers for Males and Females, Canada, 1971^{ab}

Explanatory Variables	Regression Coefficients ^c		Proportions in Each Category	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Age:				
15-19 ^d	—	—	—	—
20-24	436	667**	.1409	.1939
25-34	2,589*	1,691*	.2341	.2083
35-44	3,876*	2,473*	.2063	.1783
45-54	3,871*	2,318*	.1789	.1688
55-64	3,496*	2,288*	.1204	.0990
65+	597	1,112*	.0325	.0260
Marital status:				
Single	—	—	—	—
Married	3,059*	99	.8045	.5283
Other ^e	2,640*	150	.0530	.1517
Education:				
Elementary or less	—	—	—	—
1-3 years high school	861**	818*	.3524	.3714
4-5 years high school	1,600*	1,847*	.2845	.3922
B.A. or first degree	4,078*	4,987*	.0624	.0041
M.A. or Ph.D.	5,273*	5,786*	.0226	.0087
Residence:				
Farm	—	—	—	—
Rural non-farm	634**	911*	.1215	.0833
Urban	2,057*	1,066*	.8358	.8848
Constant	-123	718	1	1
R ²	.65	.74		
Sample size	292	278		

^a The dependent variable, earnings, is coded in dollars.

^b Ordinary least-squares regression was used because the cell counts were not readily available for generalized least-squares estimates from grouped data.

^c Significance at .01 level is * and at .05 level is **.

^d The proportions for each age group are based on the total labour force rather than on full-year, full-time workers, since the latter figures were not readily available for these disaggregated age groups.

^e Includes separated, widowed, divorced, or married and spouse absent.

Source: Special 1971 Census tabulations from Statistics Canada.

Notes

*Various persons have aided in the preparation of this work. Without implicating them for any of the results or conclusions, I would like to thank Gail Cook, Greg Jump, Jenny Pololuk, Byron Spencer, and John Vanderkamp for their comments and Dorothy and Jean Newman and Marion Stanley at the University of Toronto Centre for Industrial Relations for their assistance.

¹ Novia Carter, *Volunteers: The Untapped Potential* (Ottawa: The Canadian Council on Social Development, 1975).

² Sylvia Ostry, *The Female Worker in Canada*, 1961 Census Monograph (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), p. 11.

³ S. Meis and J. Scheu, "All in a Day's Work: A Time Budget Analysis of the Daily Activities of Men and Women," VUSP Report No. 4, mimeographed (Vancouver: Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia, 1973).

⁴ Manpower and Immigration, *Canada Manpower and Immigration Review* (Special Issue, International Women's Year, 1975), Vol. 8, No. 1, 1975, p. 17.

⁵ A linear-probability-function equation was estimated based on individual observations from the 1971 Census Public Use Sample Tape. The results generally confirm statements based on Table 4.2 and Appendix Table A.4.1. These results also indicated that women who had had previous training, and immigrant women, were more likely to participate in the labour force. No attempt was made to account for the estimating problems associated with the linear-probability function. These problems are discussed in Morley Gunderson, "Retention of Trainees: A Study with Dichotomous Dependent Variables," *Journal of Econometrics* 2 (May, 1974), pp. 79-93.

⁶ The negative relationship between the wife's labour force participation and her non-labour income (family income less her own wage) is not universally found in all data sets. Jenny Podoluk of Statistics Canada has pointed out that unpublished data from the 1974 Survey of Consumer Finance indicate married-female participation rates to be highest in the middle-income categories. In addition, when fewer income categories are used for "family income less own wage" than in Table 4.3, 1971 Census data indicate that participation rates rise slightly between \$4,000 and \$7,000. Based on the 1961 Census, Ostry (Table 6 of *The Female Worker in Canada*, *op. cit.*) finds that the negative relationship between female labour force participation and non-labour income holds for all groups of married females except those 15-34 with no children. In spite of this lack of universal agreement based on data where the effects of other variables are *not* held constant, there seems to be agreement that when the wife's wage or education is held constant (as in our regression analysis of Appendix Table A.4.2), then there is a negative relationship between female labour force participation and female non-labour income. However, as Ostry points out, in regressions based on the 1963 Survey of Consumer Finance, the negative relationship was statistically insignificant in only one-half of the regression equations. This raises the possibility of a discrepancy between female participation patterns as found in Census data with those found in the Survey of Consumer Finance.

⁷ Information in this paragraph was obtained from Statistics Canada, *Background Information on the 1971 Census Labour Force Data* (Ottawa: Information Canada), from the Labour Force Survey questionnaire, and from correspondence with Amy Kempster of Statistics Canada.

⁸ The rate was 8.9 percent for the total female labour force and 6.1 percent for the experienced labour force, which excludes unemployed persons who had never worked or who had last worked prior to January, 1970.

⁹ In addition, in Quebec the Census undercounted the number of employed females and overstated their unemployment rate because the questionnaire was translated into French literally, rather than colloquially, and some persons answered erroneously.

¹⁰ The estimated ordinary-least-squares regression equation was

$$U_f/U_m = 6.277 - .1968T + .00167T^2 + .0048C$$

$$(7.92)^* \quad (-7.34)^* \quad (7.51)^* \quad (.80)$$

where U_f and U_m are the female and male unemployment rates (*in percentages*), respectively, T is entered as 46, 47, . . . 74 for the years 1946-74, and C reflects the business cycle computed as a percentage deviation of real GNP from the trend, where the trend is obtained by regressing the logarithm of real GNP against time. This measure of the cycle was used, rather than the overall unemployment rate, to avoid the simultaneous-equation estimation problem associated with having the same variables on both sides of the equation. The overall unemployment rate is a weighted average of the male and female rates, which appear in ratio form as the dependent variable. T -statistics are given in parenthesis, with * indicating significance at the .01 level. R^2 is .74, and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.40, indicating an inconclusive test of serial correlation at the .01 level. The F -statistic on the quadratic time variable is 30, which is significant at the .01 level, indicating that the ratio of female to male unemployment exhibits a significant non-linear time trend, in this case a U-shaped trend.

¹¹ The minimum value of U_f/U_m , indicating the widest gap, occurs in the year when $\partial (U_f/U_m)/\partial T = 0$. It is a minimum, since $\partial^2 (U_f/U_m)/\partial T^2 > 0$.

¹² Equality was obtained by setting $U_f/U_m = 1$, assuming no influence of the cycle so that $C = 0$, and solving for T via the quadratic formulae $T = [-b \pm (b^2 - 4ac)^{1/2}]/2a$ where b is the coefficient of time, a is the coefficient of time squared, and c equals the constant term less $U_f/U_m = 1$.

¹³ The impact of changes in the Unemployment Insurance Act was tested by an F -test to see if the 1972 to 1974 ratios of female and male unemployment were generated by the same underlying structure as existed in the pre-1972 period. The calculated F -statistic of .087 was insignificant at the .05 level, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a similar underlying structure in the years before and after the changes in the unemployment insurance legislation. (For a description of this F -test, see J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963], pp. 137-38.) In addition, the impact of the changes in the Unemployment Insurance Act was tested by a dummy variable for the years 1972-74. The regression coefficient for the dummy variable was statistically insignificant, indicating that no structural shift in the female-male unemployment ratio had occurred since the changes in the Act.

¹⁴ *Background Information on the 1971 Census Labour Force Data*, *op.cit.*, p. 3. Approximately one-fifth of unemployed males were from the inexperienced labour force.

¹⁵ This hypothetical female unemployment rate is obtained as follows: (1) Compute the percentage of the total male labour force in each occupation. (2) Calculate the hypothetical female labour force that would exist in each occupation if the female labour force were distributed according to the male distribution. This is obtained by weighing (multiplying) the total female labour force by the male occupational weight (proportion) as calculated in step 1. (3) Calculate the hypothetical number of females who would be unemployed in each occupation if females had their same occupational propensity to be unemployed (as given by their occupational unemployment rate), but if they had the male occupational distribution as indicated by step 2. This is obtained by multiplying the female unemployment rate by the hypothetical female labour force as given in step 2. (4) Sum the hypothetical number of unemployed females and divide by the female labour force to get the hypothetical female unemployment rate that would have existed if females had the same occupational distribution as males. This could be termed the occupationally standardized female unemployment rate.

A similar calculation for males yielded an unemployment rate of 5 percent, assuming they had the female occupational distribution but the male unemployment rate within each occupation.

¹⁶ Of course, if occupational segregation breaks down, the higher propensity of

females to be unemployed within each occupation may also break down. In other words, if females become more like males in their occupational distribution, they may well become more like males in their propensity to be unemployed in each occupation.

¹⁷ For evidence on the 1961 Census data, see Sylvia Ostry, *Unemployment in Canada*, 1961 Census Monograph (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), p. 11.

¹⁸ Optimal job search is longer for the young, reflecting lower costs and higher benefits. Costs are lower because foregone income is usually low and the young are often supported by their families. Benefits are greater because of longer expected working life.

¹⁹ See, for example, M. Galensen, *Women and Work: An International Comparison* (Ithaca: New York State School of Industrial and Labour Relations, Cornell University, 1973).

²⁰ Calculations for 1931-61 were based on figures for approximately thirty industries from Tables D1-D3 in N. Meltz, *Manpower in Canada, 1931-1961* (Ottawa: Department of Manpower and Immigration, 1969). Calculations for 1971 are from 1971 Census of Canada, *Industries by Sex*, Cat. No. 94-740, Bulletin 3.4-3, December, 1974.

²¹ The coefficient of variation for the proportion of the labour force in each industry that is female is .907 in 1931, .888 in 1941, .769 in 1951, .746 in 1961, and .647 in 1971.

²² See, for example, *Canadian Occupational Forecasting Program: Forecasts of Occupational Demand in Canada to 1980* (Ottawa: Department of Manpower and Immigration).

²³ B. Seear, *Re-Entry of Women to the Labour Market after an Interruption in Employment* (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1971), p. 15.

²⁴ W. Barnes, and E. Jones, "Differences in Male and Female Quitting," *Journal of Human Resources* 9 (Fall, 1974), p. 439.

²⁵ Labour Canada, *Women in the Labour Force: Facts and Figures*, 1973 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), p. 43.

²⁶ The Canadian studies have been summarized in Morley Gunderson, "Equal Pay in Canada," in *Equal Pay for Women: Progress and Problems in Seven Countries*, ed. P. Pettman (London: MCB Books, 1975).

²⁷ Ostry, *op.cit.*

²⁸ Morley Gunderson, "Time Pattern of Male-Female Wage Differentials: Ontario, 1946-71," *Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations* (forthcoming).

²⁹ Morley Gunderson, "Male-Female Wage Differentials and the Impact of Equal Pay Legislation," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 57, No. 4 (November, 1975).

³⁰ The results that follow are not substantially altered if males are given the female occupational distribution.

³¹ The calculation is performed as follows: (1) For each occupation record the average female wage (Y_i) and the male occupational distribution, which is the proportion of the total male labour force that is in each occupation ($m/\sum m$). (2) For each occupation compute $y_i (m/\sum m)$, which gives female earnings in the occupation if females had the same occupational distribution as males. (3) Sum these figures across all occupations to get the average income of females, assuming they have the male occupational distribution. (4) Divide this figure by the actual earnings of males to get the ratio of female to male earnings, assuming both sexes have the same occupational distribution, in this case the male distribution.

³² The more narrowly defined occupations are the 23 aggregate occupations from the CCDO occupational classification. Data for full-year, full-time workers are from special 1971 Census tabulations from Statistics Canada.

³³ This does not necessarily mean that the monetary benefits from education are greater for females than for males. Proportionately more females than males are outside of the labour force and consequently would not receive any monetary benefit from their education. The data in Table 4.10 refer to labour

market workers only.

³⁴ The calculation is performed as follows: (1) For each sex, regress earnings on the explanatory variables influencing earnings. (2) Multiply the regression coefficients for the male wage equation with the average value of the corresponding explanatory variables for females, to get the expected female wage if females were paid according to the male pay structure as given by the male regression coefficients. (3) Compare this hypothetical female wage with the male wage, also based on the male pay structure. The differential would be purged of the effect of wage discrimination because both males and females are paid according to the same pay structure. (4) Compute the portion of the male-female earnings differential attributable to differences in male-female productivity-related endowments (differences in mean values of the explanatory variables) and the portion attributable to differences in the way males and females are paid for their endowments (differences in the regression coefficients).

³⁵ Hypothetical Earnings Calculations:

$\sum \bar{x}_{fbf} / \sum \bar{x}_{mbm} = 4827/8006 = .60$ each, paid according to own pay structure.
 $\sum \bar{x}_{fbm} / \sum \bar{x}_{mbm} = 7422/8006 = .93$ females, paid according to male pay structure.

5

Policies Affecting Work

Gail C.A. Cook and Mary Eberts*

Most able-bodied adults agree that they must provide for their needs by working and assume that they will have some choice in the type of work they do. In fact, however, the range of choice for women has historically been strictly limited, as it was in the Victorian world of “two spheres”¹ — a world in which business and politics were almost exclusively male concerns, while women for the most part “filled the noble offices of wife and mother.” Although few people explicitly think in these terms today, the structure and operation of many major contemporary institutions — the family and the labour market, for example — still reflect to a considerable degree this rigid separation of activity. As a result, the financial and emotional costs and benefits of particular work choices continue to be associated with one's sex.

Fulfilling her traditional roles as wife, mother, and housewife or household manager on a full-time basis may, over time, make a woman economically more vulnerable than she was when she first embarked upon this career. She is financially dependent on her husband's participation in the paid labour force and her work in the home does little or nothing towards strengthening her future earning power. While she may have chosen to forego, at least temporarily, opportunities outside the home, she may have little choice about accepting the lack of personal financial security that many homemakers endure. When married women participate in the labour force, most of them still retain the traditional responsibilities for the smooth functioning of the household and the care of the children: they have, in effect, two jobs.

For the man, fulfilling his expected role as provider may entail very real personal costs; default in performing this role may even attract state sanctions. As will be pointed out later, a man's decision to perform a full-time domestic role might make him economically even more vulnerable than the woman who does so, quite apart from subjecting him to any social disapproval that may accrue to such a choice. These examples highlight the discrepancy between the present situation and the goal expressed in Chapter 1: to expand the range of effective choices available to Canadians, so that the costs and benefits associated with particular choices are not dependent on one's sex.

Canadians have responded privately to the collision of the older social institutions and newer needs, desires, and priorities, as earlier chapters document. Changes in patterns of family formation are occurring, women are increasingly sharing in education, and women's participation in the labour force is increasing. These personal adjustments, many of which began when government policy encouraging such responses was minimal, might at first suggest that public policy initiatives are not required to reach our objective of effective choice. A simple presentation of the record of changes in family formation, education, and labour force participation does not, however, reveal the costs at which these adjustments have been made. Many women have contributed to the smooth functioning of an economic and social system at disproportionate costs to themselves. Some women may be personally able to sustain such costs: the phenomenon of the "superwoman" — competent professional, ideal wife, and mother — is often held up as proof of women's real opportunities. A social system that depends for its effective functioning on "superwomen" or, by contrast, on one-dimensional people, is, however, far from ideal.

Accordingly, we cannot leave achievement of our objective to private accommodation only. Some public involvement is required. In this chapter we explore the areas in which this involvement might occur and the implications of accepting the goal of expanding choice and dissociating the costs of particular choices from gender. This goal, we note, goes beyond the one that has animated previous reform efforts. Equality for women has been the objective of many of the policy initiatives of the past one hundred years: for example, obtaining the franchise, removing the legal barriers to women's holding certain jobs and dealing with property, and securing the enactment of equal pay legislation. The goal of these policy initiatives was to remove the outright barriers to women's movement between the "two spheres." Inherent in the equality approach, however, is a standard of female accomplishment that depends on the degree of male accomplishment. The whole dynamic of change has been to make "hers" equal "his," and "his" has rarely been examined. Something more than a "his" and "hers" approach is needed at this time to achieve effective choice for individuals of either sex.

Some observers of the Canadian economy and society argue that public ownership of the means of production is a prerequisite to expanding effective choices for women; others argue that the private market unfettered by legislation, such as equal pay and equal opportunity, would increase opportunities for women. In our view, however, public policy and changing private attitudes can achieve fundamental reforms within our mixed capitalistic-governmental economy. It is against this background that we explore means of dissociating costs from gender, so that persons and couples will be able either to choose the traditional pattern or to devise one in keeping with their own needs and desires in a decision-making environment that ex-

pands the range of effective choice. Dissociating costs from gender may, in some cases, involve a voluntary reallocation of costs among family members. It may also entail a judgment by society that some of the costs now borne by individuals must be shared by other individuals or by society as a whole.

In the following analysis we focus on selected policies within three main spheres: policies affecting the work of women who are, primarily, participants in the traditional sphere of family life; policies affecting women who have moved into the sphere of the labour market; and policies affecting women who are participants in both. Although the policy discussion is conducted with respect to women, we hope that the issues raised are sufficiently general to encourage investigation of the disproportionate costs borne by men, also as a result of convention, institutions, and policies.

Family Life

Chapter 2 provides evidence to indicate that family decisions are being made that result in the reduction of the housewife and mother roles of women through increasing childlessness, postponing childbirth, compressing the child-raising period, and increasing participation in the labour force. These changes may constitute a response to increased strains placed on women as a result of the family's changing from the primary production unit to primarily a consumption unit, as well as a response to increased opportunities for women in the marketplace.

Taking much of the production out of the home has, however, resulted in an association of productive activity with financial rewards and has left a woman's work as housewife unremunerated and less highly regarded. The increasing incidence of divorce, and attendant property settlements, has highlighted the inequity in basing ownership of property acquired during marriage on financial contribution when no payment is made for the productive labour of the wife in the home. This has stimulated a general examination of the value placed by society on the work of the housewife and mother and, for some observers, a re-evaluation of an economic structure based on unremunerated labour of large classes of persons, particularly women.

For the vast majority of Canadians, the family constitutes the basic economic unit for which income is both earned and spent. In spite of the increasing labour force participation of women, the division of labour within many families still results in the husband's obtaining money income for the family in return for his labour and in the wife's performing unpaid work in the home. This type of cooperative arrangement means that both husbands and wives work, but that husbands earn the income on behalf of the entire family. Control over expenditures from this income varies from cases where wives are placed on strict allowances to those where the entire pay cheque is handed over to the wife.

This arrangement may be satisfactory for the woman not participating in the labour force just as long as the cooperation implicit in the family unit continues. The wife's share in the family income is not guaranteed, however, and should the marriage be dissolved, she may discover that her work has earned her neither financial security nor marketable skills. This valuation of their labour in the home affects all women in their roles as housewives and as heads of single-parent families.

This section discusses alternative methods of recognizing the economic contributions of women in the home and of making the benefits associated with unpaid work in the home more closely parallel those of paid work in the labour force. These methods include inclusion of housewives' services in gross national product, wages for housewives, and reform of property relations between spouses.

Housewives' Services in Gross National Product

Gross national product is the single most important measure of economic output. Yet it excludes a large proportion of economic activity, including most of the work performed in households. Some observers are beginning to ask why a large proportion of services, performed primarily by women, are not counted in GNP; other observers suggest that this alleged anomaly not only reflects the low value placed on the contributions of women in the home but has serious implications for women: the ordinary contributions of a wife and mother, for example, are generally not recognized in law as a basis for an ownership interest in assets accumulated during a marriage.²

Exclusion from GNP of many services provided in the home is readily explainable by the definition of gross national product and the main purpose for which economists have used the measure. Gross national product is defined as the value, measured at market prices, of goods and services produced in a particular year. Establishment of a price in the market is an important prerequisite for inclusion in GNP, although prices and values are imputed to some services, such as owner-occupied housing, for which no market transaction has taken place. The proposal to include the value of services provided by women and men in their own homes would simply add to the list of imputations currently made. This step has not had high priority because exclusion does not seriously affect the primary use economists make of GNP: to measure cyclical changes in economic activity as a basis for decisions about appropriate government policies to deal with unemployment and inflation. Since activity within the household does not change markedly over the period of a business cycle, its inclusion has not been essential to appropriate policy decisions.

Interest in altering the GNP measure as now constituted does not come solely from feminists. The desire to measure a society's standard of living, or the even more comprehensive concept of societal

"well-being," has given rise to an interest in using a broadened measure, including both economic and social accounts. Interest in changing the measure has also come from analysts who note that comparisons of GNP over time in one country, or across countries, are less accurate indicators of relative standards of living than they would be if an expanded measure were used. This is because different economies, or the same economy at different times, may have different proportions of total economic activity going through the market system and therefore being reflected in the conventional GNP measure.

Our interest in the GNP, however, goes beyond the objective of improving measures of economic activity to provide better economic and social information and, consequently, better analysis. Revision of the GNP should also be evaluated in terms of its symbolic value in reflecting economic contributions of women and its importance as a prerequisite or important determinant in recognizing women's household contributions for the purpose, for example, of matrimonial property settlements. As a basis for this evaluation, we examine the principles the national accountant would follow in revising the GNP figures to include housewives' services and the alternative methods that could be used.

If the objective is to expand the GNP so as to measure the value of all work that takes place outside the labour force, the expanded GNP should include not only the economic contributions of housewives but the value of all work performed outside the labour force that substitutes for labour that otherwise would be provided and paid for in the market.³ The contributions of men and women working at home on their own behalf and as volunteers outside the home would thus find a place in the expanded measure. Since the contributions of women as housewives far outweigh any other single service not currently included in GNP, our attention is focused on housewives' services.

The objective of the national accountant would be to impute a value to the services provided by the housewife, and not to quantify the whole value of the individual housewife to her family. Consequently, the revised GNP measure would include only the value of those services provided by the housewife that could be purchased in the market. It would exclude that extra time spent in activities from which the housewife herself obtained satisfaction, even though they also provided an additional benefit to her family — the extra time spent baking and participating in special projects with children, for example. It is precisely this extra contribution to the well-being of the family that many women regard as their special contribution and that influences some women to limit their activities outside the home.

With this principle in mind, we can evaluate three major alternative methods of imputing a value to housewives' services that would be considered by the national accountant.⁴ The first approach is to estimate the number of hours incurred in providing a particular set of

services and to value these hours at the rate the individual could earn as a participant in the labour force. This is really a measure of the money income that the housewife foregoes as a result of not participating in the labour force. The estimated value would be built up on the basis of categories of women with different skills valued differently by the labour market. This method of imputing a housewife's contributions to the economy makes her contributions dependent on her productivity in the labour force and not on her skills at the services being evaluated in the household. It reflects women's implicit valuation of their own worth in the household, the decision not to participate in the labour force demonstrating that they place a value upon their time in the household at least as great as the money income and intangible benefits of labour force participation.

As pointed out above, however, evaluation of the housewife's total hours spent working in the home may result, from the accountant's point of view, in an overestimate of the value that should be attached to her economic contribution in the household. One response to this difficulty is to evaluate not the entire time the woman spends on household work, but only the minimum time required to perform the household services, using the perhaps unrealistic assumption that the housewife obtains direct satisfaction from all time spent in excess of the minimum required.

A second method of estimating a housewife's contribution is to incorporate into the GNP measure the salary of a housekeeper who performs the basic functions provided by the housewife. One assumes here that the housekeeper obtains no satisfaction above and beyond the money income earned, thereby eliminating the problems incurred with the first method of estimation.

The final method of estimating the value of a housewife's services is to specify in detail the functions associated with being a housewife. The amount of time spent on each type of activity is estimated and valued at the market wages of the appropriate worker — for example, a cook or a cleaner.

Inclusion of housewives' services into GNP by any one of these proposed methods would recognize symbolically and without money payment that women make a large contribution to the economy. Estimates obtained by the three alternative methods for a number of countries indicate that housewives' services have a value equal to about one-third of gross national product as traditionally measured.⁵ Yet not all of the work done by women in the home would be reflected in the expanded GNP: as pointed out above, any technically sound national accounting scheme excludes some of the most important values associated with being a wife and mother. Inclusion of housewives' services in GNP may thus draw from some observers the charge that it represents the wife and mother's value as only that of cook, cleaner, and baby-sitter. Such drawbacks indicate that the gross national product specifically, and the national accounts gener-

ally, are not the appropriate means for measuring certain conditions and values in society. Consequently, inclusion of housewives' services in GNP should be viewed not as an end in itself but as a possible vehicle for encouraging recognition of a housewife's contribution in different and more tangible ways. More direct and concrete means of recognizing such contributions do exist and are discussed below.

Wages for Housework

Inclusion of the value of housewives' services in GNP might provide recognition that women make an important contribution to the economy in the form of unpaid work, but it would provide no source of income to the housewife. To provide financial recognition of unpaid work, variations on a wages-for-housework proposal have been suggested. To our knowledge, such suggestions have not included either specification of a consistent plan or an analysis of its implications. Alternative types of proposals for wages for housewives are discussed in this section, followed by discussion of a concrete example.

If the objective is primarily to provide women with remuneration for work performed, two options are available. On the one hand, legislation could ensure that the members of the household participating in the labour force share their income in a designated way with other members of the household. This approach would leave the distribution of income, by family, unaffected. A precedent for sharing of income at source is provided by the military, which provides a portion of the husband's salary in the form of a separate payment to the wife. This approach might reduce the problems of those whose husbands are reluctant to share their income and, being official, might even help those women who feel guilty spending their husbands' incomes. Some part of the psychic dependence alleged to emanate from economic dependence might be reduced.

Alternatively, governments could raise tax rates or reallocate existing tax revenues to pay wages to those currently performing housework for no payment. In this case, family income in the economy would be redistributed from some families to others, depending on the eligibility criteria for receipt of wages.

The government-expenditures route to payment of wages for housewives has different implications for the national accounts, depending on whether the wages are seen as payment for productive labour, analogous to civil servants' wages, or whether they are treated as transfers, such as children's allowances and subsidies to business. In the first case, the wages would be included in gross national product as part of government expenditure on labour and would be treated as taxable income to the recipient. In the second case, the wages would be treated not as an addition to government output, but as a transfer of income within the existing economic output. This approach does not recognize the productivity of women in contributing to economic output but treats them instead as one of the

many diverse groups in our society worthy of transfer payments financed by taxing other members of the community.

Some of the supporters of government-financed salaries to housewives present a rationale for their proposal based on the nature of our economic system. They argue that the housework and child care performed by women are a prerequisite to most men's working the hours they do in the paid economy. Arguing that employers are, as a consequence, purchasing the work of both the husband and the wife for the salary of the husband, they support financial recognition of the wife's contribution. Consequently, they propose that business be taxed to finance the payment of salaries to housewives. Since wages and salaries in our economy reflect productivity of labour (with some adjustment for economic power), wages and salaries already take into account hours worked and other factors determined by the shared division of labour within the household. The issue really revolves around how work in the home should be remunerated: through private arrangements between husbands and wives; through forced sharing of the income of labour force participants; or through payment of housewives' salaries financed through the tax system. The latter approach is the subject of further analysis here. Any particular plan for government-financed salaries to housewives will have implications for the size of the female labour force, the size of the salary bill, and the redistribution of income among families or households according to the characteristics for eligibility. After discussing the problems of specifying eligibility criteria, we examine the effects of an arbitrarily defined program.

Since hours worked in the home cannot be monitored effectively enough to provide a basis for payment, the alternative is to make eligibility depend on verifiable characteristics, such as sex, non-participation in the labour force, age of children, or presence of other dependent relatives. To the extent that these categories reflect imperfectly the amount of housework and child care actually undertaken by women falling within them, the original objective of paying for such work is seriously compromised. The inability to identify how much work each person performs constitutes a basic argument against a wages-for-housework plan.

Nevertheless, if discussion of a wages-for-housewives plan is to continue, it is important to illustrate the type of consequences that might be expected from such a plan. Accordingly, we define quite arbitrarily a modest plan paying \$1,000 (far less than the minimum wage for a full-time, full-year job) to women with children of selected ages. In practice, the income from such a plan could be taxed at the individual's own tax rate; or, if an incentive to non-participation in the labour force is desired, the salary could be reduced by one dollar for every dollar earned in the labour force; or, at the extreme, eligibility could be made conditional upon non-participation in the labour force. In our example, we cannot reflect the impact of our whole tax struc-

ture, but we can show the impact of the plan when fifty cents of every household salary dollar is taxed back for every dollar received in the labour force (50 percent tax rate) and when one household salary dollar is taxed back for every dollar received in the labour force (100 percent tax rate).

The estimated impact of the wages-for-housewives program presented below is based on 1971 data from the Survey of Consumer Finances.⁶ The eligibility criteria, terms of the program, and the receipt of the income itself will affect women's participation in the labour force. A \$1,000 payment for all women with children under 18 years of age subject to a tax of one dollar for every dollar earned in the labour force (100 percent tax rate) would encourage about 20 percent of women with spouses present to withdraw from the labour force and about 3 percent of women with no spouse present to withdraw from the labour force. (Calculations based on the previous responsiveness of women to increases in income suggest that women would choose the \$1,000 if their earnings were up to 15 percent higher than the housewife's salary.) The same program with a 50 percent tax rate would encourage about 30 percent of women with spouses present to reduce their total hours in the labour force by about 53 percent and about 4½ percent of women with no spouse present to reduce their hours of work by 28 percent.

Restricting the program to women with children under age six reduces the withdrawals from the labour force significantly. Imposing the 100 percent tax, about 10 percent of women with spouses present withdraw from the labour force and about 1½ percent of women with no spouse present withdraw from the labour force. At a tax rate of 50 percent, about 14 percent of women with spouses present reduce their working hours by 44 percent, and almost 2 percent of women with no spouses present reduce their working hours by 87 percent. Clearly, the nature of the program can affect the size of the female labour force and the numbers of hours worked by women in the labour force.

Correspondingly, the nature of the program determines the costs of the program as measured by the total wages or transfer payments that must be financed. The cost of providing all women with children under 18 years of age with \$1,000 per year at a 100 percent tax rate would be about \$2.4 billion. At a tax rate of 50 percent, the total cost of the program would be almost \$2.5 billion.

Reducing the program to cover only women with children under 6 years of age and applying a tax rate of 100 percent to the wage would reduce the total cost of the program to about \$1.21 billion. A 50 percent tax rate would result in a cost of \$1.27 billion.

If \$1,000 were provided to all mothers with children aged 0-5, some benefits would accrue to higher income classes, as shown in Table 5.1. If the salary proposal were further limited to unmarried women with children, over 60 percent of these recipients would be

women who are now receiving public assistance.⁷

Table 5.1

Recipients (with Children Aged 0-5) of \$1,000 Wage, by Marital Status and Income Class, Canada, 1971

<u>Family Income</u> (<u>\$</u>)	<u>Married Mothers</u> (<u>%</u>)	<u>Unmarried Mothers</u> (<u>%</u>)
0-5,000	23.4	90.5
5,001-10,000	46.5	9.0
10,001-15,000	23.5	.4
15,001-20,000	4.3	0
20,001+	2.1	0
All incomes	99.8 ^a	99.9 ^a

^a Does not sum to 100.0 percent because of rounding.

Source: Based on data from *Survey of Consumer Finances*, 1972.

The above analysis clearly indicates that women's decisions to participate in the labour force are sensitive to payment based on their labour force status; a universal plan for all women with children, even at a modest salary of \$1,000 per year, involves a large wage bill or transfer of income. A plan excluding income as a criterion for eligibility would result in benefits for two groups of women now receiving income from other, if quite disparate, sources: first, high-income women and, second, the 60 percent of unmarried women receiving the wage or transfer support who would also be receiving public assistance.

These conclusions highlight the necessity for basic social choices as to the extent to which government policy should encourage or discourage the labour force participation of women and the extent to which policies should be universal or focused on target groups, particularly income groups.

One approach involves restricting a payments-to-housewives plan to single parents or to parents in lower income brackets. Those people responsible for child care and housework in these groups are making a contribution to society, and in economic terms many of them may be more productive in these activities than in paid employment. Society as a whole may well gain from the salary approach in cases where the alternative is to subsidize day-care facilities for people with low earning capacity in the market. Since a large proportion of single parents and low-income recipients are receiving social assistance, the net increase in outlay could be reduced by incorporating these payments into the wages-for-housework fund. Such a change would have important psychological and social advantages to the relevant group of homemakers and at the same time would provide recognition of economic output which is not likely to be achieved through the property reform described in the following section.

The necessity for basic policy choices must also be evaluated within a broader context. As we have seen, the wages-for-housework approach, by providing monetary recognition for women working at home, encourages some women to drop out of the labour force or to reduce their hours of work in the labour force. In contrast, increased provision and subsidization of child-care arrangements would make it easier for some women to work outside the home. These facts suggest the following basic questions: Should public policy encourage or discourage labour force participation of women? Should labour force participants be taxed to support a wages-for-housework plan that pays some families for services that other families must either perform themselves without payment or purchase from others? Or should people without children and people who care for their own children be taxed to subsidize care for children of other families?

These difficult questions can be decided only through the political process. They focus as much on how women who make different work decisions and who are in different marital and financial positions should be treated relative to one another as on how women should be treated relative to men. The implications of alternative policies are determined by the nature of our tax system⁸ as well as by the type of expenditure programs chosen.

Property and Support

Deficiencies in the present law governing support obligations and property relations between spouses become, of course, most readily apparent at the time of marriage breakdown. Visible hardships wrought by the application of law in separation situations stem, however, from the invisible assumptions lying at the root of much of our family law: that women as a class are and ought to be only dependents and that men as a class are and ought to be providers. The implications of these assumptions are far-reaching: the Law Reform Commission of Canada suggests that as long as these sexual classifications are inherent in the letter and spirit of family law, institutionalized sexual discrimination across the spectrum of society will be resistant to change. The categorical assumptions of the law thus affect not only the economic well-being of the spouse who fills the homemaking role, but the opportunities of women in the labour market. More basically, the classification of role according to sex in family law restricts the freedom of individual couples to decide on their own approaches to the sharing of their three basic tasks: financial provision, household management, and child care.⁹

The present law relating to property and support relations between spouses has roots deep in history. At one time, married women were legally, as well as practically, unable to establish a direct connection with the economy outside the home or to provide for their own autonomy and self-sufficiency. At marriage the husband was entitled to assume almost complete domination over the property of the wife

— real estate, personal property, even wages.¹⁰ He exercised a sort of “profitable guardianship”¹¹ over his wife and her assets. Enactment of Married Women’s Property Acts during the latter part of the nineteenth century in most Anglo-American jurisdictions accomplished the elimination of this dominion, establishing a right and power in the wife to control her own separate property.¹² It did not, however, relieve the inequities inherent in the factual realities of marriage; indeed, the legal approaches established in this period may have exacerbated the problem.

As is well known, many women choose, or are required by circumstances, to perform the roles of homemaker and mother rather than participate in the work force. Others may do both. Still others participate with their husbands in a joint endeavour, like farming, a small business, or professional practice. Few would argue that the work of these women is not valuable or deny their contribution to the financial and emotional well-being of the family. Yet the widespread public value attached to such contributions is not, as a general rule, expressed in tangible terms. The traditional social decision has been to leave the provision of tangible recognition for such contributions largely to the discretion of the husband, interfering with that discretion in only a few instances and on limited principles.¹³

Under the common law, as affected by the Married Women’s Property Acts, property relations between spouses are treated as if the spouses were strangers. Ownership of property rests with the person who paid for it with money. For most couples, the spouse with ownership acquired on this basis will be the husband. If the wife is unable to acquire an ownership interest by contributing money, she must rely on an act of her husband: he may, for example, give her an interest by placing title in her name alone, or in their joint names, or by agreeing explicitly or by implication at the time property is acquired that she is to share in it, regardless of his legal ownership.¹⁴ The idea that a wife may earn an ownership interest by her unpaid work in business or on a farm, her contribution of earnings to household expenses, or her unpaid work as homemaker and mother is not given recognition.¹⁵ This situation is an outcome of the nineteenth century concept of each spouse’s owning and controlling his or her own “separate” property, which effectively precluded development of the principle that property acquired during a marriage through the joint — if different — efforts of the spouses should be jointly owned.¹⁶ The notion of joint or community property should not, however, be regarded as an alternative that guarantees the economic independence of the wife: in those legal systems that have developed the idea of community of property, control over the community assets has frequently been vested in the husband alone.¹⁷

The main economic security of the wife has traditionally been the husband’s legal obligation to support her. Common law governing support relations between spouses also reveals a preference for treat-

ing the wife as a dependent, rather than as a contributor of value to the family. The husband was required to provide the wife with "necessaries": what these were depended on the standard of living established by the husband. Everything else that she received was at the discretion of the husband. The minimal nature of the legal obligation does not suggest that it was conceived as a way of recognizing the wife's value in the home.

The availability of support during marriage was closely tied to ideas of "guilt" and "innocence" of the spouses. So resistant was society to the idea of spouses parting that only a husband "guilty" of a matrimonial offence such as cruelty or desertion would be obliged to support his wife after separation. Furthermore, the duty would arise only if the wife were "innocent" of fault and either willing to resume cohabitation or relieved of the duty to do so by means of court action.

Adultery by the wife was an absolute bar to her receiving support. There has been more than one suggestion that marriage involves the purchase by the husband of the sexual services and exclusivity of the wife.¹⁸ Upon divorce, another principle is added to those governing support relations: social policy in favour of having the former wife, even if adulterous, continue in her dependency on the former husband, rather than become dependent on the public.¹⁹

The law relating to support today is very much the same as in the historical position outlined above. The Divorce Act,²⁰ a federal statute, now enables a husband to seek maintenance from his former wife upon a divorce, a departure from the previous position that only a wife could claim support, but much of provincial law governing support before divorce retains the historical features.

The costs to both spouses of conforming to — and departing from — the view of the family reflected in property and support law are substantial. The homemaker, still usually the woman, stands little chance of attaining self-sufficiency through her own efforts. Moreover, through her efforts she may improve the income-earning and saving capacity of the husband, or his productivity in the work force. Either the husband or the economy as a whole may, it can be argued, be unjustly enriched at her expense.²¹ The husband who fulfills a full-time homemaker role will, in fact, be dependent on his wife for support, because he does not earn outside income. Unlike the homemaking wife, however, he cannot legally enforce a duty of support; the duty now flows mainly from husbands to wives and not the other way. Nor is it likely that he could look to government welfare, since most schemes are predicated on the assumptions that only women can be dependents and that men should work unless incapacitated.

A number of fundamental questions arise in connection with reform of property and support relations between spouses. The first, whether reform is needed or not, must, in our view, be answered affirmatively. We also believe that reform should not address itself merely to alleviating some of the obvious hardships arising at dissolu-

tion of a marriage; it should be aimed as well at removing the stereotyped assumptions that lie at the root of family law. Marriage should be regarded not as a union of female dependent and male provider, but as a partnership between co-equal adults. The three tasks of financial provision, household management, and child care should be viewed as those of the couple, rather than of one or the other spouse. Lastly, the legal environment of marriage should enable couples to divide these three tasks according to their own needs and desires, without running the risk that the person who works in the household will be deprived of the fruits of his or her labour. This suggests that the spouse who participates in the labour force should, as a matter of course, share the fruits of his or her paid labour — either accumulated capital or income — with the homemaker. Requiring the earning spouse to share with the homemaker involves not only recognizing a new kind of compensatable work, but also compensating it by depriving the income earner of what society has long accustomed him to regard as “his own.” This goal will, we are aware, meet with resistance: suggesting that those who perform household tasks should as a matter of course share in the monetary rewards of labour in the marketplace is a challenge to our ideas of work and its appropriate rewards and to our view that family relationships do not involve market transactions. Removing from a whole class of people the label and vulnerability of the “dependent,” however, is an achievement that merits the effort; and its accomplishment would mean a recognition in law of the reality of the “dependent’s” contribution to the welfare of the family.

Under the present law the discretion of the earner in sharing his income and assets is made subject to a number of incentives to share, provided primarily by tax policy. Tax measures respecting transfers of property between spouses, capital gains,²² and payments to a separated spouse pursuant to a written agreement or judicial order²³ either encourage sharing or recognize that it will take place. An amendment to the Income Tax Act in 1974 provides tax relief to a person who contributes to the Registered Retirement Savings Plan of a spouse.²⁴ The difference between providing incentives to share and requiring it may be seen, however, by comparing the RRSP device with the as yet unaccepted idea that the Canada Pension Plan be amended to require the earner to contribute to the CPP of the homemaker spouse.²⁵ The Canada Pension Plan, with its compulsory contributions, would affect far more couples than would the RRSP measure, which is itself a voluntary plan, not used by as many income earners.

Using tax policy as a source of incentives to share suffers from a further drawback: tax policy may have as its primary goal something quite different from equity among family members and may be subject to fiscal and other imperatives that operate counter to sharing. There may be objections to sacrificing these imperatives to further a sub-

sidary goal. One example of this conflict is the present policy respecting taxation of the income of a spouse who is an employee or partner of the other. Provisions of the Income Tax Act stipulate that the income of an employee spouse is to be taxed in the hands of the employer spouse; they also permit the Minister of National Revenue to allocate all partnership income to one of the partner spouses for taxation purposes.²⁶ These measures are aimed at preventing fraudulent attempts to avoid or reduce tax by way of income-splitting. Yet this objective, which may be legitimate for a taxation system, works great hardship on spouses who actually do perform work as employees or partners: the couple pay a higher total tax than would be the case if their sharing of work were recognized or if they were not married, and this higher total tax burden falls on a spouse who is legally entitled to only a portion of the partnership assets.²⁷ Other statutes may also deprive the employee spouse of benefits that usually accompany employee status — unemployment insurance, for example.²⁸

Relying only on incentives to sharing still reflects the idea that the income of the spouse who works in the labour force is "his." A requirement of sharing is the only way to express the idea that the homemaker also works and should not be left economically vulnerable. The questions of whether to require sharing of assets accumulated during marriage, the extent to which sharing should be required, when sharing should occur, and what means can be used to implement it are now under consideration by the Law Reform Commission of Canada and by a number of provincial governments. Some legislative action by the provinces has already been undertaken. It is apparent from these initiatives that there is not much consensus about the answers to the questions sketched above. Legislation in effect in British Columbia, for example, provides a court with unfettered discretion to adjust ownership interests;²⁹ the Northwest Territories makes this judicial discretion subject to legislative guidelines that specify what a court must consider when deciding ownership questions.³⁰ Ontario has recently enacted legislation that seems to recognize the idea that a contribution by one spouse in work or "money's worth" can give rise to an ownership interest or ownership right in property to which the other spouse holds legal title.³¹ These three do not, however, *require* sharing of property.

The approach adopted in Quebec,³² and under consideration in some other jurisdictions,³³ is a compromise between required sharing and personal entitlement to assets earned in the marketplace. Before marriage breakdown the spouses are "separate" as to property; in the marriage-breakdown situation, sharing is required. One province, British Columbia, has under active consideration the most thorough system of required sharing: full community of property, with joint control and management.³⁴

There may be differences of opinion on the best way of imple-

menting a requirement of sharing, but as to the need for such a reform, we believe there should be no doubt. Achieving justice for the spouse who now works as an “unpaid partner” in the marriage requires that reform of property relations between spouses be a high government priority.

Most of the foregoing concerns relate to the sharing of accumulated income or capital. Different considerations apply vis-à-vis sharing of income. The military example mentioned earlier is the only instance of forced sharing of income, apart from support law, that we have found. At this point, we feel, requiring sharing of income at source has less to recommend it than reform of the law of support. In order to provide couples with the freedom to share family tasks in their own way, without unnecessary vulnerability, it is critical that the stereotyped sex roles underlying support law be removed. Rather than assuming that only women will be dependent and that women will be only dependents, in this sphere too there should be a recognition that the family role actually assumed — by either spouse — should govern the provision of support. Such economic provision should flow from the spouse who earns outside the home to the spouse who works inside it, regardless of the sex of the person doing either. Considerations of “guilt” and “innocence,” and the link between female chastity and support, should have no place in support law. Support law should aim instead at dealing with financial requirements arising from the division of responsibilities between spouses.³⁵

Dual Jobs

Previous chapters have identified important reasons for the increased participation of women in the labour force. Chapter 2 points out that labour force participation may be one response to the strains of the housewife and mother roles. Chapter 4 indicates that educational level is an important determinant of labour force participation, and the findings of Chapter 3 indicate that education will continue to be an important determinant. The nature of the job and the higher income, both associated with greater education, are critical in attracting women into the labour force. However, Chapter 4 also demonstrates that when the effect of educational level is removed, the higher the family income (exclusive of the wife's wage), the lower the participation rate of wives in the labour force. This suggests that real or perceived economic necessity is an important factor for some women.

Whether in response to the strains of the housewife and mother roles, to the interest of the job and the opportunity to utilize their skills, or to economic necessity, women are moving into the labour market sphere. When they do so, they do not leave behind them the responsibilities associated with the traditional sphere of family life; in effect, they move into what could be called a “third sphere”: dual jobs.

The physical and emotional demands of dual jobs can create significant tensions for the person trying to perform both well. Up to

now the personal adjustments documented in Chapter 2 and the reduction of household tasks — whether by means of sharing labour between husband and wife or by means of purchased replacements — have been the means most frequently discussed as a solution to the dual-job problem. These means are essentially private, although the availability of one type of replacement labour, child care, may depend on public involvement. An option that has received much less discussion is that of reducing the demands on both parties from the labour market side — for example, by facilitating part-time work or by a shorter work week; this option, like child care, may not become a real one without some public involvement. In the sections to follow, we discuss part-time work, child-care arrangements, and childbirth leave as three responses to reducing home and labour force workloads. Care is taken to avoid the widespread view that the task of reconciling “her” household tasks with outside employment is assigned entirely to the woman. A more desirable approach is to regard the “third sphere” — housework, child care, and wage earning — as the joint responsibility of the couple.

Part-Time Work

Female respondents to a Child Care Survey undertaken in 1973 suggested that flexible working hours (25 percent of respondents) and availability of more part-time work (19 percent of respondents) would enable them to look after children as well as to participate in the labour force.³⁶ Demographic, education, and labour-market-behaviour trends established in previous chapters explain the current interest in part-time work. Some evidence suggests that the time span over which women have pre-school children is being compressed, and women are sharing to a greater extent in the labour force. Participation in the labour force has become attractive and feasible for large timespans in women's lives, but demanding, if combined with all household responsibilities while children are small. Part-time work thus offers particular advantages for many women during these critical periods of their lives, enabling them not only to supplement the family income but also to maintain continuity with the labour force. Part-time work should, however, be viewed as a means of increasing options for society in general and not just as a response to narrowly defined women's problems. In the near future, prevailing attitudes may result in part-time work's being of more benefit to women, but both social attitudes and economic opportunities may well evolve to make part-time work a feasible alternative for more men also.

The latent demand for more part-time work, particularly by women, has met inertia, if not outright resistance, from some employers and some parts of the trade union movement. This resistance calls into question the advisability of looking to either private employers or trade unionists to encourage the use of part-time work as a practical alternative to the current work structure and, in particular, as

a response to the demands on women in the home and the labour force.

Reference to part-time work in collective agreements gives some impression of employees' and employers' concerns and attitudes in parts of the unionized sector.³⁷ Clear-cut evidence of resistance to part-time work is the presence of clauses in collective agreements that limit the ratio of part-time to full-time employees. In 1969, 15 of 287 agreements in all industry categories (excluding agriculture, forestry, fishing and trapping, and mining and oil) contained clauses specifying a ceiling on this ratio. In 1975, 22 of 753 agreements contained such a clause.

Such clauses are designed primarily to protect full-time workers from the competition of part-time workers, as is clear from the following example taken from one collective agreement:

The _____ company agrees not to use back-to-back shifts of part-time personnel and nothing in this article will be used to defeat the hiring of regular employees provided such are available.

Typical of the type of clause designed to protect full-time workers is the following, which covers 1,240 female and 893 male employees:

It is agreed that (persons) may be employed on a part-time basis up to a maximum of 10 percent of the staff in any office (where there are less than 10 employees in any office, one part-time [person] may be employed) and that students who have applied to the company for full-time employment when they have finished school, may be employed for training on a part-time basis.

The collective agreements reflect a variety of views on what constitutes a part-time worker. Some agreements distinguish part-time workers working regular hours or days on a continuing basis, but less than 37½ hours a week, from the part-time temporary employees hired on an "as and when required" basis. The treatment of part-time employees under the agreements examined varies according to their status and is reflected in benefits, eligibility for inclusion in the bargaining unit, and eligibility for transfer from part-time to full-time status. The status of part-time employees with respect to benefits ranges from no eligibility for benefits to partial benefits or prorated full benefits, depending on the range of definitions of part-time employees recognized in the agreement. In some agreements, part-time workers are members of the bargaining unit, while in other cases they are viewed as a potential threat to members of the bargaining unit. For example:

The company agrees that part-time employees shall not be used to the extent they displace employees within the bargaining unit, except in the case of an emergency beyond the control of the company.

Finally, provisions vary significantly among agreements as to the eligibility of a part-time employee to become a full-time employee, and the mechanism for accomplishing the transfer. One agreement, for example, states that "part-time (employees) shall not be eligible for placement on the permanent staff," while another agreement indicates

that "when additional employees are required the company will give preference to part-time employees on the basis of seniority, skill and qualifications for the job concerned and the availability for work."

The reasons offered for rejecting the part-time-work alternative are many, and sometimes appear to contradict one another. Some of these apparent inconsistencies may be accounted for when we realize that the reasons for rejecting part-time workers may vary, depending upon the type of job or the type of industry involved. In some industries or jobs the need to allocate tasks in such a way that the location of responsibility for decision-making is clear and to have the decision-maker present at critical times may militate against the use of part-time employees. Part-time workers may well be rejected by some firms because they are more costly to the firm than full-time workers. Certain overhead expenditures, such as personnel costs (varying from general record keeping to hiring costs), are related to numbers of workers and not to work output of the firm. On the other hand, however, some employers may hire part-time or casual employees because they can be paid less or given fewer fringe benefits, including job security, than full-time workers. It may be this last situation that gives rise to the charge that part-time work is, in general, exploitative and should be resisted for this reason.

The argument that part-time work is exploitative may be answered in a number of ways. Lower rates of pay and fewer fringe benefits may be the lot of the part-time employee because unions have been unwilling to bargain on his or her behalf. By so refusing, they may help to perpetuate the exploitative character that they themselves decry. The unwillingness to secure for part-time workers pro rata fringe benefits and greater job security through collective bargaining may be attributed, not to an unwillingness to encourage exploitation, but rather to other reasons. We believe that the primary reason for resistance to part-time work on the part of unions is that it is a source of competition that threatens to undermine the position of full-time workers — not only their job security, but perhaps their job goals as well — i.e., a shorter work week for everyone.

Because of union inactivity, a vicious circle has arisen: with no collective bargaining support, the part-time worker can be exploited and will be seen as an even greater threat to full-time workers, who then withhold collective bargaining support. It is apparent that action must be taken by unions or governments to secure protection — job security and pro rata fringe benefits — for part-time workers. If this were done, part-time work could be seen in its proper light: as an option giving some people the ability to reduce existing double workloads — working both at home and in the marketplace — and giving others a chance for labour force participation that would be impossible without part-time work.

Clearly, some kinds of jobs are more adaptable to part-time work than others. There has, to our knowledge, however, been little positive

or systematic attempt in Canada to identify those kinds of jobs with a view to expanding opportunities for part-time employment. Quite the contrary, it appears, is happening: union "protection" of parts of the labour force is combining with the inertia of some companies to rigidify the manner in which all workers must contribute to the labour force if they contribute at all. Rather than accept the positions and reasons of employers and unions, we would recommend investigating the potential opportunities for part-time work and assessment of the costs and benefits to both labour and business.

To obtain such information calls for pilot projects. Government at all levels could play a most useful role by establishing such projects to identify those kinds of job situations most amenable to part-time work, to develop organizational techniques for integrating part-time workers with full-time workers, and also to develop methods for reducing hiring costs of part-time workers. As the government sector should accord to part-time employees a pro rata share of fringe benefits and other conditions of full-time work, these pilot projects might be useful in determining the cost of fair treatment for part-time workers and the effect of non-exploitative part-time work on those wishing full-time work.

The expertise and experience gained in these pilot projects could be usefully carried over into the private sector. If we are correct in surmising that part-time employment with prorated full benefits is economically feasible in a number of different job categories, the demonstration and publicization of government programs and assistance from government experts would be helpful in expanding part-time employment opportunities in the private sector. Given the present underdeveloped state of our knowledge of the full potential and impact of part-time work and the best means of implementing it, we consider experimentation with these government prototypes necessary to any further exploration of the question.

Child Care

Lack of satisfactory child-care arrangements is one of the most widespread concerns of women in Canada. The reasons why this concern has surfaced at the present time are related to sociological factors, such as the reduction of the typical family unit from a three-generational group to a small cell of mother, father, and children; economic factors already discussed; and rejection by many of the automatic assumption that the continuous, uninterrupted mother-small-child relationship is the best possible one for both parties. How one should go about providing outside child care may depend on the weight one gives to these different factors.

When asked for suggestions for improved child-care arrangements, 44 percent of all working mothers responding to the Child Care Survey suggested either more flexible working hours or the availability of part-time work, as discussed above, and 46 percent suggested

solutions affecting substitute care for children, such as approved registers of sitters, more day-care centres, better location of day-care centres, and cheaper day-care centres.³⁸

Women currently working in the labour force are, by definition, able to function under the existing constraints, but for many of them the process of making child-care arrangements has been difficult, and many evaluated their child-care arrangements as only fair or poor. Mothers who were in the labour force at some time during 1973, but not at the time of the survey, also responded to the Child Care Survey; a large number of them expressed their desire for labour force participation; of these, 40 percent gave the absence of satisfactory child care as their reason for not participating.³⁹

Child care in Canada is characterized at present by a preponderance of private arrangements, often without payment. For the vast majority of children whose mothers are in the labour force, care is custodial rather than instructive in nature. As indicated in the first column of Table 5.2, 75 percent of children who are in school full-time either look after themselves or are cared for by a neighbour, relative, brother, or sister under sixteen years of age, or by someone sixteen or older in the home. Seventeen percent of full-time school children are cared for by paid arrangements. Some of these children receive paid care only because part-time school children or pre-school children requiring such arrangements live in the same household.

As is shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5.2, paid day care is relatively more important for children attending school part-time (33 percent of total arrangements for this group) and children not attending school (57 percent of total arrangements for this group). Paid care in the child's home and paid care in the home of the sitter predominate, while 7 percent of the children not attending school are cared for in a day-care centre or nursery.

Relatively few child-care arrangements are made through day-care centres. About 7 percent of mothers with infants not at school had the children in day-care centres. Of all day-care arrangements, 30 percent of mothers had paid-care arrangements for part-time school children and 51 percent had paid-care arrangements for infants not at school.

What little governmental involvement there is takes two forms: first, regulations designed to maintain quality standards in day-care centres; second, tax deductions for certain labour force participants with children⁴⁰ and subsidies for welfare or low-income families. At the federal level, financial contributions can be made to the provinces for day care under the Canada Assistance Plan.⁴¹ Since the Canada Assistance Plan provides the rubric under which federal government money can be channeled to those currently defined to be actually in need or potentially in need in the absence of assistance, the present close association between child-care centres, welfare children, and subsidies is obvious. Even within the apparent target group of low-

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Child-Care Arrangements for Children of Mothers Participating in the Labour Force, by School Status of Children, Canada, 1973
(thousands)

Child-Care Arrangements	Children Attending School Full-Time		Children Attending School Part-Time		Children Not Attending School	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Unpaid care, total	270	38	84	44	103	30
Persons over 15 years of age, living in home	116	16	30	16	35	10
Cared for by brother/sister under 16 years old	41	6	18	9	—	—
Cared for by neighbour, relative, etc.	113	16	37	19	61	18
Children looking after themselves	267	37	—	—	—	—
Children have lunch at school	134	19	—	—	—	—
Children do not have lunch at school	133	19	—	—	—	—
Paid-care arrangements	119	17	63	33	198	57
Paid care in mother's home	—	—	26	14	72	21
Day-care centre or nursery	—	—	—	—	24	7
Other arrangements	63	9	33	17	35 ^a	13 ^a
Total arrangements reported	719	100	190	100	347	100

^a Includes work-oriented arrangements, including mother working only when child in school and mother takes child to work.

Source: Statistics Canada, "Working Mothers and Their Child Care Arrangements in Canada," *The Labour Force*, September, 1975, Tables S-1.5 and S-1.6.

income families, payments for child care at the provincial level are subsidized from a number of government departments, indicating that child care is seen only as a subsidiary problem of other problems.

Our approach to the question is as follows: initially, the true economic cost of child care is outlined, followed by a discussion of the alternative ways in which child care is paid for. Throughout it is emphasized that a reasonable relationship must be maintained among the following: the care received by children in the home, the quality of day care demanded by legislation, and the extent of subsidy expected.

Cost of Day Care

As has been pointed out in connection with discussion of the possible inclusion of housewives' services in gross national product, economic costs and contributions are not limited to transactions involving money payments. The full cost of caring for children is composed of all the resources so used, including time, that could be used for other purposes. These include time spent by parents, family members, and friends that is not paid for; time spent by paid employees in the home or outside the home that is included in our measure of economic activity; the rental value of the buildings and equipment used to provide the day-care service; and, finally, the rental value of buildings and equipment that are made available without charge but, if not used for child care, would be put to some other use. These costs may then be distributed among members of society in different ways, which will be discussed below.

Some observers argue that the current system of child care, which involves mothers or sitters looking after one or two children, is inefficient, and provision of day-care centres would be less costly and therefore preferable. Child-care arrangements, however, must reflect the desires of parents and cannot be considered only from the viewpoint of minimizing cost. Recognizing that the current, predominant type of care will continue even if more day-care centres were available, the following discussion focuses on the day-care-centre approach, for which the demand appears to be growing.

Definitions of day-care centres vary among the provinces having day-care legislation. Common specifications include the number of children composing a centre (as low as three to five children), that the children be unrelated to each other or to the people caring for them, and that they be in non-residential care. Most provinces clearly differentiate in legislation between day-care centres and schools, but collection of fees is not a criterion for qualifying as a day-care centre.

Almost all provinces have attempted to establish some quality standards for day-care centres by means of legislation. Legislated standards may deal with such matters as staff qualifications, number of staff and staff-child ratios, equipment, space, furniture, and meals. Quality standards related to the program of the day-care centre may range from basic requirements of sleep periods and access to the

outdoors, to providing that a day-care operator articulate a program proposal for approval by provincial authorities.⁴²

If day-care centres are to provide a feasible means of providing day-care facilities for more children, legislation and regulations must be consistent with provision of a service to a broad range of socio-economic backgrounds. In particular, the standards imposed on day-care centres must be closely related to the quality of care that the average child receives at home and to the subsidy that the day-care centre can expect from government directly or through government subsidy of its clientele. Setting standards for day-care centres above those currently maintained in the homes of the vast majority of children, in the absence of sufficient subsidies, will simply force lower-income families to rely on private, unregulated arrangements or to leave children on their own.

If the wave of the future is provision of care for children from a broader range of income backgrounds for whom subsidies may not be provided, attention must be focused on the costliness of some of the legislative features. Provisions for meals, qualifications of staff, and ratios of staff to children contained in the Ontario legislation highlight the danger of imposition of excessively high standards.

Day-care centres in Ontario are required to provide a full-course, hot dinner a day for children aged two to five and a hot lunch for children aged six to nine, when these children attend the centre for more than six hours.⁴³ These provisions reflect concern for the child from a disadvantaged home and stipulate nutritious meals at the centre as a corrective for possible lack of proper nutrition at home. Although feasible when subsidies are provided for welfare and potential welfare families through the Canada Assistance Plan, such high-quality standards are unnecessary and even counterproductive if applied to a broader population. The Saskatchewan approach, which stipulates the number of meals to be provided, whether brought from home or supplied by the centre,⁴⁴ constitutes a reasonable approach for a larger, more diverse clientele.

In most jurisdictions the basic requirement for day-care workers is specified in terms of quality of the worker rather than his or her credentials. For example, day-care workers must

have a genuine liking, concern for, experience with, and understanding of children, be mature, possess physical and mental health and be able to function at a desirable level in accordance with their duties and responsibilities.⁴⁵

Legislation in Ontario has introduced further qualifications, based on academic credentials. In addition to being sympathetic to the welfare of children, supervisory staff in Ontario day-care centres must "have specialized knowledge and adequate experience in the methods of child guidance for the ages of the children supervised."⁴⁶ Such requirements may result in an unnecessary demand for paper qualifications that do not necessarily make workers more productive

but add significantly to costs. At a time when many professions are being criticized for demanding unnecessary qualifications and apprenticeships, this problem should be anticipated in the case of what may be a new growth industry — day care.

The required staff-to-child ratio is an important indicator of quality of day-care service, with significant implications for costs. Examination of the number of staff members required for a designated number of children of specific ages reveals clear incentives in the Ontario regulations for larger centres. In general, the maximum number of children per staff member increases as the age of the children increases. This provision reflects the view that younger children require more constant attention. Within age categories, the number of staff members varies according to the number of children. Simple calculations of the maximum number of children per staff member allowed by the regulations show the incentive provided to larger day-care centres. For example, for the two to four-year-old group, the maximum child-to-staff ratio is 9 to 1 for 35 to 45 children, and 5 to 1 for a centre with up to 15 children.⁴⁷ These regulations mean that day-care-centre operators can reduce staff costs by increasing the size of the day-care centre. In the process, however, the objective of quality as measured by the staff-to-child ratio has been reduced.

Policies towards day-care centres must reflect a balance that will result in the accommodation of an increasing number of children from various socio-economic backgrounds in the absence of universal subsidy and the maintenance of acceptable quality standards. Demands for excessively high standards may simply result in pricing out of the market large elements of potential users of day-care-centre facilities. Detailed examination of quality standards is required in order to be able to predict the type of centre favoured by the regulations and to assess the consistency of the results with the original objectives.

Who Pays for Day Care?

Payment for day care comes in the form of time commitment, money payment, or tax payment. Day care is paid for by those people (parents, family members, and friends) currently looking after children for no reimbursement, who are paying directly in time; by those people who purchase day-care services either through private arrangements at home or in day-care centres, who are paying in money; and by those people, with and without children, who pay through taxation and government expenditure. Both provincial and federal taxpayers pay directly to support the arrangements for child care provided through the Canada Assistance Plan, while both provincial and federal taxpayers pay higher taxes to finance the deductions allowed for child-care purposes.

Currently, most child care is financed privately by families. Children from some low-income families are subsidized through the Canada Assistance Plan, which provides funds jointly from the federal and the provincial levels of government. Charitable foundations pro-

vide an alternative source of subsidy. Much of the current debate concerning child-care provisions surrounds whether government subsidies should be extended and, if so, to whom. Two opposing positions with respect to universal subsidies of day care are taken. Those arguing for further subsidy point out that opportunities are not going to be equal for men and women until women are relieved of the primary responsibility for child care. This requires looking outside the family, at least during daytime hours, to another organization to perform the child-care service. Supporters of this position argue that subsidization is necessary if the centres are to be provided and utilized. Only if child-care centres are available do equal opportunities come about.

Those arguing against universal subsidized day care point out that in recent years it has become a matter of personal choice whether to have children and it is a matter of family priority for all except low-income groups whether to pay for day-care facilities. This group rejects the idea that taxpayers without children and taxpayers who care for their own children should be responsible for subsidizing other people's children in child care.

Basically, the debate comes down to whether child care is regarded as a private discretionary expenditure for middle- and higher-income groups that should be privately financed. Or in the society of 1975 and beyond, should day care be regarded in the same way as health and education expenditures, which are supported primarily from tax revenue? Whatever the outcome, subsidy or partial subsidy of higher-income groups at the expense of lower-income groups should be avoided. This could happen, in principle, with the introduction of partial subsidization; costs of day care would still be very high in terms of the earning capacities of low-income women but would be quite feasible for women with high earning power in the labour market. Either subsidization of children from low-income backgrounds or a universal subsidy on behalf of all children would be preferable to a plan that would result in a subsidy primarily to high-income groups.

Discussion of subsidies should not, however, rule out the possibility that day care can be paid for in time as well as money. For example, parents working in the labour force may wish to pay for the service in money, while parents not in the labour force may wish to contribute directly to the day-care service by paying in time in return for care for their children. Some form of cooperative arrangement involving both workers paid in money and workers paid in reduced rates for their children's day care may well be feasible. Since parents require some commitment on the part of the organization before seeing their partial cooperative as a viable alternative, employees paid in money could be responsible for organizing the centre, and establishing the mix of parents paying in time and money. A cooperative day-care centre of this variety would be reliable, would meet the needs of parents working in the home as well as of those working in the labour force and at home, would provide flexibility in the form of

payment by the users, and would allow some parents to monitor the service directly by participating in it.

Suggested Elements of Government Policy

Government policy concerning child care must address the objectives of government involvement as well as the appropriate mechanism to achieve these objectives. Any policy should recognize the following considerations:

- Child care should be regarded as a family, rather than as a maternal, responsibility. Governments should avoid any measures of a fiscal or other nature that imply the contrary.
- The demographic, educational, and labour market behaviour of women all suggest that there will be a growing demand for child-care facilities for all income groups. As a result, any policy should address provision of day care directly, and not as a subspecies of another problem — e.g., welfare.
- The generalized day-care service should be custodial in nature to meet expected demands of the majority of people, while education and special care should be aimed at particular target groups and not be regarded as essential to generalized day care.
- Quality standards in legislation should accord with the prevailing care provided to children and not be so high as to price the average family out of the day-care market.
- All parents should have access to the service. Priority might be given to parents of severely mentally or physically handicapped children who carry a heavier burden.
- A basic policy should be articulated regarding subsidies with the extent, nature, size, and characteristics for eligibility being specified. If a wages-for-housework plan were ever seriously considered, the logical inconsistency of paying women to perform a task in the home when performance of the task outside the home is also subsidized should be addressed directly.
- Legislation should not prevent payment for the service in terms of time (cooperative arrangement) rather than money.

Childbirth Leave

The need to accommodate the tasks of child care and income-earning arises even before the child is born. In this section we examine societal arrangements designed to enable this accommodation before, at, and shortly after the birth of a child. The basic aims of childbirth leave for workers are to provide a period of leave from work, long enough to accommodate the employee's needs but short enough to satisfy the employer's interests in continuity of his or her work force, during which time the job of the absent employee will be kept available; the entitlement to resume the same or a comparable position, with no loss of accumulated fringe benefits and no reduction in wages; and protection against dismissal for pregnancy. The provision of income during the leave period, by means of benefits provided out of public funds or by an insurance system, is part of childbirth-leave

protection as formulated in two international Maternity Protection Conventions.⁴⁸

A society's view of the "proper" sphere of women will, clearly, affect its policy on childbirth leave. A society that believes that women should bear and rear children above all other activities may make no provision at all for leave, preferring to let women who take on additional responsibilities bear alone any resulting tension. A society ambiguous about whether women are valued for activities other than childbearing may refrain from incorporating leave policies into its general legislation, preferring to leave the issue for case-by-case negotiation in individual workplaces. Where another role for childbearers or childrears is not only recognized but also valued, we may expect some generalized attempt in legislation to require accommodation for the multiple role. Such a generalized approach would reflect a view of childbirth leave that begins to transcend the "special interest" category: even if the approach of legislation is to address childbirth leave as if it were only a "women's problem," it is nonetheless evidence of widespread social support for the attempts of women to deal with that problem and a social judgment that the costs of childbearing should not be borne by women alone.

At the time of writing, only seven of the thirteen jurisdictions in Canada have adopted childbirth-leave legislation of general application, applying the same basic leave requirements to the majority of enterprises in the jurisdiction,⁴⁹ rather than leaving the issue for enterprise-by-enterprise negotiation. British Columbia was the first jurisdiction to enact such legislation; the Maternity Protection Act passed there in 1921⁵⁰ grew directly out of the Maternity Protection Convention of the International Labour Organization.⁵¹ This 1921 Act indicates the expectation of the British Columbia legislature that passage of similar legislation by other jurisdictions in Canada would soon be forthcoming,⁵² but it was not until forty-three years later, in 1964, that New Brunswick became the second Canadian jurisdiction to make provision for leave legislation of general application.⁵³ Ontario, the federal government, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan acted in the years 1970 to 1973 to establish legislation.⁵⁴ The common pattern in these jurisdictions before enactment of legislation, and in those that do not yet have it, is for leave policies to be established by government for its employees and for the question of leave in the private sector to be dealt with by some combination of employer initiative and union negotiation — or not at all.⁵⁵ In 1971 the federal government added to the Unemployment Insurance Act a provision for a basic level of income for employees on leave who do not benefit from any other income-maintenance scheme.⁵⁶ Medical insurance plans provided by government deal with the medical expenses arising from delivery.

That roughly half of the jurisdictions in Canada lack childbirth-leave legislation at present, fifty-four years after passage of the first

international convention respecting maternity leave, is not a proud achievement. This situation reflects a high degree of ambiguity regarding women in their childbearing and employment roles. With increasing evidence that women will work outside the home, we must ensure that it is not women alone who bear the cost of the tension created by outside employment and parenthood. Moreover, all Canadian jurisdictions with childbirth leave established by legislation have treated the question as a "women's problem": in no existing legislation is childbirth leave made available to fathers; income maintenance during the childbirth period, under the Unemployment Insurance Act, is similarly restricted to females. We believe that recognizing a father's interest in postnatal leave would further the idea that not only women bear the responsibility for child care and household tasks. Where both parents are ordinarily in the labour force, the family may decide for various reasons that the father is the more appropriate person to stay at home after the child's birth; even where only the father is in the labour force, he may need leave to help with child care and household tasks — particularly in the small nuclear family. Recognition of the father's interest in postnatal leave could help a couple establish a pattern of shared responsibilities towards children that would continue into the future.⁵⁷

The leave periods provided by all of the Canadian jurisdictions that have legislation are in accord with, or in excess of, the minimum of twelve weeks set by international standards.⁵⁸ All but one of the jurisdictions do, however, fall short of the eighteen weeks' total leave recommended by the Royal Commission on the Status of Women.⁵⁹ Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Canada (the federal government) require reinstatement of the employee in the same or a comparable job to that held before leave;⁶⁰ Nova Scotia requires, less specifically, that the employee be permitted to "resume work."⁶¹ These same five jurisdictions ensure that the employee will not lose pension and other benefits accrued up to the time leave commenced;⁶² three of them — Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, and Ontario — also specifically protect seniority accumulated before the start of leave.⁶³ The maternity-leave pioneers, British Columbia and New Brunswick, regrettably lack these protections.

It has been suggested that the cost of providing childbirth leave would provide a motive for the employer to decrease the number of women employed, or employed in critical jobs. This could be accomplished by altering recruitment and promotion policies or by means of discharge or layoff. Canadian childbirth-leave legislation deals with only one of these eventualities, leaving the others to be dealt with under the provisions of other legislation, where available. Legislation prohibits the dismissal of an employee because she is pregnant⁶⁴ (Nova Scotia), because she is "pregnant or has applied for leave"⁶⁵ (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Canada), because of an absence in accordance with the Act⁶⁶ (British Columbia, New Brunswick), or because of

entitlement to leave of absence⁶⁷ (Ontario). In addition, Manitoba, Ontario, and Canada protect against layoffs,⁶⁸ and Saskatchewan against suspension.⁶⁹ British Columbia and Saskatchewan provide significant extra safeguards to the employee: the onus of proving that dismissal or suspension is not for a prohibited reason is on the employer.⁷⁰

There are, however, some serious drawbacks in the present legislative provisions. Only two jurisdictions, British Columbia and New Brunswick, impose no minimum period of employment as a condition of eligibility for leave. Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Canada make statutory leave during the childbirth period available only to women who have been in continuous employment with the employer for at least twelve months;⁷¹ Nova Scotia has no explicit requirement of twelve months' prior service in its leave provision, but extends protection against dismissal only to employees with twelve months' continuous service,⁷² which might produce the same effect as the Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Canada provisions. Ontario, which originally required twelve months' service before leave,⁷³ has recently increased this period to "twelve months and eleven weeks prior to delivery."⁷⁴ This qualifying period may be designed to accommodate the employer's interest in the stability of the work force; it also reduces the number of potential claimants and thereby reduces the cost of providing leave. Yet this qualifying period may act as an incentive to dismiss a female employee before she qualifies for leave. No protection against such behaviour is provided in any of those statutes imposing the twelve-month qualifying period, and there is certainly evidence, if only of an anecdotal nature, that this is one of the problem areas in the existing provisions. International standards stress the desirability of having no qualifying period for leave;⁷⁵ it would appear reasonable to consider eliminating the period. Experience in jurisdictions with no qualifying period would be useful to determine whether elimination would lead to abuses. At the very least, protection against dismissal before expiration of the qualifying period should be included in the legislation. As a matter of policy, all protection against dismissal should require the employer to establish that dismissal was not for reasons connected with childbirth leave or pregnancy. The employer, and not the employee, is in a better position to establish the cause of dismissal and would likely have greater resources to do so.

A second problem in the area of childbirth leave is the lingering presence in legislation of opportunities to make categorical assumptions about women. Although most jurisdictions give the woman employee considerable freedom to determine when, within the statutory limits, her leave will begin, in certain circumstances three jurisdictions take control of the length of the prenatal leave period away from the employee and bestow it on the employer. Ontario and Nova Scotia have almost identical provisions permitting the employer to require commencement of leave of absence "at such time as the duties of her

position cannot reasonably be performed by a pregnant woman or the performance of her work is materially affected by her pregnancy.”⁷⁶ The first of these allows the employer to judge the individual employee in light of ideas about pregnant women in general, rather than on the basis of her own ability to perform a particular job. It may also open the door for stereotypical ideas about what is “proper” for pregnant women; only the second part of the Ontario and Nova Scotia test demands an assessment of the individual’s ability to perform her own job. The approach adopted by Saskatchewan is more desirable, permitting an employer to initiate leave only where pregnancy “would reasonably interfere with the employee’s duties.” Even here the employee is given two safeguards: the leave period initiated by the employer may not exceed three months, and the Act establishes a presumption in favour of the employee that pregnancy would not reasonably interfere with her duties, requiring the employer to prove that it would.⁷⁷

We suggest that all provinces should have childbirth-leave legislation. Existing legislation, and that enacted in future, should deal with the legislative shortcomings outlined above. Greater efforts should be made to encourage men to consider as legitimate their claim to be present in the home during some of the infant’s early growth. If the questions of childbirth leave and day care were to be regarded in a larger perspective as relevant to both men and women, we believe that more satisfying attempts, of a more far-reaching nature, could be made to resolve the problem of dual “jobs” — in the home and in the labour market.

Labour Force

Chapter 4 indicated that the trend towards greater participation by women in the labour force is continuing, but that most women are still segregated into a narrow range of occupations and are still subject to lower pay than men. Pay differentials persist even when differences in educational attainment and occupational distribution, which may themselves be affected by discriminatory practices, are accounted for. In addition, two studies indicate that equal pay legislation has not reduced the differential between male and female earnings.⁷⁸

This evidence suggests the necessity of examining the nature of Canadian equal pay legislation and also of recognizing that equal pay policies cannot be fully effective if other opportunities for discrimination exist. Accordingly, we examine equal opportunity legislation dealing with hiring, promotion, and conditions of work. Finally, we examine the affirmative action approach, which requires the cooperation of employers in identifying new opportunities for women, in contrast to the equal pay and equal opportunity approaches, which require complaints by individual employees as a basis for redress.

Equal Remuneration

Equal pay legislation in Canada was the first step made to combat discrimination against women in employment. Even as a first step it was long in coming. Although Lipton reports a union demand for equal pay for women in Canada at least as early as 1883,⁷⁹ the first equal pay legislation was not enacted until 1951.⁸⁰ All the other jurisdictions in Canada except Quebec followed suit over the period 1952 to 1973,⁸¹ with the major activity occurring in the decade of the fifties.

Equal pay legislation addresses itself to the narrow problem of payment of a lower level of wages to women than to men performing the same job. The legislation does not concern itself with employer behaviour towards women in the areas of recruitment, training, promotion, and job assignment — all factors that might affect wages. These problems are now coming to be dealt with through equal opportunity legislation, which will be discussed below. In addition, although “wages” might be defined to include all types of remuneration, equal pay legislation has not, historically, dealt with equal pension rights and fringe benefits for female employees. Only recently have some jurisdictions in Canada enacted legislation aimed specifically at discrimination in pensions and fringe benefits.⁸² Because of its recent enactment it is difficult at this stage to assess the performance of the legislation.

Moreover, the approach of Canadian equal pay legislation has been to require equal wages for men and women only when the women perform the “same” or “identical” work as men in the same establishment. Of the twelve jurisdictions that have equal pay legislation, eleven originally enacted it in a form requiring a basic sameness or identity of male and female jobs.⁸³ New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and the Yukon Territory retain the sameness standard even now.⁸⁴ The sameness standard is a very narrow one. It requires, first of all, that there be a male employee against whose work that of the woman can be measured, so that in enterprises with no male employees, the legislation cannot be applied. The standard also requires a basic similarity in the type of work performed by the male and female employees, without which no further comparative analysis can be made. The employer can thus escape equal pay legislation based on the sameness standard either by segregating jobs into “male” and “female” categories or by introducing variations in job requirements so that the jobs will no longer be “identical.”

Some jurisdictions have moved to broaden the standard used in equal pay legislation. In Alberta and the Northwest Territories, for example, the present requirement is that male and female employees be performing “similar or substantially similar” work. Manitoba requires that they be engaged in “the same or substantially the same” work, and Prince Edward Island requires “substantially the same” work.⁸⁵ These relaxations do not remove the need to establish a similarity in type of job, and their likely effect on variation in job content may be

relatively small. In five jurisdictions⁸⁶ we find an attempt to identify and apply factors that go towards making one job similar to another. The Ontario Employment Standards Act of 1974, for example, requires that male and female employees be paid equal wages for "substantially the same kind of work, performed in the same establishment, the performance of which requires the same skill, effort and responsibility and which is performed under similar working conditions."⁸⁷ Here again, the fundamental requirement of similar types of jobs is maintained, although the enumeration of the factors may have a small mitigating effect on the rigidity of the sameness or even substantial sameness standard.

Further opportunities to escape the operation of legislation may arise from the exceptions provided in most acts. In New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Canada, a difference in wages "based on a factor other than sex" will be acceptable;⁸⁸ eight other jurisdictions stipulate that this other factor be one that would "normally" or "reasonably" justify a differential in wages.⁸⁹ Whatever the formulation, it is apparent that the exception is a broad one.

A few jurisdictions attempt to be more specific about the kinds of factors that would justify a difference in wages. Saskatchewan permits wage differentials based on seniority or merit,⁹⁰ as do Ontario and the Yukon.⁹¹ The latter two also recognize the validity of a differential arising from a system that measures earnings by the quality or quantity of production.⁹² Even these specific exemptions may not remove opportunities to discriminate. The evaluation of the merit of an employee, even pursuant to a uniformly applied system of evaluation, may well be affected by subjective factors, including categorical expectations about particular sexes. The evaluation system itself may be based on such assumptions. Separate lines of seniority for men and women may be maintained, unless some other kind of legislation effectively prohibits them. The separation of seniority may carry with it greater scope for the accumulation of seniority by men, or higher values on male than on female seniority. Nor is a quantity-of-production (piecework) system entirely fair; it may simply permit women to escape wage "ceilings" by the expenditure of greater effort.

We come now to consider the effect of equal pay legislation. In its absence some financial incentive exists for employees to have a woman perform more advanced tasks than are recognized by her job classification and pay. Introduction of equal pay legislation alone, without complementary legislation such as equal opportunity, results in a number of alternative possibilities, one of which would be worse than complete absence of legislation. Equal pay legislation alone provides an incentive for employers to further segregate women into female occupations or occupations defined differently from those of men; if there are no male employees receiving a higher rate of pay for these jobs in the same establishment, the equal pay legislation is inapplicable. If women are not segregated, but rather retained in the

same classifications as would be the case in the absence of legislation, equal pay provisions could apply. In this case, if employers regard women as more costly or less desirable to the establishment than men, equal pay legislation could provide an incentive to reduce the employment of women.

A precise measurement of the impact of equal pay legislation on employer behaviour in Canada is difficult. In some jurisdictions equal pay legislation has operated in the absence of complementary legislation (equal opportunity, for example) for some time, the longest period being about twenty years.⁹³ In others, equal pay and equal opportunity legislation were enacted together, but very recently. The years since the enactment of the first equal pay legislation, in 1951, have not seen the disappearance of job segregation and wage differentials. On the other hand, however, a survey of four jurisdictions with equal pay legislation reveals no complaints under the legislation for years at a time and that very few of the complaints that were made have resulted in settlement.⁹⁴ One suspects, but cannot prove, the existence of a paradox. Equal pay legislation may be having the negative effects on women generally that one might expect if employers perceived equal pay legislation as a real threat: job segregation and perhaps reduction of employment opportunities. On the other hand, equal pay legislation does not, in fact, hold much threat that an employer will be required to pay equal pay to individual women because of the narrowness of the legislative standards, the possible exceptions, the inability of equal pay legislation to combat employer segregation of employees, and the problems of enforcing the legislation discussed below.

It is significant that the largest single award ever to female employees in Canada, that won by women hospital workers in British Columbia in 1973, arose in the context of equal pay but was not approached in the fashion usually used for equal pay complaints. The British Columbia Human Rights Commission, upon receipt of 342 complaints from female hospital workers, entered into negotiations with the Minister of Health and the Hospital Employees Union and arrived at an agreement covering 8,000 female hospital employees throughout the province. The settlement went not only to those who could prove that they were doing "substantially the same work as men," but to all those earning less than the male base rate per month. The agreement also provided that over the lifetime of the contract all forms of discrimination against female employees, in pay, training, and promotional opportunities, be eliminated and a thorough study of job classifications be undertaken.⁹⁵ That such widespread action was needed after years of "equal pay" legislation and traditional action under it is certainly evidence of the inefficacy of traditional equal pay protection.

The British Columbia hospital settlement points up a key factor in effective use of equal pay legislation: a commitment by government to

its implementation. Without such commitment the best legislation possible would be next to useless; with it, even narrowly conceived legislation could achieve results. But while this commitment may be critical, it cannot be depended upon as a complete replacement for reform. Alternatives to equal pay legislation, and complements to it, must still be considered.

Equal opportunity legislation is designed to combat discrimination in hiring, promotion, and conditions of employment. It could be regarded as both an alternative and a complement to equal pay legislation. As a complement to equal pay, equal opportunity legislation could help combat employer response to equal pay, by means of discriminatory hiring practices, for example. Whether used as an alternative or a supplement to equal pay, equal opportunity legislation might have a beneficial long-term effect: it should increase demand for female employees, raising the wages they can command in the market.

In the short run, however, equal opportunity legislation may be effective primarily for those women prepared to seek higher wages by winning promotion. The woman who desires to receive fair value for her work in her existing job, often a "women's job," may be unassisted by equal opportunity legislation. Nor is she able to take advantage of equal pay legislation. This gap in coverage has caused considerable interest in the alternative of requiring equal pay for "work of equal value," instead of for "the same work." The "equal value" concept is endorsed in Convention 100 of the International Labour Organization, a promotional convention which Canada has ratified.⁹⁶ The "equal value" approach does not depend on there being male and female employees working at the same or similar jobs. Its application can be illustrated by briefly examining the legislation of one of the jurisdictions that has begun to implement the "equal value" approach.

The British Equal Pay Act⁹⁷ of 1970 establishes two kinds of situations: that where men and women are "employed on like work" and that where men and women are employed on work "rated as equivalent." The "like work" situation is roughly comparable to the "same" or "substantially the same" work rubric in Canadian legislation. With regard to "work rated as equivalent," the Act provides for the evaluation of "jobs to be done by all or any of the employees in an undertaking or group of undertakings," in terms of the demands made on workers under various headings. The legislation mentions specifically, but not exhaustively, effort, skill, decision. If the job performed by the woman is given an equal value, or "would have been given an equal value but for the evaluation being made on a system setting different values for men and women on the same demand under any heading," the woman is to be given equal treatment as regards terms and conditions of employment.⁹⁸

Job evaluation to determine whether jobs are of "equal value" is not, admittedly, an easy task. Still, many employers have developed

job evaluation systems, and governments whose equal pay legislation now requires consideration of factors like skill, effort, and responsibility in equal pay determinations have also developed some expertise in the area. The "equal value" approach offers the attractive possibility that job segregation will not necessarily prevent application of the legislation. Since Canada has ratified Convention 100, it would be desirable for jurisdictions here to give serious consideration to the "equal value" approach as a substitute for the narrower "equal pay."

Equal Opportunity

As mentioned previously, equal opportunity legislation is designed to combat discrimination in the areas of hiring, promotion, and conditions of work. It often appears as part of legislation aimed at securing for minority groups a range of human rights: freedom from discrimination in public accommodation, freedom from discrimination in renting or buying residential or commercial property; freedom from discrimination in public notices or signs. Human Rights Commissions usually administer this anti-discrimination "package," as well as educate the public on the causes and removal of discrimination.

Enactment of equal opportunity legislation for women in Canada was accomplished by broadening the provisions of existing human rights legislation so that sex and, in some cases, marital status became "prohibited grounds of discrimination," along with the older grounds of race, religion, national origin, etc. Most jurisdictions in Canada now have equal opportunity provisions that apply to women; they were enacted starting in 1964⁹⁹ and continuing from 1969 to the present.¹⁰⁰ The only exceptions are Prince Edward Island and the federal government. The latter has, at present, a few provisions aimed at assuring equal employment opportunity for women: one in the Unemployment Insurance Act,¹⁰¹ a second in regulations under the Fair Wages and Hours of Labour Act,¹⁰² and the third in the Public Service Employment Act.¹⁰³ To date, however, no comprehensive program has been implemented; one was introduced into Parliament in 1972¹⁰⁴ but not proceeded with, and the future of a Human Rights Act¹⁰⁵ introduced in 1975 is uncertain.

Equal opportunity provisions available to women in Canada today vary from province to province. In some provinces the protection available to women is not yet the same as that afforded members of minority groups. A survey of existing legislation, focusing on measures aimed at discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status, reveals the following:

Most jurisdictions provide certain basic protections against discrimination by employers and trade unions. For example, all but one¹⁰⁶ prohibit a trade union from excluding a person from full membership; expelling, suspending, or otherwise discriminating against a member; or discriminating against a person with regard to employment by an

employer. Although four provinces prohibit such discrimination only on the basis of sex,¹⁰⁷ the other provinces and territories prohibit it on grounds of both sex and marital status.¹⁰⁸ New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba, Alberta, and British Columbia extend comparable prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status to other associations as well: professional, business, and trade associations (New Brunswick),¹⁰⁹ employers' organizations or occupational associations (Manitoba, Alberta, British Columbia),¹¹⁰ and self-governing professions (Ontario).¹¹¹ Nova Scotia prohibits discrimination by professional, trade, and business associations on the basis of sex but not marital status.¹¹² Only two provinces (Manitoba and British Columbia) prohibit the negotiation by a trade union of an agreement that would discriminate against members on the basis of sex and marital status.¹¹³

Protection against discrimination by employers exhibits a similar pattern. Basic protection against refusing to employ or continuing to employ and against discrimination in regard to employment or conditions of employment exists in most jurisdictions: four (Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Quebec, and Saskatchewan) prohibit such discrimination only on the basis of sex,¹¹⁴ whereas the others prohibit this discriminatory conduct on the basis of both sex and marital status.¹¹⁵ As with the trade union situation, the extension of protection beyond the basic is not uniform across the jurisdictions surveyed: Ontario includes in its Human Rights Code perhaps the most complete list of kinds of prohibited employer behaviour;¹¹⁶ Manitoba, British Columbia, and Quebec have similar, if less extensive, lists.¹¹⁷ Both British Columbia and Manitoba include in their legislation a general statement of fundamental employment rights¹¹⁸ which is missing from other provincial enactments.

Many jurisdictions do make specific efforts to reach discriminatory conduct at the recruitment stage. Five, for example, specifically prohibit discrimination by employment agencies; four of these jurisdictions consider both sex and marital status as prohibited grounds of discrimination,¹¹⁹ one considers sex only.¹²⁰ A number specifically prohibit the publication of discriminatory help-wanted advertisements.¹²¹ The expression of limitations, specifications, or preferences as to sex and/or marital status in application forms or job interviews is subject to fairly widespread prohibitions,¹²² although a simple request for information concerning sex or marital status does not, it would appear, fall within the legislative framework to the same extent.¹²³

A few jurisdictions have begun to address discrimination against women who wish to engage in their own commercial enterprises. These prohibit discrimination in the sale or lease of commercial premises on the basis of sex¹²⁴ and also, in some cases, marital status.¹²⁵ There are at the moment, however, no explicit prohibitions against discrimination in the granting of credit to women, although at least two jurisdictions have begun to take an interest in the problem.¹²⁶

As with equal pay legislation, the anti-discrimination measures often contain significant exceptions. The Human Rights Code of Newfoundland, for example, exempts from its provisions most of the upper hierarchy of the educational system,¹²⁷ long a special preserve of women workers. Most jurisdictions, in addition, permit differentiation by an employer on the basis of sex or marital status where these are bona fide or reasonable occupational qualifications.¹²⁸ A widely stated exception like this one could lead to abuse, or at least to prolonging the investigation and enforcement process. Categorical exemptions such as this, based on the characteristics of "women" in general, may also hamper in some cases the consideration of the capabilities of an individual woman applicant. The exceptions provided in the British Columbia legislation, that sex is not a reasonable cause for discrimination unless it relates to the maintenance of public decency and that marital status is not a reasonable cause at all,¹²⁹ would appear sufficiently broad to cover most cases in which some exemption is necessary — e.g., washroom attendants, hospital attendants, even actors and models. Its adoption in other jurisdictions would be desirable.

Preliminary indications are that women are using equal opportunity legislation more than they have used equal pay legislation in the past. It is premature at this stage to predict the likely "success" of equal opportunity legislation. There is certainly evidence that not all of the existing inequities, even those that fall within the terms of reference of the legislation, have been removed. This may be a factor of time; equal opportunity legislation for women is a very recent innovation. The overall effectiveness of the equal opportunity approach to date may also reflect the fact that in some jurisdictions the coverage is still quite narrow. It may also reflect weaknesses in the system for enforcing both equal pay and equal opportunity legislation.

Enforcement

The present method of enforcing equal pay and equal opportunity legislation in Canada is primarily based on the adversary method, a process that involves a contest between parties. The contest in the employment discrimination context is, essentially, between the employee and her employer; the subject matter of the dispute is whether the employer has in the past behaved in a prohibited fashion towards the employee and should thus provide redress.

Inherent in any adversary method of proceeding is the necessity of individual action by an affected person: it cannot operate without an actual case and complaint to set it in motion. For an individual to set any adversary process in motion, he or she must first have knowledge of its availability; the individual must also possess the ability and resources to use it. Motivation to use it is important too; and motivation may depend on a sense of the clear practical advantage to be gained from embarking on this course of action. The effectiveness of any

adversary method of controlling behaviour is thus dependent on the characteristics of those to whom it is available. In the employment context the employee's knowledge, ability, resources, and motivation will affect the degree to which costs of discriminating, imposed by legislation, will be brought home to the employer.

It is unlikely that an individual employee will have access to sufficient resources to bear all of the financial costs involved in engaging the employer in a one-to-one adversary situation: a suit by the employee against the employer in a court, for example. Equal pay and equal opportunity legislation in Canada attempts to redress the economic imbalance between employers and employees by providing that a government agency (either a branch of a labour department or a human rights commission) will assume, in a proper case, the cost and responsibility of investigating and securing redress for employer violation of legislative standards. This assumption of cost is, as well, an appropriate recognition that the employee should not bear the full cost of accomplishing employer compliance, a result that concerns society as a whole.

The government does not, however, act only as the financial supporter of the employee. Upon receipt of a complaint from an employee, there is an initial stage of deciding whether to proceed further on the employee's behalf: the government acts as investigator, fact-gatherer, and decision-maker. Following investigation comes attempted settlement of a complaint found to have merit: the government here acts partly as agent of the employee, partly as enforcement agency.

At this stage of government involvement, a number of practical problems arise for the employee. Very few jurisdictions provide effective means for her to challenge an initial decision that her complaint is not worth further government action.¹³⁰ Nor does she have many alternatives to action by the government on her behalf: only two jurisdictions allow an employee seeking back pay or damages to take an "equal pay" case to the courts on her own.¹³¹ The only alternative to government action in many jurisdictions is a private prosecution of the employer by the employee in the criminal courts. Often she must secure government permission to do this.¹³² Nor is it advantageous from the employee's point of view: she must bear herself all the costs associated with the prosecution; the high standard of proof in criminal trials reduces her chances of success; and while some provinces do provide high penalties for convicted employers, many others have only nominal ones.¹³³ Moreover, in some jurisdictions it is not mandatory but only permitted that a judge convicting an employer for breach of the legislation also require the employer to pay the employee back wages owing because of the discrimination.¹³⁴

Providing ways of challenging adverse government decisions, as well as effective alternatives to government action for the employee, would reduce her dependency on the discretion of government

officials; women with resources could decide for themselves which forum would give them the best chances of success, and women with real differences of opinion with government officials (on the facts of their case or on the law) could have them resolved by a third party.

We have mentioned that the first stage of government action on a proper complaint involves investigation and attempted settlement. If settlement proves impossible, a second stage of a trial-type hearing before an independent decision-maker is often provided for. A third stage, of appeal from an award, is found in many jurisdictions, and the fourth step of enforcing or collecting an award is, in various forms, present in almost all jurisdictions. A basic four-stage proceeding may be very lengthy. An employee who continues, or wishes to continue, in an employment relationship with her "adversary" may be subject to unpleasantness or even reprisals during and after the proceeding. Provisions that give the employee control over the length of the process are quite rare in Canada,¹³⁵ and guarantees against employer reprisals may be, in reality, ineffective to deal with the many forms of subtle recrimination that could occur. To say, moreover, that the process involves four steps may be to underestimate its length. In jurisdictions where line officials in government departments, or persons holding trial-type hearings, have no decision-making authority, the need to go from them to the real decision-makers for final action adds further steps to the process.¹³⁶ Reference of complaints to other departments of government, as provided for in federal Bill C-72,¹³⁷ or the need to transfer a complaint from one government agency to another once investigation has disclosed the real issue involved¹³⁸ may add still more steps. As mentioned earlier, the vigour and commitment of government agencies can mitigate many of the hardships involved in following the statutory procedure. Yet to rely on this subjective ingredient, which can vary over time and from one jurisdiction to another, is, of itself, an inadequate solution. Governments should make serious efforts to streamline the procedure for investigating and handling complaints.

It is also, we believe, necessary to move farther away from the basic adversary nature of the enforcement procedure. In the context of equal pay and equal employment legislation as it presently stands, this could be accomplished by introducing a number of features. Those jurisdictions that have not done so should empower government agencies to initiate action against employers on their own motion, or at the instance of third parties.¹³⁹ To allow an employer to escape the costs of discrimination merely because an employee complainant cannot be found is to confer a windfall benefit on him. It should also be made clear in legislation that recoveries from employers can encompass not just a single employee, but all the work force if a proper case can be made: a legislative statement to this effect, and not merely an unarticulated practice in this regard, is an effective way of publicizing to employers the risks involved in dis-

criminating. Lastly, legislation not only should aim at redressing past grievances as is now the case, but should take direct aim at influencing future employer behaviour. Instead of relying on the educative effect of awards or the possibility of securing injunctions against repetition of behaviour, agencies should be empowered to require of an offending employer a positive commitment to future action to remove discrimination against his or her female employees.¹⁴⁰

In addition to broadening the narrow adversary approach of present legislation, a serious commitment by governments to a new form of anti-discrimination action is needed. The aim of this new form of action is to “engage in positive efforts to encourage the training, recruitment, and career development of historically disadvantaged minorities.”¹⁴¹ It is future-directed and comprehensive and does not depend on the presentation of an individual past grievance for its implementation. Its name is affirmative action.

Affirmative Action

An employer may be induced to introduce an affirmative action program in a number of ways. One of these is the voluntary approach: the government may assist the employer with advice and information and may also ensure that an affirmative action program started to benefit one group will not be charged with discriminating against groups that are not benefited by the program. Alternatively, an employer could be ordered to start an affirmative action program for certain employees: a court making a finding of discrimination under Title VII of the U.S. Human Rights Act can, for example, order the offending employer to take affirmative action in the future. The effect of these orders in a few cases may be to encourage others to start voluntary action.¹⁴² Lastly, implementation of affirmative action plans may be made a condition of securing some financial advantage from government — funding or a contract to supply goods and services. This last form of implementing affirmative action is called contract compliance.

Affirmative action is essentially a result-oriented program, aimed at identifying and hiring or promoting or training qualified women. It is sometimes, mistakenly we believe, characterized as a “quota” system. Regardless of the manner in which affirmative action is brought about — voluntarily or by some form of “coercion” — the design and goals of each program are individualized for each employer to as great an extent as possible. Affirmative action does not involve the establishment of quotas across the economy, or in a particular sector of it.

A number of stages are involved in the design and implementation of an affirmative action plan, and each of them is within the control of management in the individual workplace, working in conjunction with government officials and, ideally, employees and union representatives.

The first and possibly most important stage is establishment of a data base: an analysis of the composition of the current work force, by

sex, of current job categories, of salary levels, of length of time in positions, and so on. Analysis of external data is also required: to be identified here are such matters as the composition of the population of the immediate area and of the labour force in that area and an analysis of the availability of qualified and qualifiable women in the relevant labour force.

There are no fixed rules about what measures should be proceeded with after this data base has been established; devising specific strategies is a matter for each organization. The strategies devised after establishment of the data base will be aimed at removing discrepancies revealed by the analysis — as, for example, between the number of qualified and qualifiable women presently employed and the number available in the work force; in the present utilization and compensation of women within the work force of the enterprise; and between the kinds of advancement opportunities available to such women and those available for male employees. Goals and strategies for achieving them can be set, and timetables respecting the implementation of the strategies and achievement of the self-generated goals will be determined.

In affirmative action programs involving financial loss for non-compliance, it is useful to remember that the standards of achievement against which an enterprise will be measured after the initial establishment of the program are the standards set in that program itself. Failure to accomplish the goals agreed to with the government authorities, without a justifiable reason, may bring adverse consequences. In voluntary programs, of course, attainment of the established goals according to the established timetable is dependent not on coercion, but on a combination of employer goodwill and employee interest in the program.

The affirmative action concept has already received considerable attention in Canada. Governments have undertaken such programs with respect to their own female employees; five jurisdictions (Nova Scotia, Ontario, the Northwest Territories, Manitoba, and New Brunswick) have enacted that voluntary affirmative action programs to benefit a particular group may be established and will not be charged with discriminating against groups not benefited by the program,¹⁴³ and a measure introduced in Alberta forms the basis for the establishment by regulation of a type of affirmative action.¹⁴⁴ A bill for an affirmative action plan has been introduced in the British Columbia legislature.¹⁴⁵

One of the main advantages of affirmative action is that it shifts the costs of securing compliance with generally accepted social goals from the individual to a broader group. The more a social goal is accepted, the more persons who should be willing or required to share the cost of achieving it. The cost distribution achieved through affirmative action depends to some extent on the nature of the program introduced. Costs of the employer in performing the data analysis and implementing the chosen strategies will, in the first in-

stance, fall on the employer, raising the problem that, by making non-discrimination more costly than discrimination, coercive measures will be needed to force him or her to accept this "unfair" burden. On second glance, however, one can see a further distribution; affirmative action costs will no doubt be passed by the employer to those purchasing his or her goods or services: the public through the government as purchaser of goods and services or the public through private consumer action. It can be argued that the costs of non-discrimination may not be spread in this way throughout the whole of society but only among purchasers of certain kinds of goods and services; it can also be argued, however, that to broaden the spread of costs even in this fashion is better than leaving them largely with the individual employee.

In summary, a number of policy priorities with respect to anti-discrimination legislation in employment can be identified. First is commitment by governments to the vigorous enforcement of existing legislation. Commitment to the goal of eliminating discrimination should also motivate those governments that have not yet done so to provide effective anti-discrimination measures, directed against discrimination by employers and unions on grounds of both sex and marital status, in areas of recruitment, promotion, remuneration, and conditions of work. That such protection does not already exist throughout Canada is a serious omission. A concerted effort should also be made to examine implementation of legislation aimed at equal pay for work of equal value and at affirmative action. Justice for an ever increasing number of women in the labour force demands no less.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have established government policy as an important prerequisite for expanding the range of choice in such a way that the advantages and disadvantages of particular choices are unrelated to one's sex. While recognizing that a change in attitudes is necessary to accomplish this goal, public policy can also recognize and foster those changes in attitudes that have already occurred. In the spirit of this objective of expanding the real choices for both women and men, we have argued that such important issues as care of children and part-time work must no longer be viewed as women's issues but must be viewed as issues affecting all individuals and society in general. This approach has proven useful in the discussion of selected policies in this chapter and constitutes an approach worthy of wider use.

Within this broader social perspective of the responsibilities of men and women in Canada, we have made no rigid assumption concerning the particular division of responsibilities that will be chosen by families and households. We have sought to avoid creating a new structure with its own — if different — set of sex-related costs. Although many families may continue to opt for the traditional division of

responsibilities, policies must also accommodate those who wish to move beyond the “two spheres” of separate activity for men and women to the third sphere of dual jobs. While it is, of course, important from a policy point of view to remove all existing prohibitions against movement between the two spheres, we wish to go further: to expand the range of alternatives for women and men and to make the personal costs and benefits to each far more comparable. Acceptance of this goal implies rejection of a standard that evaluates female behaviour in terms of male behaviour and endorses choice rather than role as the principle by which decisions should be made.

Table A.5.1
Equal Opportunity Legislation for Women, by Jurisdiction, Year of Introduction, and Time Lapse since Enactment of General Legislation

<u>Jurisdiction</u> ^a	<u>Provisions in Favour of Women Added</u>	<u>First Enactment of Equal Opportunity Legislation and Gap before Women Protected</u>
British Columbia	"Sex" as prohibited ground of discrimination first appeared in <i>The Human Rights Act</i> , S.B.C. 1969, c. 10. Coverage was broadened by <i>The Human Rights Code of British Columbia Act</i> , S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119.	<i>The Fair Employment Practices Act</i> , S.B.C. 1956, c. 15 — 13 years.
Ontario	Women first protected by <i>The Women's Equal Employment Opportunity Act</i> , S.O. 1970, c. 33; protection broadened somewhat by S.O. 1972, c. 119.	<i>The Fair Employment Practices Act</i> , 1951, S.O. 1951, c. 24 — 19 years.
Manitoba	Sex first appeared as prohibited ground of discrimination in <i>The Human Rights Act</i> , S.M. 1970, c. 104. Protection broadened in <i>The Human Rights Act</i> , S.M. 1974, c. 65.	<i>The Fair Employment Practices Act</i> , S.M. 1953 (2nd sess.), c. 18 — 17 years.
Alberta	Sex as prohibited ground first appeared in <i>The Human Rights Act</i> by reason of S.A. 1971, c. 48.	<i>The Human Rights Act</i> , 1966, S.A. 1966, c. 39 — 5 years.
Newfoundland	Sex as prohibited ground of discrimination in <i>The Newfoundland Human Rights Code</i> , S. Nfld. 1969, No. 75.	<i>The Newfoundland Human Rights Code</i> , S. Nfld. 1969, No. 75 — no gap.

(cont'd on p. 188)

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Jurisdiction ^a	Provisions in Favour of Women Added	First Enactment of Equal Opportunity Legislation and Gap before Women Protected
New Brunswick	Sex first included as prohibited ground in <i>The Human Rights Act</i> , S.N.B. 1971, c. 8; protection broadened in S.N.B. 1973 (1st sess.), c. 45, and R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 20 (Supp.).	<i>Fair Employment Practices Act</i> , S.N.B. 1956, c. 9 — 15 years.
Saskatchewan	Sex added to <i>The Fair Employment Practices Act</i> by S.S. 1972, c. 43.	<i>The Fair Employment Practices Act</i> , S.S. 1956, c. 69 — 16 years.
Nova Scotia	Sex first included as prohibited ground of discrimination by reason of S.N.S. 1972, c. 65.	<i>The Fair Employment Practices Act</i> , S.N.S. 1955, c. 5; in force Jan. 1, 1956 — 16 years.
Yukon	Sex and marital status added as prohibited grounds of discrimination by O.Y.T. 1974 (2nd sess.), c. 7.	<i>Fair Practices Ordinance</i> , O.Y.T. 1963 (2nd sess.), c. 3 — 11 years.
Northwest Territories	Sex and marital status added as prohibited grounds of discrimination by O.N.W.T. 1974 (1st sess.), c. 4.	<i>Fair Practices Ordinance</i> , O.N.W.T. 1966 (2nd sess.), c. 5 — 12 years.

^a The jurisdictions of Canada and Prince Edward Island do not have general legislation that protects equal opportunity on the ground of either sex or marital status.

Sources: Provincial statutes.

Notes

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¹ The phrase is that of G. M. Young. It is quoted from N. St. John-Stevan, "Women in Public Law," in R. H. Graveson and F. R. Crane, eds., *A Century of Family Law* (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1957), pp. 256-88, at p. 257.

² See *Kowalczyk v. Kowalczyk*, [1973] 2 All E. R. 1042 (C.A.).

³ For greater detail, see Oli Hawrylyshyn, *A Review of Recent Proposals for Modifying and Extending the Measure of GNP*, Cat. No. 13-558 (Ottawa: Information Canada).

⁴ Oli Hawrylyshyn, "The Value of Household Services: A Survey of Empirical Estimates," *Review of Income and Wealth* (forthcoming).

⁵ Oli Hawrylyshyn, "Evaluating Household Work: Theoretical and Methodological Approaches," Working Paper No. 2, Non-Market Activity Project, Statistics Canada, May, 1975.

⁶ These estimates were derived for this chapter by Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto, using the 1972 Survey of Consumer Finances (Census Family Tape). Estimates of the labour supply responses of women are based on wage, family income, and substitution elasticities contained in Constantine Kapsalis, "An Econometric Estimation of Labour Supply Functions in Canada," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, 1975.

⁷ These estimates were also obtained by Samuel A. Rea, Jr., using the 1972 Survey of Consumer Finances.

⁸ For a detailed discussion of the federal taxation system as it affects married women and of alternative approaches, see D. G. Hartle, *Taxation of the Incomes of Married Women*, Study No. 5, Royal Commission on the Status of Women (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971).

⁹ Law Reform Commission of Canada, *Maintenance on Divorce*, Working Paper No. 12 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975), p. 24.

¹⁰ For a more complete statement of the historical position, see A. V. Dicey, *Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century* (2nd ed., with a preface by E. C. S. Wade [London: Macmillan & Co., 1962]), pp. 371-84.

¹¹ G. L. Williams, "The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife," (1947) 10 *Modern Law Review* 16, at p. 18.

¹² M. A. Glendon, "Matrimonial Property: A Comparative Study of Law and Social Change," (1974) 49 *Tulane Law Review* 21, at pp. 29-30. The author describes achievement of freedom from the husband's control as "the first stage of transformation," which brought about "formal equality" between men and women; the "second stage of transformation of matrimonial property" is called by the author "the stage of sharing."

¹³ By the common law of England, for example, the wife possessed a right to dower in freehold lands held by the husband during marriage, entitling her to a life interest in one-third of such property on the husband's death. In Canada at present, dower rights are given to wives by statute in Ontario, Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. The necessity that a wife "bar" or sign away her dower rights on a sale of property by the husband during marriage may give the wife some small measure of control over dispositions.

¹⁴ For a more complete description of the legal position, see M. C. Cullity, "Property Rights During the Subsistence of Marriage," in D. Mendes da Costa, ed., *Studies in Canadian Family Law*, Vol. I (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972), at

pp. 179-282.

¹⁵ See, for example, *Murdoch v. Murdoch* (1973), 41 D.L.R. (3d) 367, [1975] S.C.R. 423, [1974] 1 W.W.R. 361, 13 R.F.L. 185 (S.C.C.) (unpaid labour in a ranch business); *Fiedler v. Fiedler* (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 397 (Alta. S.C., App. Div.), rev'g (1974), 48 D.L.R. (3d) 714, [1974] 6 W.W.R. 320, 16 R.F.L. 67 (Alta. S.C. T.Div.) (substantial contribution to household expenses); and *Kowalczyk v. Kowalczyk*, *supra*, note 2.

¹⁶ W. Friedmann, "A Comparative Analysis," in W. Friedmann, ed., *Matrimonial Property Law* (Toronto: Carswell Company, 1955), pp. 433-53, at p. 436 (University of Toronto School of Law, Comparative Law Series, Vol. 2).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

¹⁸ One of the most vivid comments is Engels' "this marriage of convenience often enough turns into the crassest prostitution — sometimes on both sides, but much more generally on the part of the wife, who differs from the ordinary courtesan only in that she does not hire out her body, like a wageworker, on piecework, but sells it into slavery once for all" (F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* [New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972], p. 79).

¹⁹ In *Hyman v. Hyman*, [1929] A.C. 601 (H. of L.), Lord Atkin observed, at pp. 628-29, "When the marriage is dissolved the duty to maintain arising out of the marriage tie disappears. In the absence of any statutory enactment the former wife would be left without any provision for her maintenance other than recourse to the poor law authorities. In my opinion the statutory powers of the Court to which I have referred were granted partly in the public interest to provide a substitute for this husband's duty of maintenance and to prevent the wife from being thrown upon the public for support." In *Tucci v. Tucci*, [1969] 2 O. R. 429 (Ont. C. A.), Laskin, J. A. (as he then was), observed, at p. 430, "A wife guilty of a matrimonial offence is not on that ground alone to be denied statutory maintenance where the public interest requires it, as where she would otherwise be destitute."

²⁰ *The Divorce Act*, R. S. C. 1970, c. D-8, as amended by R. S. C. 1970, 2nd supp., c. 10, s. 65, Item 13, and Stats. Can. 1972, c. 17, s. 2(2), Sched. B, Item 6.

²¹ The argument of "unjust enrichment" was used by Mr. Justice Laskin, as he then was, in his dissenting judgment in the *Murdoch* case, to support the imposition on the husband in favour of the wife of a constructive trust for part of the ranch property: see (1974), 41 D.L.R. (3d) 367, at p. 388.

²² *The Income Tax Act*, Stats. Can. 1970-71-72, c. 63, as amended, sections 40(4), 40(5), 70, 73, and 74.

²³ *The Income Tax Act*, sections 60(b) and 60(c), allowing deductions from income of amounts paid; sections 56(1)(b) and 56(1)(c), making such payments taxable as income in the hands of the recipient; and section 109(4), stipulating that when this occurs, the recipient is deemed not to be the spouse of the taxpayer for the purposes of the standard married deduction. See also s. 60.1 of the *Income Tax Act*, added by s. 31(1) of Stats. Can. 1974-75, c. 25 (Bill C-49, passed by the House of Commons February 27, 1975).

²⁴ See Stats. Can. 1974-75, c. 26, ss. 30, 39(2), 99(3) and 99(4), which added new sections 60(i), 60(j), 74(6), 146(5.1) and 146(8) to *The Income Tax Act*, applicable to 1974 and subsequent taxation years.

²⁵ Royal Commission on the Status of Women, *Report* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970), p. 40 (Recommendation 103). The recommendation applies to both Canada and Quebec Pension Plans.

²⁶ *The Income Tax Act*, sections 74(3) and 74(4) (employee of a spouse or spouse's partnership); and section 74(5) (spouses partners in a business). Income from a farm partnership was taxed in the husband's hands although the wife had provided most of the capital investment in *Klamzowski v. M.N.R.*, 52 D.T.C. 51 (I.T.A.B.). Asper suggests that taxing income in the husband's hands is the tendency in the Department (I. H. Asper, "Tax Law Bristles with Bias Against Women," *Globe and Mail*, Nov. 20, 1975).

²⁷ Asper, *loc. cit.*

²⁸ "Employment of a person by his spouse" is not considered to be insurable employment for purposes of *The Unemployment Insurance Act*, Stats. Can. 1970-71-72, c. 48: see s. 3(2)(c).

²⁹ *The Family Relations Act*, S.B.C. 1972, c. 20, s. 8, and *Stevenson v. Stevenson* (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 762 (B.C.S.C.).

³⁰ By s. 28(2) of *The Matrimonial Property Ordinance*, O.N.W.T. 1974 (3rd sess.), c. 3, a judge hearing a dispute between spouses may make "such order with respect to the property in dispute as he considers fair and equitable"; this discretion is made subject to the direction in s. 28(4) of the Ordinance that the judge in making the order "shall take into account the respective contributions of the husband and wife whether in the form of money, services, prudent management, caring for the home and family or in any other form whatsoever."

³¹ *The Family Law Reform Act*, 1975, S.O. 1975, c. 1, s. 1(3)(c). The language of the provision is not clear. Rather than specify what legal result would flow from the contribution, the Act provides that the spouse "shall not be disentitled to any right to compensation or other interest flowing from such contribution" because of the marital relationship or because the contribution was that of a reasonable spouse in the circumstances.

³² This system, known in Quebec as the "partnership of acquests," was established by *An Act Respecting Matrimonial Regimes*, S.Q. 1969, c. 77. For an analytical study of this and other regimes operating in the province, see E. Caparros, "Matrimonial Regimes in Quebec," in Law Reform Commission of Canada, *Studies on Family Property Law* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975), pp. 5-252.

³³ The Law Reform Commission of Ontario has recommended adoption of this approach: see O.L.R.C., *Report on Family Law*, Part IV, *Family Property Law* (Toronto, 1974). Other jurisdictions have it under study: see University of Alberta, Institute of Law Research and Reform, *Matrimonial property: working paper* (Edmonton, 1974); Manitoba Law Reform Commission, *Working paper on family law*, Part II, *Property Disposition* (Winnipeg, 1975); Saskatchewan Law Reform Commission, *Working papers: Division of matrimonial property; possible solutions to problems within the present law; tentative proposals for reform* (Saskatoon, 1974).

³⁴ British Columbia, Royal Commission on Family and Children's Law, *Report on Matrimonial Property*, Report No. 6 (Vancouver, 1975).

³⁵ This basis for determining support obligations between spouses is more fully articulated in Law Reform Commission of Canada, *Working Paper Number 12*, *supra*, note 9.

³⁶ Statistics Canada, "Working Mothers and Their Child Care Arrangements in Canada," *The Labour Force* (forthcoming), Table 10.

³⁷ Data on part-time clauses in collective agreements were obtained from the Collective Bargaining section of the Economics and Research Branch of Labour Canada. The data cover collective agreements including 500 or more employees in Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) groups 101 to 999 for the year 1975.

³⁸ *Loc. cit.*, *supra*, note 36.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Table 4.

⁴⁰ *The Income Tax Act*, s. 63, allows a mother to claim a deduction for child-care expenses only if she is employed in the labour force; a father can claim the expenses as a deduction only if he has no wife, or his wife is physically or mentally unable to care for children. Claimants of the deduction must be prepared to substantiate the amounts claimed by receipts; and the section stipulates that the female taxpayer can claim only the least of \$500 per child in care, \$2,000, or $\frac{2}{3}$ of earned income for the year.

⁴¹ *Canada Assistance Plan*, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-1 (originally enacted Stats. Can. 1966-67, c. 45).

⁴² Usually, legislation relating to day care is skeletal in nature, establishing a

mechanism for licensing, supervising, and perhaps funding the facilities, and some basic quality standards, with more detailed specification of quality standards left to regulation. Some provinces include day-care provisions in legislation dealing with other "welfare institutions": see, for example, *The Welfare Institutions Licensing Act*, R.S. Nfld. 1970, c. 397, s. 2(f)(v). In other provinces, day care is considered as a separate subject matter — see, for example, *The Child Care Facilities Act*, S.P.E.I. 1973, c. 33; *The Day Care Act*, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. D-4.1; *The Day Nurseries Act*, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 71; and *The Day Care Services Act*, S.N.S. 1970-71, c. 71.

⁴³ R.R.O. 1970, Regulation 160, section 9(1)(b) and 9(1)(c), as amended by O. Reg. 547/71, sections 8(1) and 8(2). Ontario day-care regulations are passed under the authority of *The Day Nurseries Act*, R.S.O. 1970, c. 104, as amended by S.O. 1970, c. 50, s. 25; S.O. 1971, c. 93; S.O. 1971 (2nd sess.), c. 11, and S.O. 1973, c. 77.

⁴⁴ Section 9(e) of *The Day Care Regulations*, Saskatchewan Regulation 16/72; first passed under the authority of *The Child Welfare Act*, R.S.S. 1965, c. 268. Day care is now governed by *The Family Services Act*, S.S. 1973, c. 38.

⁴⁵ Saskatchewan Regulation 16/72, s. 7C.(1).

⁴⁶ R.R.O. 1970, Regulation 160, sections 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(b).

⁴⁷ See Schedule 1A, added to R.R.O. 1970, Regulation 160, by O.Reg. 547/71, section 15.

⁴⁸ *The Maternity Protection Convention (No. 3)*, adopted by the International Labour Organization in 1919, and in force as of June 13, 1921; and *The Maternity Protection Convention (Revised)*, 1952 (No. 103), in force as of September 7, 1955.

⁴⁹ It is not uncommon, however, for workers in certain occupations to be excluded from coverage — women employed in agriculture, home work, and domestic service, for example. Canada has in the past suggested that one obstacle to its ratification of the international conventions on maternity leave is the requirement in the conventions that workers in these categories be covered by legislation: see I.L.O., *Maternity Protection: A World Survey of National Law and Practice* (Geneva, 1965), p. 255.

⁵⁰ S.B.C. 1921 (1st sess.), c. 37. The legislation appeared in identical form in successive editions of the Revised Statutes of British Columbia: see R.S.B.C. 1924, c. 155; 1936, c. 169; 1948, c. 204; 1960, c. 235. It was repealed by *The Maternity Protection Act*, 1966, S.B.C. 1966, c. 25, s. 8, and the present maternity leave provisions in British Columbia are those in the 1966 Act.

⁵¹ S. Woodsworth, *Maternity Protection for Women Workers in Canada* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), p. 11.

⁵² S.B.C. 1921 (1st sess.), c. 37, s. 7.

⁵³ *Minimum Employment Standards Act*, S.N.B. 1964, c. 8, sections 11, 12, and 13; the maternity leave provisions now in force in New Brunswick are those found in the *Minimum Employment Standards Act*, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-12. They are the same as those enacted in 1964.

⁵⁴ Ontario first provided for leave in section 9 of *The Women's Equal Employment Opportunity Act*, S.O. 1970, c. 33, R.S.O. 1970, c. 501. Leave provisions were moved into *The Employment Standards Act* by S.O. 1972, c. 119; present leave provisions appear as Part XI of *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974, S.O. 1974, c. 112. The federal government added leave provisions as Division V.1 of the *Canada Labour Code*, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, by means of R.S.C. 1970, 2nd supp., c. 17, s. 16, which came into force on August 1, 1972. Manitoba provided for leave by adding a new section 34.1 to *The Employment Standards Act*, R.S.M. 1970, c. E110, by means of S.M. 1972, c. 52, s. 3. Leave provisions in Nova Scotia first appeared as part of the new *Labour Standards Code* introduced by S.N.S. 1972, c. 10. Provisions now in effect in Saskatchewan were added by S.S. 1973, c. 51, s. 11 as Part VA of *The Labour Standards Act*, 1969, S.S. 1969, c. 24.

⁵⁵ Information concerning leave policies in two jurisdictions which do not now

have general legislation may be obtained from Citizens' Advisory Board, *Interim Report on the Status of Women in Alberta* (Edmonton: Queen's Printer, 1972), p. 11, and R. Geoffroy and P. Ste-Marie, *Attitude of Union Workers to Women in Industry*, Study No. 9, Royal Commission on the Status of Women (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), at pp. 67-86 (Quebec). Information about leave practices and policies in a number of jurisdictions in Canada before 1970 may be found in Woodsworth, *op. cit.*, note 51, at pp. 11-30; in Canada, Department of Labour, Women's Bureau and Economics and Research Branch, *Maternity Leave Policies* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969); and in Royal Commission on the Status of Women, *Report*, at pp. 84-85, 111, 130, 134, and 138.

⁵⁶ A new *Unemployment Insurance Act* was enacted by Stats. Can. 1970-71-72, c. 48 (see sections 30 and 46 of that Act).

⁵⁷ Recognition of a father's interest and personal obligation towards child care might, for example, create a climate in which part-time work options for both parents are readily available as long as children are under a certain age (see the brief discussion by Commissioner J. Henripin in R.C.S.W., *Report*, p. 427). Most legislation providing for childbirth leave for women divides the leave period into pre- and post-natal periods; extending leave to fathers would be based on the premise that post-natal leave involves not only health considerations related to childbearing, but also child-rearing activities (see G. Ackerman, "Child Care Leave for Fathers?" *Ms.*, September, 1973, p. 118, and *Ackerman v. Board of Education of the City of New York*, 387 F. Supp. 76 [S.D.N.Y., 1974]).

⁵⁸ For a discussion of international standards respecting duration of leave, see I.L.O., *op. cit.*, *supra*, note 49, at pp. 207-18.

⁵⁹ Royal Commission on the Status of Women, *Report*, Recommendation 16, at p. 87. Only Saskatchewan provides for a leave of 18 weeks (12 weeks before, 6 after, birth); the federal government, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Ontario provide for 17 weeks (11 weeks before, 6 after), and British Columbia and New Brunswick permit a maximum of 12 weeks' leave. To secure the maximum normal leave in most jurisdictions, an employee is usually required to give timely notice of her intention to seek leave and present to the employer a medical certificate setting out the anticipated delivery date.

⁶⁰ See *The Employment Standards Act* (Manitoba, cf. note 54, *supra*), s. 34.1(4); *The Labour Standards Act*, 1969 (Saskatchewan, cf. note 54, *supra*), s. 50D.; *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974 (Ontario, cf. note 54, *supra*), s. 38(1); and *Canada Labour Code* (cf. note 54, *supra*), s. 59.3(1).

⁶¹ *Labour Standards Code* (Nova Scotia, cf. note 54, *supra*), s. 56(4).

⁶² *The Employment Standards Act* (Manitoba), s. 34.1(5); *The Labour Standards Act*, 1969 (Saskatchewan), c. 50D.; *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974 (Ontario), s. 38(1); *Canada Labour Code*, s. 59.3(2); *Labour Standards Code* (Nova Scotia), c. 56(4).

⁶³ *The Labour Standards Act*, 1969 (Saskatchewan), s. 50D.; *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974 (Ontario), s. 38(1); *The Labour Code* (Nova Scotia), s. 56(4).

⁶⁴ *The Labour Standards Code* (Nova Scotia), s. 56(1).

⁶⁵ *The Employment Standards Act* (Manitoba), s. 34.1(6); *The Labour Standards Act*, 1969 (Saskatchewan), s. 50F(1); *Canada Labour Code*, s. 59.4.

⁶⁶ *The Maternity Protection Act*, 1966 (British Columbia, cf. note 50, *supra*), s. 6(1); *The Minimum Employment Standards Act* (New Brunswick, cf. note 53, *supra*), s. 11.

⁶⁷ *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974 (Ontario), s. 35.

⁶⁸ *The Employment Standards Act* (Manitoba), s. 34.1(6); *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974 (Ontario), s. 35; *Canada Labour Code*, s. 59.4.

⁶⁹ *The Labour Standards Act*, 1969 (Saskatchewan), s. 50F(1).

⁷⁰ *The Maternity Protection Act*, 1966 (British Columbia), s. 6(1) (dismissal only); *The Labour Standards Act*, 1969 (Saskatchewan), s. 50F(1) (dismissal and suspension).

⁷¹ *The Employment Standards Act* (Manitoba), s. 34.1(1)(a); *The Labour Standards Act*, 1969 (Saskatchewan), ss. 50A(1) and 50A(4); *Canada Labour Code*, s. 59.2(1)(a).

⁷² *The Labour Standards Code* (Nova Scotia), s. 56(2).

⁷³ *The Women's Equal Opportunity Act*, R.S.O. 1970, c. 501, s. 9(7).

⁷⁴ *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974 (Ontario), s. 36(1).

⁷⁵ I.L.O., *op. cit.*, *supra*, note 49, at p. 206.

⁷⁶ *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974 (Ontario), s. 35, and *The Labour Standards Code* (Nova Scotia), s. 56(1).

⁷⁷ *The Labour Standards Act*, 1969 (Saskatchewan), ss. 50F(2) and 50H(2).

⁷⁸ See Morley Gunderson, "Male-Female Wage Differentials and the Impact of Equal Pay Legislation," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 57, No. 4 (November, 1975), and Morley Gunderson, "Time Pattern of Male-Female Wage Differentials: Ontario, 1946-71," *Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations* (forthcoming).

⁷⁹ C. Lipton, *The Trade Union Movement of Canada 1827-1959*, 3d ed. (Toronto, 1973), p. 72.

⁸⁰ *The Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act*, 1951, S.O. 1951, c. 26.

⁸¹ After the Ontario initiative, the following legislation was enacted: Saskatchewan (*The Equal Pay Act*, S.S. 1952, c. 104); Canada (*Canada Fair Employment Practices Act*, Stats. Can. 1952-53, c. 19); British Columbia (*Equal Pay Act*, S.B.C. 1953 (2nd sess.), c. 6); Manitoba (*The Equal Pay Act*, S.M. 1956, c. 18); Nova Scotia (*Equal Pay Act*, S.N.S. 1956, c. 5); Alberta (*An Act to Amend the Alberta Labour Act*, S.A. 1957, c. 38, s. 41); Prince Edward Island (*The Equal Pay Act*, S.P.E.I. c. 11); New Brunswick (*Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act*, S.N.B. 1960-61, c. 7); Northwest Territories (*Fair Practices Ordinance*, O.N.W.T. 1966 (2nd sess.), c. 5); Newfoundland (*The Newfoundland Human Rights Code*, S. Nfld. 1969, No. 75, s. 10); Yukon (equal pay added to *The Labour Standards Ordinance* by O.Y.T. 1973 (1st sess.), c. 13, s. 2).

⁸² Two examples of legislation dealing directly with discrimination in pensions and fringe benefits may be found in *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974, S.O. 1974, c. 112, s. 34, and federal Bill C-52, *The Statute Law (Superannuation) Amendment Act*, 1975, which received first reading on February 17, 1975; this bill would remove discriminatory provisions from a number of federal statutory superannuation plans. Some jurisdictions interpret human rights legislation prohibiting discrimination in "conditions of employment" on the basis of sex and/or marital status as forbidding discrimination in pensions and fringe benefits: see, for example, "Guidelines for Ensuring Compliance with the New Brunswick Human Rights Code in the Matter of Discrimination on the Grounds of Sex or Marital Status," issued by the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission, and the *Human Rights Act*, S.N.B. 1971, c. 8, s. 3(1)(b), as enacted by 1973 (1st sess.), c. 45. Jurisdictions which also appear to use this approach are British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland: see *Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119, s. 8(3) and s. 9(3); *The Human Rights Act*, S.M. 1974, c. 65, ss. 6 and 7(2); *Nova Scotia Human Rights Act*, s. 3(6) as enacted by S.N.S. 1973, c. 45, s. 3(3), and *Newfoundland Human Rights Code*, R.S. Nfld. 1970, c. 262, s. 9(5). Alberta, on the other hand, explicitly states that the provisions of its human rights legislation respecting age and marital status do not affect the operation of any bona fide retirement, pension, or group or employee insurance plan (see *The Individual's Rights Protection Act*, S.A. 1972, c. 2, s. 6(2)), and Ontario makes it very clear that the provisions of its Human Rights Code respecting discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status, and age do not apply to "any bona fide superannuation or pension fund or plan or any bona fide insurance plan . . . that differentiates or makes a distinction, exclusion, or preference between employees or any class or classes of employees because of age, sex, or marital status." See s. 4(9), added to the *Ontario Human Rights Code* by S.O. 1974, c. 73, s. 3.

⁸³ The very strict "same work" standard prevailed in British Columbia from 1953 to 1959; in Ontario from 1952 to 1958; in Nova Scotia from 1956 to 1967; in Prince Edward Island from 1959 to 1968; and in the Northwest Territories from 1966 to 1974. Legislation requiring that the work of men and women be "identical or substantially identical" prevailed in Alberta from 1957 to 1970; in Manitoba from 1956 to 1972; and at the federal level from 1956 to 1972. Saskatchewan appears to be the exception during the early years of Canadian equal pay legislation; from 1952 to 1973, that province required that men and women be performing work of "comparable" character.

⁸⁴ These three continue to require that men and women be performing "the same work": see *Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act*, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. F-9, s. 3(1); *The Newfoundland Human Rights Code*, R.S. Nfld. 1970, c. 262, s. 10(1); *Labour Standards Ordinance*, R.O.Y.T. 1971, c. L-1, s. 12.1(1) as added by O.Y.T. 1973 (1st sess.), c. 13, s. 2.

⁸⁵ See *Individual's Rights Protection Act*, S.A. 1972, c. 2, s. 5(1), as enacted by S.A. 1973, c. 61, s. 9; *Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. F-2, s. 6(1); *The Equal Pay Act*, R.S.M. 1970, c. E-130, s. 3, as enacted by S.M. 1972, c. 47, sections 3 and 4; *The Human Rights Act*, S.P.E.I. 1968, c. 24, s. 7(1).

⁸⁶ The five are British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and Canada. See *The Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119, s. 6; *The Labour Standards Act*, 1969, S.S. 1969, c. 24, s. 41 as enacted by S.S. 1973, c. 51, s. 9; *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974, S.O. 1974, c. 112, s. 33; *Labour Standards Code*, S.N.S. 1972, c. 10, s. 55(1); *Canada Labour Code*, s. 38.1(1) enacted by R.S.C. 1970, 2nd supp., c. 17, s. 9.

⁸⁷ *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974, S.O. 1974, c. 112, s. 33.

⁸⁸ See *The Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act*, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. F-9, s. 3(2); *Labour Standards Code*, S.N.S. 1972, c. 10, s. 55(2); *Human Rights Act*, S.P.E.I. 1968, c. 24, s. 7(2); *Canada Labour Code*, s. 38.1(2) added by R.S.C. 1970, 2nd supp., c. 17, s. 9.

⁸⁹ See *Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. F-2, s. 6(3); *The Individual's Rights Protection Act*, S.A. 1972, c. 2, s. 5(3); *Equal Pay Act*, R.S.M. 1970, c. E-130, s. 3(3) as added by S.M. 1972, c. 47, s. 5; *The Newfoundland Human Rights Code*, R.S. Nfld. 1970, c. 262, s. 10(2) (all the foregoing stipulate that the factor be one that would normally justify the differential); and *Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119, s. 6(3) ("reasonably").

⁹⁰ See section 41(1) of *The Labour Standards Act*, 1969, as enacted by S.S. 1973, c. 51, s. 9.

⁹¹ See section 12.1(1)(a) and (b) of *Labour Standards Ordinance*, R.O.Y.T. 1971, c. L-1, as enacted by O.Y.T. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 13, s. 2; and section 33(1)(a) and (b) of *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974, S.O. 1974, c. 112.

⁹² See section 12.1(1)(c) of *Labour Standards Ordinance*, R.O.Y.T. 1971, c. L-1, enacted by O.Y.T. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 13, s. 2, and section 33(1)(c) of *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974, S.O. 1974, c. 112. It may also be noted that Ontario and the Yukon would also accept "any factor other than sex" as a justification for wage differentials: see s. 12.1(1)(d) enacted by O.Y.T. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 13, s. 2, and s. 33(1)(d) of *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974.

⁹³ The equal pay provisions of the federal government were, for example, enacted in 1956, and there is as yet no general legislation at the federal level dealing with equal opportunity for women; equal pay legislation was first enacted in Ontario in 1951, and its first equal opportunity legislation for women was enacted in 1970.

⁹⁴ The jurisdictions surveyed were Canada, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and British Columbia; the annual reports of the Department or Ministry enforcing equal pay legislation were consulted starting with the year the legislation became effective to the most recent annual report available. Data available from the authors.

⁹⁵ See British Columbia, Department of Labour, *Annual Report for the Year*

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⁹⁶ International Labour Organization, *Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value* (Convention 100). Canada ratified the convention on November 16, 1972.

⁹⁷ *The Equal Pay Act, 1970* (1970, c. 41).

⁹⁸ See *The Equal Pay Act 1970*, s. 1(5).

⁹⁹ The first equal opportunity provisions in favour of women were those enacted in Quebec: see *An Act respecting Discrimination in Employment*, Stats. Que. 1964, c. 46, which is still in force.

¹⁰⁰ A chart indicating when equal employment opportunity legislation for women was introduced into various Canadian jurisdictions appears in Appendix Table A.5.1.

¹⁰¹ Stats. Can. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 140(2)(b), requiring that the Minister of Manpower "ensure that in referring a worker seeking employment there is no discrimination because of race, national origin, colour, religion, sex, marital status, age or political affiliation," on the part of the national employment service.

¹⁰² See SOR/73-278 (*Canada Gazette*, Part II, vol. 107, No. 11) adding a new paragraph to regulations made under *The Fair Wages and Hours of Labour Act*, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-3.

¹⁰³ *The Public Service Employment Act*, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-32, stipulates in s. 12(2) that the Public Service Commission in prescribing selection standards for public servants shall not discriminate against any person by reason of, *inter alia*, sex.

¹⁰⁴ On May 10, 1972, Bill C-206, *An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code and the Public Service Employment Act with respect to discrimination in employment based on age, sex and marital status*, received first reading in the House of Commons. In explaining why the government did not proceed with this bill, the Minister of Justice declared the government's intention to create instead a federal Human Rights Commission in 1974: "Commission on Egalitarian Rights Proposed by Lang for New Year," *Globe and Mail*, December 11, 1973.

¹⁰⁵ Bill C-72, *The Canadian Human Rights Act*, received first reading on July 21, 1975.

¹⁰⁶ The exception is Quebec. *An Act respecting Discrimination in Employment*, Stats. Que. 1964, c. 46, contains in section 3 a narrower prohibition, against an association of employees resorting to "discrimination in admitting, suspending or expelling a member" on the basis of sex.

¹⁰⁷ The three provinces, in addition to Quebec (see above), which prohibit discrimination by a trade union on the basis of sex are Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan: see, respectively, *The Newfoundland Human Rights Code*, R.S. Nfld. 1970, c. 262, s. 9(3)(a); *Human Rights Act*, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11, s. 9 and s. 11A(2), added by S.N.S. 1972, c. 65, s. 1; and *The Fair Employment Practices Act*, R.S.S. 1965, c. 293, s. 5, as amended by S.S. 1972, c. 43, s. 5.

¹⁰⁸ Provinces and territories prohibiting trade union discrimination on the basis of both sex and marital status are the Yukon and Northwest Territories, British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and New Brunswick: see, respectively, *The Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.Y.T. 1971, c. F-2, s. 3(3) as amended by O.Y.T. 1974 (2nd sess.), c. 7, s. 1; *Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. F-2, s. 3(4); *Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119, s. 9(1)(a), 9(2); *The Individual's Rights Protection Act* S.A. 1972, c. 2, s. 9; *The Human Rights Act*, S.M. 1974, c. 65, s. 6(1)(c); *The Ontario Human Rights Code*, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318, s. 4a(1), added by S.O. 1972, c. 119, s. 6; *The Human Rights Act*, S.N.B. 1971, c. 8, s. 3(3), as amended by S.N.B. 1973, c. 45, s. 3(1).

¹⁰⁹ *The Human Rights Act*, S.N.B. 1971, c. 8, s. 7(1), as enacted by S.N.B. 1973, c. 45, s. 7. Discrimination by employers' organizations on the basis of sex and marital status is also prohibited: see s. 3(1), as enacted by S.N.B. 1973, c. 45, s. 3(1).

¹¹⁰ See *The Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119, s. 9(1)(a); *The Individual's Rights Protection Act*, S.A. 1972, c. 2, s.9; *The Human Rights Act*, S.M. 1974, c. 65, s. 6(1)(c).

¹¹¹ *The Ontario Human Rights Code*, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318, s. 4a(2), added by S.O. 1972, c. 119, s. 6.

¹¹² *Human Rights Act*, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11, s. 10 and s. 11A(2), added by S.N.S. 1972, c. 65, s. 1.

¹¹³ *Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119, s. 9(1)(b), and *Human Rights Act*, S.M. 1974, c. 65, s. 6(1)(c).

¹¹⁴ *Newfoundland Human Rights Code*, R.S. Nfld. 1970, c. 262, s. 9(1)(a); *Human Rights Act*, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11, s. 11A(1)(d), added by S.N.S. 1972, c. 65, s. 1; *An Act respecting Discrimination in Employment*, Stats. Que. 1964, c. 46, sections 1a and 2; *Fair Employment Practices Act*, R.S.S. 1965, c. 293, s. 3, as amended by S.S. 1972, c. 43, s. 4.

¹¹⁵ *Fair Employment Practices Ordinance*, R.O.Y.T. 1971, c. F-2, s. 3(1) as amended by O.Y.T. 1974 (2nd sess.), c. 7, s. 1; *Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. F-2, s. 3(1) and 3(2); *Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119, s. 8(1)(a); *Individual's Rights Protection Act*, S.A. 1972, c. 2, s. 6(1)(a) and (b); *Human Rights Act*, S.M. 1974, c. 65, s. 6(1)(a); *Ontario Human Rights Code*, S.O. 1970, c. 318, s. 4(1)(b) and 4(1)(g) as enacted by S.O. 1972, c. 119, s. 5; *Human Rights Act*, S.N.B. 1971, c. 8, s. 3(1), as enacted by S.N.B. 1973, c. 45, s. 3(1).

¹¹⁶ Section 4(1) of the *Ontario Human Rights Code*, as enacted by S.O. 1972, c. 119, s. 5, also prohibits (a) refusing to refer or recruit for employment; (c) refusing to train, promote, or transfer an employee; (d) subjecting an employee to probation or apprenticeship or enlarging the period of apprenticeship; (e) establishing or maintaining an employment classification or category that by its description or operation excludes a person from employment or continued employment; (f) maintaining separate lines of progression, advancement, or seniority.

¹¹⁷ Section 6(1)(a) of the *Manitoba Human Rights Act*, S.M. 1974, c. 65, also prohibits a refusal to advance or promote a person, as does section 8(1)(a) of the *Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119; *An Act respecting Discrimination in Employment*, Stats. Que. 1964, c. 46, s. 1a and 2 prohibits resorting to "discrimination in . . . promoting, laying-off, or dismissing an employee."

¹¹⁸ See the *Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, sections 8(1) and 9(1), and the *Manitoba Human Rights Act*, section 6(1).

¹¹⁹ The *Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, sections 8(1)(b) and 8(2); the *Manitoba Human Rights Act*, s. 6(1)(b); the *Ontario Human Rights Code*, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318, s. 4(5) as enacted by S.O. 1972, c. 119, s. 5; *The Human Rights Act*, S.N.B. 1971, c. 8, s. 3(2), as amended by S.N.B. 1973, c. 45, s. 3(1).

¹²⁰ *The Human Rights Act*, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11, s. 8(2), as amended by S.N.S. 1970-71, c. 69, s. 2(2) and s. 11A(2) as enacted by S.N.S. 1972, c. 65, s. 1. Saskatchewan has an indirect prohibition against discrimination by employment agencies; *The Fair Employment Practices Act*, R.S.S. 1965, c. 293, s. 4, as amended by S.S. 1972, c. 43, s. 5, prohibits employers from using employment agencies that discriminate on the basis of sex against persons seeking employment.

¹²¹ Seven jurisdictions specify that advertisements should not indicate that sex (and, in some, marital status) is a limitation, specification, or preference for the job: see *The Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. F-2, s. 3(3)(b) (sex and marital status); *Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119, s. 7(a) as amended by S.B.C. 1974, c. 87, s. 18(b) (sex and marital status); *Individual's Rights Protection Act*, S.A. 1972, c. 2 s. 7(1)(a) (sex alone); *Fair Employment Practices Act*, R.S.S. 1965, c. 293, s. 7(a) as amended by S.S. 1972, c. 43, s. 8 (sex alone); *An Act respecting Discrimination in Employment*, Stats. Que. 1964, c. 46, s. 4 (sex alone); *Human Rights Act*, S.N.B. 1971, c. 8, s. 3(4)(b) as enacted by R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 20 (supp.), s. 1 (sex and marital status); *Human Rights Act*, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11, s.

11A(1)(d) added by S.N.S. 1972, c. 65, s.1 (sex). Two jurisdictions go farther, specifically prohibiting the publication of separate male and female help-wanted columns: *Human Rights Act*, S.M. 1974, c. 65, s. 6(3) and *Ontario Human Rights Code*, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318, sections 4(2) and 4(3) enacted by S.O. 1972, c. 119, s. 5.

¹²² Four jurisdictions prohibit the use of application forms and the making of any written or oral inquiry that indicate that sex and marital status may be a limitation, specification, or preference for the position: see *Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. F-2, s. 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(c); *Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119, s. 7(a) as amended by S.B.C. 1974, c. 87, s. 18(b); *Human Rights Act*, S.M. 1974 c. 65, s. 6(4); *Human Rights Act*, S.N.B. 1971, c. 8, s. 3(4), as enacted by R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 20 (supp.), s. 1. Alberta and Saskatchewan have similar provisions, but only with regard to sex: *Fair Employment Practices Act*, R.S.S. 1965, c. 239, s. 7(a), added by S.S. 1972, c. 43, s. 7; and *Individual's Rights Protection Act*, S.A. 1972, c. 2, s. 7(1)(a). Nova Scotia prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in "the use of application forms": see *Human Rights Act*, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11, s. 11A(1)(d), added by S.N.S. 1972, c. 65, s. 1.

¹²³ The Yukon and Northwest Territories, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and New Brunswick are the jurisdictions that prohibit a request for information concerning an applicant's sex and/or marital status: see *Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.Y.T. 1971, c. F-2, s. 3(2), as amended by O.Y.T. 1974 (2nd sess.), c. 7; *Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. F-2, s. 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(c); *Human Rights Act*, S.M. 1974, c. 65, s. 6(4); *Human Rights Act*, S.N.B. 1971, c. 8, s. 3(4), as enacted by R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 20 (supp.), s. 1 (all sex and marital status); *Fair Employment Practices Act*, R.S.S. 1965, c. 239, s. 7(b), as added by S.S. 1972, c. 43, s. 7 (sex alone).

¹²⁴ Section 4, paragraphs (a), (b), and (c), of the *Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in the purchase of a commercial or dwelling unit, land, or an interest in land; and also in the terms and conditions of such purchase. Section 4, paragraphs (a) and (b), of the *Individual's Rights Protection Act* prohibits a person from denying the right to occupy as a tenant any commercial or dwelling unit, or discriminating in the terms and conditions of such tenancy on the basis of sex. Similar to the Alberta provisions are s. 4(1)(a) and (b) of the *Manitoba Human Rights Act*; section 3(1)(a) and (b) of the *Ontario Human Rights Code*, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318, as enacted by S.O. 1972, c. 119, s. 4; and section 11A(1)(b) added to the *Nova Scotia Human Rights Act* by S.N.S. 1972, c. 65, s. 1.

¹²⁵ Section 5 of the *Human Rights Code of British Columbia* prohibits a refusal to allow occupancy as a tenant on the basis of sex and marital status; section 5(a) of the *Manitoba Human Rights Act* prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status in the purchase of a commercial unit or land or an interest in land and in any term or condition of purchase; section 4(1)(a) and (b) of the *Human Rights Act*, S.N.B. 1971, c. 8 as enacted by S.N.B. 1973, c. 45, c. 4(1) prohibits denying on the basis of sex or marital status the right to occupy a commercial or dwelling unit and discriminating in conditions of occupancy; section 4(2) prohibits a refusal on these grounds of an offer to purchase property.

¹²⁶ Following discussions between the British Columbia Department of Consumer Services and the Credit Grantors Association of Vancouver, the latter has issued voluntary guidelines to its members aimed at avoiding sex-based discrimination in the granting of credit. See B.C. Department of Consumer Services, "News Release: Phyllis Young Announces Anti-Sex Discrimination Guidelines . . .," June 20, 1975; on September 4, 1975, the Premier of Ontario announced that credit guidelines would be issued in that province, and in November, 1975, voluntary guidelines were issued by the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations following discussions with a number of groups and associations.

¹²⁷ *The Newfoundland Human Rights Code*, R.S. Nfld. 1970, c. 262, s. 9(6)(c), exempts from application of the fair employment practices section of the Code an employer "which is a Board of Directors of a College or a School Board or

an Amalgamated School Board or a Consolidated School Board constituted by or under The Schools Act" or "a Board of Directors of a College, a Board of Education, a common board, committee or other governing body existing by virtue of section 4 of The Schools Act"; Section 9(6)(d) exempts, *inter alia*, employment of Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents of Education under *The Department of Education Act*, and Supervising Inspectors under *The Education Act*.

¹²⁸ The exception is made where sex and/or marital status is a "bona fide occupational qualification" in the *Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.Y.T. 1971, c. F-2, s. 13(3), as re-enacted by O.Y.T. 1974 (2nd sess.), c. 7, s. 4(1); the *Individual's Rights Protection Act*, S.A. 1972, c. 2, sections 6(3) and 7(2); *Ontario Human Rights Code*, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318, s. 4(7) as enacted by S.O. 1972, c. 119, s. 5; the *Human Rights Act*, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11, s. 11A(1)(d), enacted by S.N.S. 1972, c. 65, s. 1; *The Newfoundland Human Rights Code*, R.S. Nfld. 1970, c. 262, s. 9(1). The exception is "a bona fide occupational qualification as determined by the [Human Rights] Commission" in *Human Rights Act*, S.N.B. 1971, c. 8, sections 3(5), 4(4), and 6(3) as enacted by S.N.B. 1973, c. 45, sections 3(2), 4(3), and 6(2), and "a bona fide occupational qualification necessary to the normal operation of the employer's business or enterprise" in *Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. F-2, s. 13(3). Section 1a of *An Act respecting Discrimination in Employment*, Stats. Que. 1964, c. 46, states that an exclusion based on "the inherent requirements" of the job is not discrimination. Two provinces use a reasonableness standard; differentiation on the basis of sex is permitted in Saskatchewan "where the work or the position cannot reasonably be performed by persons of that sex": see *Fair Employment Practices Act*, R.S.S. 1965, c. 293, s. 20(3), added by S.S. 1972, c. 43, s. 11. *The Human Rights Act*, S.M. 1974, c. 65, s. 6(6), allows an exception on the basis of "reasonable occupational qualification and requirement for the position or employment."

¹²⁹ *Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119, sections 8(2)(a) and (b).

¹³⁰ These observations on procedure are based on an analysis of twenty pieces of legislation. In British Columbia, Alberta, Newfoundland, and the Northwest Territories, the substantive provisions respecting equal pay and equal opportunity are found in the same legislation; hence the procedure for enforcing equal pay and equal opportunity is basically the same: see *The Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119, as amended by S.B.C. 1974, c. 87; *The Individual's Rights Protection Act*, S.A. 1972, c. 2, as amended by S.A. 1972, c. 61, s. 9; *The Newfoundland Human Rights Code*, R.S. Nfld. 1970, c. 262, as amended by S. Nfld. 1973, No. 34, s. 7(a); and *Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. F-2. In analyzing enforcement procedure in Saskatchewan, one must have regard to three statutes: equal pay is governed by *The Labour Standards Act*, S.A. 1969, c. 24, as amended by S.S. 1973, c. 51, and equal opportunity by *Fair Employment Practices Act*, R.S.S. 1965, c. 293, as amended by S.S. 1972, c. 43. *The Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission Act*, 1972, S.S. 1972, c. 108, as amended by S.S. 1973, c. 94, gives the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission a role in the enforcement of both kinds of legislation. In three jurisdictions, Quebec, Prince Edward Island, and Canada, there is only one type of protection, the first only equal opportunity and the latter two only equal pay: see *An Act respecting Discrimination in Employment*, Stats. Que. 1964, c. 46; *The Human Rights Act*, S.P.E.I. 1968, c. 24; and *Canada Labour Code*, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, as amended by R.S.C. 1970, 2nd supp., c. 17. In Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and the Yukon Territory, equal pay and equal opportunity provisions are contained in separate pieces of legislation, and there are different procedures applicable to the enforcement of the two types of protection: see *The Equal Pay Act*, R.S.M. 1970, c. E-130, as amended by S.M. 1971, c. 62, and S.M. 1972, c. 47, and *The Human Rights Act*, S.M. 1974, c. 65 (Manitoba); *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974, S.O. 1974, c. 112, and *The Ontario Human Rights Code*, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318, as amended by S.O. 1971, c. 50, s. 63, S.O.

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1972, c. 119, and S.O. 1974, c. 73; *Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act*, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. F-9, and *The Human Rights Act*, S.N.B. 1971, c. 8, as amended by S.N.B. 1973 (1st sess.), c. 45 and R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 20 (Supp.) (New Brunswick); *Labour Standards Code*, S.N.S. 1972, c. 10, and *Human Rights Act*, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11, as amended by S.N.S. 1970, c. 85, S.N.S. 1970-71, c. 69, and S.N.S. 1972, c. 65 (Nova Scotia); *Labour Standards Ordinance*, R.O.Y.T. 1971, c. L-1, as amended by O.Y.T. 1973 (1st sess.), c. 13, and *Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.Y.T. 1971, c. F-2, as amended by O.Y.T. 1974 (2nd sess.), c. 7. In the *Newfoundland Human Rights Code* and the equal pay legislation of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, it is in the discretion of the enforcing authority whether an investigation into a complaint will be conducted; there does not appear to be any appeal for an employee from a refusal to cause a complaint to be investigated. In other jurisdictions, it appears as if the enforcing authority is obliged to conduct an investigation into a complaint. In only a few of these, however, is it mandatory for the government to move from the failure of an attempted settlement of the complaint to a hearing (see the equal pay legislation of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island). In the majority, it is, again, within the discretion of the enforcing authority as to whether a hearing will be held if attempted settlement of the complaint is a failure. There do not appear to be appeal provisions for the employee where this discretion is exercised against the holding of a hearing. In *The Employment Standards Act*, 1974, s. 49(2), we find a rare example of a section giving the employee a right of review of a decision at the investigation and settlement stage. The employee's right of review of a decision adverse to her is not, however, as substantial as the review right given to an employer against whom an order has been made: see s. 50.

¹³¹ See *The Individual's Rights Protection Act*, S.A. 1972, c. 2, s. 5(5), as enacted by S.A. 1973, c. 61, s. 9; the employee cannot bring the action where she has made a complaint to the Alberta Human Rights Commission. What appears to be a right of action to recover back pay in an equal pay situation is also given by section 6(5) of the *Human Rights Code of British Columbia*, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119.

¹³² Statutes require that government permission to bring a private prosecution be obtained in Quebec (equal opportunity); Nova Scotia (equal pay and equal opportunity); Prince Edward Island (equal pay); Newfoundland (equal pay and equal opportunity); Northwest Territories (equal pay and equal opportunity); Yukon Territory (equal opportunity); Manitoba (equal opportunity); Ontario (equal opportunity); and New Brunswick (equal opportunity).

¹³³ The following have fines of \$100 or under for individuals found to be in breach of equal pay legislation: Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, and the Northwest Territories. Maximum fines for individuals in breach of equal pay legislation are \$200 in Alberta, \$500 in Saskatchewan, and \$1,000 in British Columbia, Canada, and the Yukon. Fines for individuals in breach of equal opportunity legislation are \$100 or less in Quebec, Newfoundland, Northwest Territories, the Yukon, and Saskatchewan. Maximum fines against individuals for breach of equal opportunity legislation are \$200 in Alberta, \$500 in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and \$1,000 in British Columbia, Manitoba, and Ontario. The only occasion on which an individual might be liable to a fine of more than \$1,000 for a breach of legislation is for breach of Ontario equal pay legislation, which provides a penalty of \$10,000 for breach. Corporate fines for breach of equal pay legislation are \$100 or less in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia; maximum corporate fines for breach of equal pay are \$500 in Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, and the Northwest Territories; \$1,000 in Alberta, Canada, and the Yukon; \$2,000 in Saskatchewan; and \$5,000 in British Columbia. Maximum corporate fines for breach of equal opportunity legislation are \$500 in Newfoundland, the Northwest Territories, the Yukon and Saskatchewan; \$1,000 in Alberta, Quebec, and Nova Scotia; \$2,000 in New Brunswick; and \$5,000 in Manitoba, British Columbia, and Ontario. Once again, the highest potential

corporate fine is found in Ontario equal pay legislation: \$10,000 for a breach. The foregoing figures indicate that in many cases a fine might amount to no more than a "licence fee" for discriminatory conduct.

¹³⁴ Those jurisdictions that require a convicting court to order payment of "back wages" in addition to a possible fine are Manitoba (equal pay), the Yukon (equal pay), and Ontario (equal pay). Jurisdictions that permit, but do not require, a convicting court to do so are Canada (equal pay), Saskatchewan (equal opportunity), and New Brunswick (equal opportunity).

¹³⁵ In *The Equal Pay Act* of Manitoba, there are provisions allowing an employee to bring a criminal prosecution without government permission at various stages of the investigation, conciliation, and hearing procedure if action is not taken by the government within certain time limits set out in the Act: see section 7(11), as enacted by S.M. 1972, c. 47, s. 8.

¹³⁶ For example, an order may be made at the hearing stage by the person or board holding the hearing in British Columbia (equal pay and equal opportunity), Saskatchewan (equal pay and equal opportunity), Manitoba (equal pay and equal opportunity), Ontario (equal opportunity), Nova Scotia (equal pay), and Prince Edward Island (equal pay). By contrast, a number of jurisdictions provide that only a recommendation may be made at the hearing stage: Alberta, Newfoundland, the Northwest Territories, and New Brunswick (equal pay and equal opportunity); the Yukon (equal opportunity); and Nova Scotia (equal opportunity). Although in some cases an order having binding effect may then be made by the next official or body in the hierarchy, in some others, a number of further stages after the hearing must be pursued before an order is made. In Nova Scotia equal opportunity procedures, for example, the recommendation from the hearing must go first to the Human Rights Commission, which then reports to the Minister, who can make an order giving effect to the recommendations. The longest process is that in Alberta. After a complaint, the Human Rights Commission embarks upon investigation and attempted settlement; a hearing may then be held if requested by the Commission of the Minister; the board holding the hearing makes recommendations and not an order. Following receipt by the Human Rights Commission of these recommendations, another attempt at settlement is required. If no settlement is reached within thirty days, the Commission is to deliver the file to the Attorney-General, who is empowered to apply to the Supreme Court, which then holds a new hearing into the matter. Only the Court is empowered to make orders. See *The Individual's Rights Protection Act*, S.A. 1972, c. 2, sections 17 to 22.

¹³⁷ Section 28(5) of Bill C-72 provides that where a question arises as to the status of the complainant (i.e., whether she is lawfully present in Canada, absent but entitled to return, a Canadian citizen, or a permanent resident), the federal Human Rights Commission is required to refer the question to the appropriate minister of government and cannot proceed with the complaint unless the question is favourably resolved.

¹³⁸ It may, for example, become apparent on further investigation that a complaint about denial of equal pay really involves the type of structural discrimination that can be dealt with only through equal opportunity legislation. In jurisdictions where equal pay and equal opportunity are dealt with under different Acts, by different enforcing authorities, it may be that the authority that first received the complaint will send the complainant, or refer the complaint, to the appropriate officials.

¹³⁹ In the following jurisdictions, complaints may be initiated only by the persons aggrieved: New Brunswick (equal pay and equal opportunity); Ontario (equal pay); Prince Edward Island (equal pay); the Yukon (equal opportunity); Newfoundland and the Northwest Territories (equal pay and equal opportunity).

¹⁴⁰ Title VII of the U.S. *Civil Rights Act*, 1964, as amended by the *Equal Employment Opportunity Act* of 1972, provides in section 706(g) that a court which finds that an employer has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice may, *inter alia*, "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of

employees, with or without back pay..., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." While not exactly similar to the suggestion made here, the U.S. provision provides a useful example of a means of tackling the real problem in employment discrimination: "Implicit in the principal of the Ontario law is the belief that when discriminatory attitudes are wiped out, structural forms of unfairness will be abolished by enlightened employers. But this belief is naive, resting on a fallacious assumption about the rationality of human conduct and human institutions. Discriminatory structures will endure until a concerted effort is made at exposing and abolishing them" (L.S. Bohnen, "Women Workers in Ontario: A Socio-Legal History," [1973] 31 *U. of T. Faculty of Law Review* 45, at p. 72).

¹⁴¹ Canada, Department of Labour, *Annual Report for Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1970*, p. 17. This report indicates an awareness of the value of affirmative action in the case of some minority workers and compares affirmative action favourably to case-by-case action under the *Fair Employment Practices Act*.

¹⁴² M. Bralove, "Costly Lawsuits Spur Companies to Step up Efforts to End Bias," *Wall Street Journal*, August 2, 1974.

¹⁴³ Government programs are still in an early stage. In Office of Equal Opportunities for Woman, Public Service of Canada, *The Employment of Women in the Public Service of Canada: Mandate for Change* (Ottawa, 1973, 1974) are outlined steps taken by the federal government through the end of 1973. Ontario's *Guidelines for Ministries and Crown Agencies of the Ontario Government on Affirmative Action for Women Employees* were first issued in September, 1974, and in June, 1974, *La Rapport du "Task Force" sur l'Égalité des Chances à la Fonction Publique* was accepted by the Ministry of the Public Service in Quebec for implementation. Provisions in provincial legislation permitting the establishment of affirmative action programs and "immunizing" them against charges of discrimination may be found at: *Fair Practices Ordinance*, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. F-2, s. 4; *The Human Rights Act*, S.M. 1974, c. 65, s. 9; *Ontario Human Rights Code*, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318, s. 6a., added by S.O. 1972, c. 119, s. 7; *Human Rights Act*, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11, s. 19; *Human Rights Act*, S.N.B. 1971, c. 8, s. 13.

¹⁴⁴ See section 11(2) of *The Individual's Rights Protection Act*, S.A. 1972, c. 2, as amended by S.A. 1973, c. 61, s. 9, which permits the making of regulations requiring that contracts designated in the regulations, entered into by the Crown in Right of Alberta, by a municipal corporation, school board, or hospital board shall contain such provisions as may be specified in the regulations for the purpose of securing compliance with sections 2 to 10 of the Act.

¹⁴⁵ Bill No. 16, the *Affirmative Action Plan Act*, 1975, was introduced by M.L.A. Rosemary Brown. It provides for a type of "contract compliance" affirmative action, requiring affirmative action plans from "every employer within the Province, who directly or indirectly receives government monies, including, but not limited to, every . . . government department, crown corporation, commission, board or agency and every hospital, university, college, vocational school or school board" (s. 3) and affecting as well government contracts for goods or services (s. 12(1)).

6

Opportunity for Choice: An Assessment

Gail C.A. Cook

In response to the challenge contained in the opening paragraph of this book, the evidence provided in the preceding chapters and the opportunity-for-choice criterion are combined here to form the author's assessment of the opportunity for choice for women in Canada. In making this evaluation, the chapter highlights the key patterns common to women's participation in the home, educational institutions, and the labour force; focuses on some of the current barriers to opportunity for choice; and outlines the key issues to be faced if opportunity for choice is to be extended in the future.

The Patterns

Interpretation of women's activities varies according to whether one examines current patterns or changes in patterns over time and whether one looks at the patterns of women in general or focuses on particular groups of women. These differences in perspective undoubtedly account for the coexistence of apparently contradictory interpretations of women's current activities and of what these activities will be in the future; they may also be a source of optimism in some quarters and pessimism in others concerning the prospects for women in Canadian society.

As is seen below, the analysis presented in the preceding chapters tells a story that is quite consistent across the domains of family, education, and the labour force, whether we are examining current patterns or changes in patterns and women generally or specific groups of women.

Current Patterns versus Changes in Patterns

One's impression of women's activity in all three areas differs dramatically according to whether one examines patterns for a single year (usually 1971) or changes in patterns over the last twenty or thirty years.

Looking first at decisions affecting the family, we see clearly the distinction between the current pattern and the changes in this pattern which reflect the decisions of a minority. While divorce rates have increased for couples with and without children, most marriages do

not end in divorce. While the incidence of one-parent families increased between 1961 and 1971, most families have two parents. While there is an increasing incidence of childlessness, most couples do not remain childless.

In educational institutions, we see that female enrolment rates in post-secondary educational institutions, particularly in universities, have increased more than male rates. Yet males still account for more than 60 percent of all university students. Similarly, although female enrolment in the fields of science, business, law, and medicine has increased over the last fifteen years, the total number of women students in these fields remains small. Women are still concentrated in traditional areas such as arts, education, and nursing.

There is a parallel to this situation in the labour force. While there have been dramatic increases in the number of women participating in the labour force and a moderate decline in occupational desegregation (as measured by broad occupational groupings), the 1971 picture is one of women still highly concentrated in traditional occupations.

The changes outlined indicate that some women and some families are adapting to new pressures and new opportunities. These changes in themselves, however, cannot be defined as good or bad. For some women the dissolution of a marriage represents a tragedy, while for others it reflects the exercise of an option made possible through their capacity to become economically independent. Similarly, the rise in labour force participation by women reflects the economic necessity for some to engage in fairly low-paid, dead-end, and dull jobs, while for others it is a real opportunity to explore their own abilities and interests outside the home.

Variations among Women

Evidence in all three major areas of women's participation in society supports a second observation: aggregate figures on women's activities hide very large variations in patterns among women. A snapshot picture of women's activities in 1971 reveals a fairly traditional pattern for most women, with quite different patterns within this overall picture. This does not necessarily mean that many women's aspirations and attitudes have not changed, but rather that the changes either have been resolved within the more traditional patterns or have not reached the point of breaking with established patterns sufficiently to show up in the statistics.

The analysis of fertility confirms the significant differences among women that are concealed by figures allegedly portraying the status of women at a point in time or the change in status over time. Observing the patterns of all women, one finds that women are still marrying at about the same rate as previously (allowing for changes in age structure), but the devotion to the full-time mother role has been diminishing owing to childlessness, reduction of the number of children, a

possible telescoping of the timespan between first and last births, and increasing involvement in the labour force. Yet, within this general pattern, women differ significantly from one another. For example, women who are the most likely to have the fewest children are those who marry late, who have relatively high levels of education, who live in urbanized areas, and who are immigrants or the children of immigrants. Some of these factors, such as immigrant status, might make women more likely to rethink their roles (including the familiar one of mother), while other factors are indicative of greater opportunities available to women outside the home. For whatever reason, it is women with these characteristics who contribute to the changing pattern of fertility, while the majority of women continue to follow the more traditional patterns.

Similarly, the full story of women's participation in educational institutions and the labour force can be told only after an examination of specific activities within each of these two major institutions. In short, some women have attained a great deal within both educational institutions and the labour force — most women have not. Enrolment rates by females (and males) vary systematically with such factors as education of parents, family income, and community size. Women with more highly educated parents, with higher family incomes, and from larger communities are more likely to achieve higher levels of education. Higher levels of education, in turn, make women more likely to participate in the labour force, while, in contrast, the higher the married woman's family income (exclusive of her own wage), the less likely she is to participate in the labour force. Combining the influence of education and family income, we can conclude that for women of a specified educational attainment, the higher the family income, the less likely they are to participate in the labour force.

The preceding discussion highlights the differences in patterns of participation among women. Educational and income levels consistently show up as important and systematic influences on these patterns, and their significance in explaining the quite different behaviour of groups of women points out quite graphically that opportunity for choice in Canada varies with factors in addition to sex or gender.

Attitudes

Although this book has concentrated primarily on what women and men do, a balanced appraisal of the evidence requires some attention to how they feel. The most tangible sources of attitudes are those Canadian Gallup polls containing responses to various questions probing respondents' views of the desirable role for women. Significantly, men and women vary minimally in their responses to most questions, indicating that, in general, no great battle of attitudes is being waged between women and men in Canada.¹ Women's attitudes are just as much a barrier to expanding opportunity for choice

as are men's attitudes. A fundamental reason that men tend to become the target of criticism by some women is that they happen to occupy the vast majority of positions of power where decisions affecting women are made.

In a society where women and men are socialized through the same traditions and institutions, it is not surprising that they should have similar attitudes. There is, however, evidence for 1971 that suggests a change may be taking place, leading to greater differences in the views of women and men. These differences centre primarily on perceptions of women's ability and their chances of success. For example, 63 percent of women and 53 percent of men "think women could run most businesses as well as men,"² while 71 percent of males and only 57 percent of females think that women in Canada "get as good a break as men."³ Men and women, however, are much more in agreement concerning whether a woman having the same ability as a man has as good a chance of becoming an executive of a company. Forty-two percent of men and 41 percent of women replied yes, while 50 percent of men and 53 percent of women replied no.

A combination of indirect sources as well as anecdotal evidence provides further tentative information on the attitudes and feelings of women in Canada. If, for example, we compare the responses of a sample of women to questions eliciting their views on the appropriate role of women with the actual behaviour of women in the population generally, it is clear that a substantial proportion of them must act in one way (for example, participate in the labour force if they have children) and yet disapprove of that action. For at least some of these women, then, there may be a conflict between their behaviour and the behaviour they regard as appropriate. Although some women may be able to resolve this apparent conflict with no difficulty, for other women it provides a formula for guilt.

A critical feature of the renewed interest in the role of women in the last few years is that uncertainty and guilt seem to be borne by many women who have made quite different decisions in life. Many mothers who work outside the home feel guilty that they are not spending full time in the home. At the same time, many women who do not participate in the labour force are questioning the extent to which they are contributing to society and to making the most of their own lives. Many women who would prefer not to have children feel a subtle but strong social sanction, causing them considerable discomfort. Meanwhile, many women who remain single beyond a socially respectable age are subject to the extremes of sympathy and envy for their position.

When these changes take place within a society that simultaneously questions and increasingly rejects many of its traditional social institutions, uncertainty and instability are enhanced. It is not surprising, therefore, that we have seen movements grow up that attempt to recapture desirable aspects of the past by trying to graft a nostal-

gic view of the historical role of women onto a different social and economic structure. The more difficult, long-lasting, and rewarding approach, in contrast, is to adapt existing institutions and create new ones that have the stability and the flexibility to provide opportunity for choice for both women and men in the future.

Consequences of Choice

The opportunity to make effective choices, and not the achievement of any particular pattern of outcome, has been the basis for our judgments of current patterns of participation presented in this book. The evidence presented suggests that an expansion of the choices available to women could lead to wider differentials between women and men in some of the usual measures of success in the labour force and to deterioration in some of the obvious measures of family stability.

Under our opportunity-for-choice criterion, a reduction in occupational segregation by reducing barriers to women in the labour force and the closing of earnings differentials based on factors not considered legitimate in differentiating among individuals would both be favoured. Yet, as was seen in Chapter 4, a decline in occupational segregation can be consistent with the widening of the earnings gap between women and men. A more equal occupational distribution could transfer women from clerical and teaching occupations, where the earnings differential is small, to primary and blue collar jobs, where the earnings gap is large. Desegregation within occupations would, of course, narrow the earnings gap. Another example of possible perverse results shows up in possible changes in unemployment rates resulting from changes in the distribution of women among occupations. If, for example, women had been distributed in the same way as men among occupations in 1971 and yet had retained their 1971 unemployment experience within each occupation, their unemployment rate would have been significantly higher.

The expansion of effective choices for women in the labour force may provide real alternatives for more women who are involved in unsatisfactory family relationships. As alternative economic support becomes more feasible, a greater incidence of marriage dissolution may result and, in addition, a growth in the number of one-parent families. Neither of these characteristics has been traditionally regarded as a measure of social success. Moreover, many families that do not reach the point of dissolution may still experience considerable family friction caused by the increase in effective choices and the philosophy generating these options. If the "rules of the game" that originally guided a marriage relationship are seriously questioned, a rocky transition into a new form of relationship may be expected in at least some families. Other families, however, will continue to respond to the new opportunities and pressures within a stable family relationship. The trend towards increased childlessness and smaller families (which is quite evident if we look at 1973 age-specific fertility rates),

women's pursuit of increased higher education, and increased participation by women in responsible positions in the labour force are all responses to current pressures and opportunities that can, in principle, be consistent with the continuation of strong family life.

Opportunity for Choice: Some Barriers

The opportunity-for-choice criterion encourages emphasis on the reasons for differences in patterns exhibited by men and women. Use of this criterion requires going beyond the description of the patterns to discuss the reasons for the differences, stressing different costs and benefits to men and women from choosing among the same set of alternatives.

Observers of women's position in society tend to emphasize quite different barriers to equal opportunity for choice. Interestingly enough, there is some tendency for social science observers in one discipline, whether it be sociology, psychology, or economics, to emphasize the importance of factors emanating from another discipline. Many sociologists and psychologists, for example, emphasize the importance of economic factors and of the capitalistic system in general in limiting opportunity for choice for women. At the same time, economists often seek refuge in social attitudes as the key contributor to patterns that they cannot fully explain.

Our view is that no single basic cause of unequal opportunity for choice can be isolated. Barriers to choice are varied, complicated, and interconnected. The discussion that follows highlights only a few of them.

Many married women have a more effective choice either to participate in the home alone or in the home and labour force simultaneously than do most married men, since social pressures against full-time "house-husbands" remain strong. Relieved of the necessity to earn income, these women have the additional option of pursuing their own interests on a more flexible basis inside and outside the home.

The cost of participation in family life and the labour force simultaneously, however, is greater for most women than for their husbands. Once these married women make the decision to participate in both spheres, they take on the problems of dual jobs. These include more total work hours than for their husbands as well as the social sanctions reflected in the Canadian Gallup polls, which are especially severe if women have children.

Turning to the labour force, we found earlier that certain characteristics such as age, marital status, and education are associated with commitment to the labour force and become important in explaining the patterns of earnings between females and males. For example, the earnings of younger, single, and educated females tend to compare more favourably with those of males with the same characteristics than do the earnings of older, non-single, and less-educated females with those of males with the same characteristics.

Marital status and education appear to provide an indication of what women's commitment to the labour force is likely to be. While marriage appears to be associated with lack of job commitment on the part of women, it is associated with commitment to the job by males.

We find that once the presence of children is accounted for, married women are no less likely to participate in the labour force than are single women. While having and raising children is an important and rewarding experience for many women and many men, the division of responsibilities is such that women are expected to spend more time than men in this activity.

Evidence on the effect of marital status and presence of children on labour force participation, combined with evidence on earnings, indicates that women are much more closely associated with family responsibilities than are men. More significantly, however, even if women do not choose this primary commitment to the family, they are often assumed to do so when decisions concerning their labour force status, on-the-job training, and remuneration are being made. It is this "assumption" that is used to "explain" why, in the labour force, many women are treated differently from men.

Other social patterns have the potential power to place women at a disadvantage in business and professional jobs in which an interchange of information is useful. A good deal of this type of communication takes place informally over a drink after work or en route to squash courts, activities that often do not include women or that women's home responsibilities tend to rule out.

As was pointed out in the previous chapter, there are situations in which the law, in general, does not currently treat the contributions of unpaid and paid labour in similar fashion and therefore does not treat women fairly as compared to men. The law can, however, be made to be effective in dealing equitably with the distribution of assets built up during a marriage and in reducing outright discrimination that results in women with the same qualifications as men being paid significantly less than men. A combination of the law and improved manpower policies could remove discrimination in access to training and in other developmental opportunities for women.

The law cannot, however, by itself alter that whole set of attitudinal and social assumptions and pressures that affect what girls and boys or women and men do in life. To deal effectively with these important influences on the lives of all of us will take time and change from a number of directions. Elimination of sex stereotyping in children's books and in their classrooms can alter the expectations and attitudes of succeeding generations. The presence of increasing numbers of women in responsible positions throughout society would then help to reinforce these new expectations and attitudes. Other possible options and outcomes are discussed in the section to follow.

Opportunity for Choice: The Future

Three fundamental questions must be posed in the context of a debate on the expansion of the range of effective choices for women in Canada. Do Canadians wish to expand the range of effective choices? If so, what range of methods are Canadians willing to use to achieve this goal? Finally, what are the implications of that increased choice, and how might they affect responses to the first question?

Options for the Future

Although there may be some Canadians who do not wish to expand the range of effective choices for women in Canada, our view is that the real debate is over the mechanisms to achieve this goal. The policy options available to governments range from doing nothing to alter the evolution of interrelationships between women and men in society to pursuing fairly rigidly defined interventions taking the form, for example, of quota systems to ensure a specified representation of women and men in the labour force. Neither extreme captures the spirit of this book. To ignore the inequities between treatment of men and women in Canadian society is unsupportable; to legislate too heavily in this area runs the risk of either being ineffective or reducing the choices for some men and women in a fashion unintended by the legislation.

Although our criterion of equal opportunity for choice is relevant for evaluating the options for women and men at any point in time, the future provides us with far more latitude in defining new situations and new responses by men and women within our society. Consequently, for the future we can concentrate on our goal: to expand the range of effective choices available for both women and men in Canadian society.

It is quite easy to specify this goal, but much more difficult to obtain any agreement on just how it can be achieved. The basic question is the extent to which Canadians as individuals and groups can adapt privately and experiment with new alternatives for both work and social interaction and how much governments must be relied upon to direct this change. More specifically, the question is the extent to which responsibility for change is to be borne at the individual or family level as opposed to the government level.

Many women have been bearing a greater proportion of the costs incurred to make family life function smoothly and have made their economic contribution in both the home and the labour force with less than their full rewards. Part of the response to this virtual assignment of tasks to women is the rebellion of some against the assumption that problems of accommodating family and outside life, whether it be in the labour force or community generally, are women's issues alone. As indicated earlier, part-time work and child care, when seen in the larger context, are clearly social issues. The problem, however, remains. The ultimate solution may be to redefine family roles, which

may require, in turn, a restructuring of working conditions in the labour market to accommodate this new division of responsibilities. Since the structure of work in the labour market is unlikely to undergo significant change in the near future, another route requiring minimal interference with family life (and, in particular, the husband's position) and with the labour force itself has been pursued. This allegedly easier and quicker avenue for change is to place the responsibility for expanding choices on governments. Consistent with this route, for example, is that spokeswomen or spokesmen for women call not only for public provision of day-care centres, but also for public subsidy of such facilities. Success in this approach would mean that men could continue to devote their time, in the same way as previously, between home and labour force, and the cost of child care to the family would be less through tax increases than through private purchase.

To date, there is little evidence that Canadian governments have viewed the problems of child care as a social concern rather than a family concern. At the same time, if left as a family concern, child care tends to be the mother's responsibility. As a result, a decision to avoid public subsidies and public involvement generally may, in effect, be a decision to leave the primary responsibility for child care with mothers. This will reduce the effective choices of some mothers relative to those of their husbands.

Economic Implications of Growth in the Female Labour Force

Decisions on general policy options will affect the rapidity with which choices are expanded and the nature of their implications. If governmental response is chosen, the nature of the policies implemented will provide incentives for women to make particular choices that will affect the size of the female labour force. Equal opportunity legislation, subsidization of day-care centres, and affirmative action programs, for example, will encourage increased participation of women in the labour force, while virtually all variants of salaries-for-housewives proposals provide a disincentive to women's participation in the labour force. The particular combination of policies favoured, and the vigour with which each is pursued, will be an important factor affecting the size of the female labour force.

It is precisely this impact of policy changes on the labour market that some critics use as an argument against measures to expand effective choices for women. In particular, they are fearful that unemployment levels will increase as a result of any such encouragement.

This fear can be addressed by examining both its appropriateness and the accuracy of its predictions. First, it is inappropriate to evaluate long-term policies in terms of possible short-term consequences, such as unemployment rates. The economy undergoes cycles: at some times unemployment rates are high and at other times

a shortage of labour exists. Long-term policy changes affect participation rates which span all phases of many cycles. To evaluate the economic efficacy of long-term proposals in terms of a possible short-term result that is characteristic of a particular phase of the cycle is misleading.

Second, we cannot assume that an increase in the female labour force will necessarily lead to an increase in unemployment rates. Even if that were true, however, a complete picture of the economic consequences of the increased female labour force must include an assessment of the positive influences on such economic indicators as gross national product and the general level of prices.

To provide some tangible support for a more balanced view of the implications of a larger female labour force, we present an experiment using a framework for examining the major interrelations among important economic indicators (econometric model).⁴ Since we cannot predict what encouragement future government policies will provide to female labour force participation, we arbitrarily choose rates of increase in the female labour force over the next few years. Using the econometric model, we can estimate the effect of these increased rates on unemployment rates, price levels, and Canada's international trade position simultaneously. The resulting numbers must be interpreted with care, as they reflect very closely the assumptions and conditions incorporated into the model. They are presented here not as a forecast of the future but rather as a means of focusing on the important interrelationships among the major economic variables.

Since the purpose of this exercise is to examine the implications of an increase in participation rates of women and not to predict these rates, we run a comparative experiment. Using the statistical model, the magnitudes of the major economic variables are projected over the next ten-year period. As indicated in Table 6.1, female participation rates are assumed to increase from 39.7 percent in 1975 to 50.1 percent in 1985. The results are identified as the control solution. The experiment involves computation of another solution by gradually increasing the female participation rate until it is 5 percentage points higher in 1985 than the female participation rate contained in the control solution. A year-by-year comparison of the two solutions identifies the impact of the increased female labour force participation rates on all major economic indicators in the economy.

The results in Table 6.2 do much to allay the fears of those concerned with the unemployment consequences of a growing labour force. The labour force increase of 3 to 3½ percent over the period expands gross national product by 2 percent to 2½ percent to absorb most of the additional workers. The overall unemployment rate increases by six-tenths of a percentage point by 1985. The level of detail provided, however, does not permit an indication of the extent to which the increase in unemployment is borne by men or women.

Table 6.1

Female Participation Rate Assumptions and Resulting Labour Force Estimates, Canada, 1976-85

Year	Female Participation Rate (percentages)		Labour Force (millions)	
	Experimental	Control	Experimental	Control
1976	41.7	40.3	10.364	10.251
1977	43.2	41.2	10.735	10.564
1978	44.6	42.3	11.089	10.880
1979	46.1	43.2	11.465	11.200
1980	47.6	44.3	11.826	11.521
1981	49.1	45.2	12.208	11.850
1982	50.5	46.4	12.558	12.185
1983	52.0	47.5	12.961	12.530
1984	53.5	48.7	13.343	12.878
1985	55.0	50.1	13.733	13.240

Source: Simulations using the University of Toronto's TRACE econometric model.

The increase in the labour force reduces both wages and prices below their otherwise expected levels, resulting in the reduction of the rate of inflation by between .2 percent and .3 percent per year. As a result of these combined effects, export sales are encouraged and imports discouraged, resulting in an improvement in Canada's current account balance by \$1 billion to \$2 billion per year.

The preceding results suggest that the Canadian economy has a high capacity to absorb additional labour. In fact, the additional five-percentage-point increase in female labour force participation rates was absorbed without assuming the expansionary fiscal and monetary policy characteristic of the late 1960s and early 1970s. For this and other technical reasons, the increases in the unemployment rate shown over the period may be overestimated. If, in addition, we note that the control solution itself assumed the female participation rate to rise by 11.4 percentage points between 1974 and 1985, we realize that the experimental solution contains in it an increase of 16.3 percentage points (from 38.7 percent to 55.0 percent) in the labour force participation rate of women over the same period. This constitutes a large increase in female participation rates and a real test of the Canadian economy's capacity to absorb additional workers. Not only does the Canadian economy appear capable of absorbing additional labour force participants, but it is clear from the above analysis that there are beneficial effects from doing so.

Table 6.2
Estimated Effect of Alternative Female Participation Rates on Selected Economic Variables, Canada, Selected Years, 1976-85

Variable	Alternative Solutions	Year			
		1976	1979	1982	1985
Employment (millions)	Experimental	9.602	10.736	11.821	12.979
	Control	9.547	10.568	11.541	12.599
	Difference	0.055	0.168	0.280	0.380
Unemployment rate (percent)	Experimental	7.352	6.362	6.093	5.491
	Control	6.863	5.646	5.283	4.839
	Difference	0.489	0.716	0.810	0.652
Real GNP (billion 1961 \$)	Experimental	86.297	103.268	121.054	140.986
	Control	85.912	102.058	118.820	137.566
	Difference	0.385	1.209	2.234	3.421
GNP price index (1961 = 1.000)	Experimental	2.108	2.503	2.931	3.445
	Control	2.109	2.517	2.977	3.540
	Difference	-0.002	-0.015	-0.046	-0.095
Average annual wage rate (thousand \$)	Experimental	5.992	7.440	9.163	11.381
	Control	6.006	7.546	9.476	12.031
	Difference	-0.014	-0.106	-0.313	-0.650
Balance of payments on current account (billion \$)	Experimental	-4.021	-4.662	-5.240	-7.001
	Control	-4.012	-4.855	-6.020	-8.834
	Difference	-0.008	0.194	0.780	1.833

Source: Simulations using the University of Toronto's TRACE econometric model.

Concern about increased female participation rates and the employment consequences may well be a concern of the past, as fears about Canada's future productivity performance become stronger. Increasingly, economists are predicting that the changing age structure of the population, combined with lower productivity performance, will lower the potential rate of growth in the 1980s.⁵ They are already beginning to look towards increased female participation rates as a means of counteracting the expected slowdown in the working-age population. In this context, policies such as training programs for women wishing to enter the labour force and provision of more and better day-care centres are being mentioned.

This brings the discussion full circle, from fears of the labour force consequences of policy measures such as improved day-care centres to fears of the economic future, requiring a larger female labour force and therefore policy measures that will encourage it.

In this context, it should be stated clearly that there is a greater issue here than juggling the size of the female labour force to meet specified economic objectives. What is at issue is the opportunity for women to choose a commitment to the labour force and to be treated in a fashion commensurate with that commitment. Consequently, if alterations must be made in the size of the labour force, they should not be made on the basis of a participant's sex. For example, the argument is often made that in times of recession, women should be laid off before men, because the former are allegedly economically dependent or secondary workers while the latter are supporters of families. This judgment implies that jobs should be allocated on the basis of financial responsibilities and capacity. If this were so, the heads of single-headed families with low income, even though they are women, should be given preference in the job market, while men with private incomes should be subject to the judgment that they do not hold jobs out of economic necessity. Such examples make it quite clear that judgments of economic need cannot be made on the basis of a person's sex. It is not clear, however, that financial need ever was, or ever should be, the basis of job allocation on any systematic basis for the entire labour market.

Receptivity to Change

The requirements for change can be documented, and the options for directing change can be outlined, but the important prerequisite for achieving change is the general receptivity of Canadians. Current economic and social conditions can have a profound influence on the direction and rapidity with which progress is made in expanding the range of effective choices for women and men. In a general environment of economic uncertainty, such as has characterized the Canadian economy in late 1975 and early 1976, it is not surprising to see priorities on social issues change. With government expenditures under fire, it is easy to call for cutbacks in social programs and even

to rationalize these when they not only do away with excesses of past programs but hit into the core of valuable programs for developing people and technical innovations capable of dealing with Canada's future problems.

In this context, the danger is that any momentum built up to deal effectively with social issues of particular interest to women will meet with little encouragement. Moreover, this general view may well be exacerbated by the view in some quarters that if women would only do what they were allegedly born to do — devote themselves entirely to family and home — then many of the current symptoms of social instability would be reduced.

The above is neither a judgment on the importance of the issues treated in this book nor a prediction of the priority that Canadians or Canadian governments will attach to these issues in the next few years. It merely provides a realistic context in which those interested in expanding the range of effective choices for women and men can assess their efforts and the likely payoffs.

Opportunity for Choice: Conclusions

We have viewed the study of women's pattern of participation in the home, educational institutions, and the labour force as part of a study of social cooperation between women and men in Canada. In this way women's issues become human or social issues, and attention is focused on the distribution of the benefits and costs of social cooperation between women and men in Canada.

Our criterion for evaluation of the evidence presented in the book focuses on equal opportunity for women and men in Canada. Such equal opportunity would exist if the costs and benefits of particular choices were unrelated to one's sex. This criterion recognizes that there are limits on the choices of all Canadians according to individual, family, and societal constraints and focuses attention on women's opportunity for choice as affected by the fact of being born female.

Looking to the future, efforts should be made to remove Canadian women and men from the filing boxes marked sex, marital status, and parenthood status, which carry with them automatic and unwarranted assumptions concerning the desires and responsibilities of the people contained within them. Such reform would constitute a significant step in achieving our goal of expanding the range of effective choices for both women and men in Canada.

Notes

¹ Monica Boyd, "Equality Between the Sexes: The Results of Canadian Gallup Polls, 1953-1973," revision of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association, August, 1974.

² *Ibid.*, Table 5.

³ *Ibid.*, Table 5.

⁴ Simulations were performed by Gregory V. Jump, using the University of Toronto's TRACE econometric model. Details of the model and the control projections are contained in *Canadian Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2, published jointly by the Institute for Policy Analysis and Data Resources Inc. in May, 1975.

⁵ Economic Council of Canada, *Twelfth Annual Review: Options for Growth* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1975), Chap. 3.

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